EditWhile Bulgaria tries to renegotiate its gas deal with Turkey, Ankara eyes even bigger projects
More than a decade after first considering a concession for the Black Sea Motorway, Turkey has now placed the project among its top strategic priorities in relations with Sofia
While Bulgaria continues to bear the heavy financial burden of its most controversial contract with Turkey, Ankara is already looking ahead to far larger infrastructure deals in the country.
More than a decade after the Bulgarian state first analysed the possibility of granting a concession for the Black Sea Motorway, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has now included the project among Ankara’s strategic priorities in bilateral relations with Sofia.
The controversial long-term contract between Bulgargaz and Turkey’s state-owned company BOTAŞ – strongly criticised by the opposition as unfavourable – has left Sofia accumulating daily liabilities exceeding €536,000 for reserved but unused capacity to import 1.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year.
Signed in 2023 for a 13-year period by a caretaker government appointed by then President Rumen Radev, the agreement quickly became one of the most contentious domestic political issues and was even referred to the Prosecutor’s Office. It can only be terminated if Bulgaria pays the full amount due for the entire period in a lump sum. Bulgargaz has stopped payments for months.
Pressure to renegotiate the deal has yielded no results. The current government of Prime Minister Rumen Radev now avoids the term “renegotiation” and prefers to speak of “upgrading” the agreement. Notably, some of the architects of the original deal are once again in executive power.
For Ankara, resolving the BOTAŞ dispute appears to be only part of a broader conversation about the future of bilateral relations. Turkey sees Bulgaria – not Greece – as the preferred vital transport corridor.
After announcing that President Erdoğan had ordered the BOTAŞ issue to be resolved as quickly as possible, Foreign Minister Fidan used his visit to Bulgaria to shift focus toward “much larger and more strategic projects”: the Black Sea Motorway, a possible new railway line, the expansion of the Kapitan Andreevo border crossing, and the construction of additional border checkpoints.
These projects confirm Ankara’s ambition to position itself as a key energy and transport corridor between Asia and Europe. The Black Sea Motorway would not only connect Istanbul with Varna, but would also link to major Black Sea ports such as Constanța and Odesa. It would create a corridor to Romania and Moldova, and from there to Ukraine – a country whose post-war reconstruction Turkish businesses are already preparing for.
Coordination with the European Commission?
A former deputy transport minister, speaking anonymously to EUalive, warned that choosing the concession model could significantly delay the project. “Coordination with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition will be required, because an intergovernmental memorandum with Turkey gives Turkish companies the right to participate in the future concession procedure,” the source explained.
Intergovernmental agreements are excluded from the scope of Bulgaria’s Concessions Act. This means Bulgaria must notify the European Commission of the concession terms, a process full of uncertainties that could substantially slow down the motorway project. If the concession contract includes state guarantees or compensation for the investor in case of low traffic, Brussels could intervene under state aid rules.
The intergovernmental memorandum was signed in February, during the final month of the regular government. At the time, Transport Minister Ivan Ivanov stated that Turkish companies had already expressed interest in building the Black Sea Motorway on a concession basis, as well as the Malko Tarnovo–Burgas and Varna–Durankulak sections.
“Congestion in the Bosporus and the expected growth in freight traffic are pushing Turkey to seek alternative routes to the northern Black Sea ports,” the former deputy minister noted.
Regional Development Minister Ivan Shishkov recently confirmed that “Turkey has the greatest interest in building” the motorway. “The countries around us have started wanting to build our infrastructure because this problem is becoming theirs as well,” he said.
According to official data, Bulgaria has only about 910 km of completed motorways, placing it among the EU countries with the least developed motorway network relative to its territory and population. Key projects such as Hemus, Ruse–Veliko Tarnovo, and the Black Sea Motorway have been discussed and partially built for decades. By comparison, Croatia – a country half Bulgaria’s size – has over 1,350 km of motorways.
The Ministry of Regional Development is preparing new motorway projects to be implemented through concessions. Minister Shishkov is optimistic that, with proper preparation, actual construction could begin in about 18 months.
The traps
The EUalive source believes it will be difficult to avoid state compensation mechanisms in any future Black Sea Motorway concession contract, since most traffic is concentrated in just four months of the year.
“In a public-private partnership, the state must act as a real partner. Of course, a formula can be included to prevent excessive profits, but without a risk-sharing mechanism, no private investor will take on the financing of a multi-billion-euro project alone.”
To avoid repeating the difficult situation with BOTAŞ, the source recommends placing Bulgargaz in formal insolvency (“real bankruptcy”). Its activities could then be taken over by Bulgartransgaz, giving the government greater flexibility in negotiations for the Black Sea Motorway concession.
Bulgaria already has bitter experience with motorway concessions. The ill-fated Trakia concession (2005–2007) became a symbol of non-transparent infrastructure deals. It was sharply criticised by the European Commission for lack of open tender and for shifting excessive risk onto the state. After years of scandals, the concession was terminated and the motorway completed with European funds.
After the BOTAŞ deal, Bulgaria can hardly afford another strategic contract whose risks only become clear after signing. The stakes surrounding the Black Sea Motorway go far beyond the missing 103 kilometres between Varna and Burgas. The real question is whether the Bulgarian authorities will manage to turn the country’s favourable geography into a national advantage – without once again paying a high price for someone else’s strategic interests.
Caption: Bulgaria’s highway network. The sections in red are under construction.
Updated: June 18, 2026 - 07:46
