World order was not destroyed by the Venezuela episode – it was already dead

The U.S. operation in Venezuela and the detention of President Nicolás Maduro mark a turning point in how Washington under the new administration interprets international law, Hanna Shelest, director of security programmes at the Ukrainian Prism Foreign Policy Council, told EUalive’s partner European Pravda. Below is a brief overview of her comments.

The military operation has revived long-standing debates over humanitarian intervention, sovereignty and the “right of the strong”, raising fresh questions about the erosion of international legal constraints at a time when Europe is already struggling to uphold them amid Russia’s war against Ukraine. The development signals that the “right of the strong” has overtaken legal restraints that were long considered binding, which is a shift with far-reaching global repercussions.

The precedent is not entirely new. The United States has previously tested the limits of international law, from Kosovo to Iraq and Libya. Yet the Venezuelan operation stands out for both its method and justification, reviving unresolved debates about humanitarian intervention while simultaneously undermining them.

At the core of the controversy lies the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), actively debated in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The idea held that when a state commits grave human rights violations, the international community may intervene by force if the UN proves unable to act. Although discussed at the UN and partially embedded in NATO’s strategic thinking, R2P never became a clear legal norm and was gradually abandoned.

In Venezuela’s case, some of the traditional conditions associated with humanitarian intervention arguably existed. Many countries did not recognise the legitimacy of Maduro’s elections, and the regime has long been subject to sanctions for human rights abuses. However, Shelest argues that Washington has effectively dismantled any legal argument it might have used.

Denmark PM urges Trump to cease Greenland ‘threats’ following provocative interview

Maduro is not being prosecuted for systematic human rights violations, but for alleged narcotics-related crimes. The publicly known indictment does not address the regime’s long-standing repression. This choice, Shelest warns, mirrors a critical mistake made in Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s capture initially enjoyed broad support, but his later trial and execution transformed him, in the eyes of many Iraqis, from a criminal dictator into a martyr.

A similar risk now exists with Maduro. Had the U.S. focused on regime crimes and accountability under international justice mechanisms, broader regional support – including in Latin America, might have followed. Instead, accusations of “narcoterrorism” may provoke backlash and erode legitimacy.

The operation also raises unprecedented diplomatic concerns. The forcible seizure of a foreign leader deemed illegitimate by Washington breaks a long-standing taboo. For decades, even adversaries were guaranteed personal safety when travelling to the U.S. for UN General Assembly meetings. That assumption can no longer be taken for granted.

This development opens what Shelest describes as “Pandora’s box”. If the US can act this way on foreign soil – and publicly hint at repetition – uncertainty spreads across capitals worldwide. The question of “who might be next” now looms large, particularly given the unpredictability of the current administration.

Contrary to some fears, the Venezuelan operation is unlikely to embolden China to attack Taiwan. Beijing has never concealed its position on Taiwan and does not require new precedents to justify force. Russia, however, is a different case.

Moscow has long justified its actions by pointing to U.S. precedents, from Kosovo to Iraq. The events in Caracas provide Russia with fresh rhetorical ammunition. The Kremlin is almost certain to cite the Venezuelan operation to legitimise future actions, reinforcing a familiar narrative: if the U.S. can act this way, why can’t Russia?

At the same time, Maduro’s detention represents a serious blow to Moscow. Russia had positioned itself as a guarantor of Maduro’s security, supplying air defence systems and private security personnel. None of this proved effective. This failure follows Russia’s inability to protect Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, where it managed only to evacuate Assad to Moscow.

As a result, other authoritarian leaders relying on Russian protection may begin to reassess its value. While this will not trigger an immediate geopolitical realignment, Russia has lost a key asset: credibility as a security guarantor for regimes and their leaders.

In Europe, reactions have been muted. Many governments are choosing pragmatism over moral clarity, reluctant to antagonise Washington amid sensitive negotiations on Ukraine. For European leaders, maintaining channels with the U.S. currently outweighs the need to condemn events in Venezuela.

The broader conclusion, Shelest argues, is sobering. The world order was not destroyed by the Venezuela episode – it had already ceased to function. The rules-based system has been eroding for years, and the US operation merely exposes that reality.

The Venezuelan raid also has a strong domestic dimension. In the U.S., drug trafficking is a central political issue, and the operation allows the administration to frame its actions as protecting American citizens. This narrative is likely to feature prominently in the run-up to the 2026 midterm elections.

Venezuela, not Europe or NATO allies, appears to be the terrain on which this new doctrine of power will be tested – with consequences that will have repercussions far beyond Latin America.

Transatlantic loyalty vs. sovereignty concerns: Western Balkans split over Trump’s Venezuela strike

The full article in Ukrainian can be found here.

Caption: Protesters hold a banner with the words ‘In defence of peace! No to the US aggresion against Venezuela’ as they demonstrate during the ‘End US military aggression against Venezuela’ protest organised by the Portuguese Council for Peace and Cooperation (CPPC) in Lisbon, Portugal, 05 January 2026. EPA/ANTONIO PEDRO SANTOS