EditVisegrad’s critical minerals challenge: can Central Europe move up Europe’s strategic supply chain?
Despite limited domestic resources, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are racing to secure a place in Europe’s critical raw materials strategy
As Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers of critical raw materials, the countries of the Visegrad Group are finding themselves at the centre of a strategic debate that will shape the future of the continent’s green and industrial transition.
Lithium, rare earth elements, cobalt and other critical minerals are essential for electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy technologies and defence production. Yet none of the four Visegrad countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, possesses significant documented deposits of rare earth elements.
That has not prevented them from becoming increasingly important to the European Union’s plans under the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), the flagship initiative designed to strengthen Europe’s supply security and reduce strategic dependencies.
The urgency of the issue has grown since China, which dominates global rare earth extraction and processing, tightened export controls on several critical materials and permanent magnets in 2025. The move exposed Europe’s continued vulnerability in sectors ranging from automotive manufacturing to wind energy.
For Central Europe, the challenge is determining whether the region can move beyond its traditional role as a manufacturing base and establish itself in the higher-value segments of emerging supply chains.
The four Visegrad countries have adopted markedly different approaches.
Hungary has focused on attracting investment. Over the past decade it has become one of Europe’s largest battery manufacturing hubs, drawing major Asian producers including CATL, Samsung, LG and SK On through subsidies and state support.
The strategy has delivered factories, jobs and production capacity. However, critics argue that much of the value creation remains outside the Hungarian economy. Foreign manufacturers largely operate within their own supply networks, limiting opportunities for domestic firms to integrate into strategic parts of the battery value chain.
At the same time, environmental controversies surrounding major projects have fuelled local opposition and raised questions about the long-term sustainability of the model.
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The Czech Republic has pursued a different path, centred on the development of the Cínovec lithium deposit, one of Europe’s most significant lithium projects. The European Commission has designated the project as strategic under the CRMA, and planned output could eventually support battery production for more than one million electric vehicles annually.
Yet mining is not expected to begin until around 2030, highlighting a broader challenge facing Europe’s raw materials ambitions. Even projects regarded as strategic continue to face lengthy permitting procedures and environmental assessments.
For Prague, the bigger question is what comes after extraction. Analysts warn that mining lithium alone will generate limited strategic benefits if battery production, processing and recycling take place elsewhere. The Czech Republic’s automotive sector is among the most important in Europe, making the development of downstream industries particularly important.
Slovakia faces similar concerns. Although geological surveys suggest the presence of lithium and antimony resources, Bratislava remains focused on mapping deposits and assessing potential secondary sources from historical mining sites.
The country’s larger concern is industrial positioning. Slovak experts argue that the domestic battery ecosystem lacks key components, particularly producers of active cathode materials, which occupy a crucial place in battery supply chains.
The exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of strategic projects approved under the CRMA has intensified concerns that the country could struggle to benefit fully from emerging European mechanisms unless it secures a stronger role in future investment plans.
Poland, meanwhile, is betting on an unconventional resource: mining waste.
Researchers increasingly view coal-bearing formations, spoil heaps and historical mining residues as potential sources of critical raw materials. Elements such as germanium, gallium, cobalt and certain rare earth elements can be found in mining by-products that were long treated as waste.
This approach reflects a broader shift in European thinking. As access to new mineral deposits becomes increasingly difficult, secondary resources and recycling are gaining importance within the EU’s raw materials strategy.
Warsaw has launched a national programme to identify and develop such resources, while plans for a rare-earth processing facility in Puławy could help strengthen Poland’s position in the European supply chain.
Despite their different approaches, all four countries face the same structural challenge.
The real competition is increasingly about processing, refining, recycling and advanced manufacturing – the stages where most value is created and where China continues to maintain a dominant position.
This reality also exposes a weakness in Europe’s broader strategy. While Brussels has introduced ambitious legislation and joint procurement mechanisms, implementation remains uncertain. A recent report by the European Court of Auditors warned that many CRMA objectives lack binding force and could be delayed by permitting procedures that often stretch for years.
The full article by EUalive partner focuseurope.pl – here.
Caption: Illustrative image. Top-down view of sand mining machinery and material piles in an open-pit quarry, showing industrial extraction activity in a raw materials production site./Pexels
Updated: June 23, 2026 - 15:31
