Who controls the past controls the present: Eastern Europe confronts the ghosts of the Red Army

Preserving Soviet monuments across the former Iron Curtain is not merely a matter of historical piety. In the shadow of Russia’s war against Ukraine, these statues, obelisks and military cemeteries have become active instruments in a struggle over memory. They anchor a narrative in which the Red Army appears solely as a liberating force, while any challenge to that version is branded as Russophobia or the falsification of history.

According to Romania’s National Office for the Cult of Heroes, the country still hosts 180 monuments dedicated to the Red Army in 145 localities, alongside 233 Soviet military cemeteries. Their legal status is governed by a 2003 law, a 2005 bilateral agreement with Russia, and the Geneva Conventions. Similar arrangements exist across Central Europe. The common thread is troubling: while Russia wages a war of aggression, it continues to deploy the dead of 1944–45 as a diplomatic shield and a tool of pressure in the very countries it once occupied.

Poland: systematic dismantling

Poland has taken the most assertive approach. A 2016 decommunisation law prohibiting the promotion of totalitarian systems through public names and monuments gained real force only after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Local authorities were empowered to remove “monuments of gratitude” to the Red Army; where they hesitated, regional prefects could intervene. Cemeteries and monuments listed as historical heritage were generally protected.

The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) compiled a list of roughly 60 sites for demolition or relocation. Coordinated removals followed in several towns in autumn 2022. Russia reacted with fury, accusing Poland of desecrating graves and falsifying the victory over fascism. Moscow opened criminal cases against Polish officials and placed politicians from Poland and the Baltic states on wanted lists.

The most sensitive site remains the Mausoleum of Soviet Soldiers in Warsaw. Every year the Russian ambassador lays wreaths there on 9 May. Since 2022 these ceremonies have been met with protests – sometimes violent. In 2022 the ambassador was doused with red paint; blood and bones were scattered on the steps. In 2026 the embassy still framed the event as an expression of “grateful memory” while denouncing “Russophobia” and the destruction of memorials.

Slovakia: embracing the Kremlin narrative

Slovakia presents a stark contrast. Hundreds of larger and smaller Second World War monuments continue to provide year-round opportunities for Russian soft-power activity. The most visible local vehicle is the motorcycle club “Brat za brata” (“Brother for Brother”), closely linked to the Russian Night Wolves.

Since 2015 the group has staged annual “Rides of Freedom,” visiting military cemeteries while displaying Soviet and Russian flags. It is heavily promoted on the Russian embassy’s social-media channels – the most active of any Russian diplomatic mission in the EU. Its leader, Matúš Alexa, has met the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service and received an official award from Vladimir Putin, delivered by the Russian ambassador, for preserving the memory of the Soviet Army’s “decisive role.”

After Robert Fico returned to power at the end of 2023, the Slovak state itself began aligning with this agenda. Government officials now regularly attend commemorations and invite Russian diplomats. The new ambassador, Sergei Andreev, arrived in late 2025 with a reputation for influence operations; Slovakia accepted the nomination without reservation.

Hungary: restoration with Russian money

Hungary has chosen restoration. Under a 1996 bilateral agreement and a 1997 law, military graves and monuments are to be maintained. In practice, Russian funding has flowed more freely since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Monuments have been renovated or newly unveiled in Csákberény (2023), Gödöllő (2023), Nagybajom (with Gazprom support, 2023) and Gánt (2024). Dozens of burial sites have been restored in recent years, often with Russian diplomats present.

These events have provoked domestic protests – black plastic sheeting draped over statues, Ukrainian and EU flags raised – but official policy has remained accommodating.

Romania: legal protection and administrative inertia

Romania occupies a middle ground of relative inaction. The dense network of monuments and cemeteries – especially numerous in Suceava, Iași, Mureș, Arad, Timiș and Cluj counties – remains largely untouched. The Soviet Soldier monument once standing in central Bucharest was moved after 1989 to the Pipera cemetery, where the Russian ambassador still marks Victory Day. Occasional local initiatives, such as a 2025 proposal in Sighișoara to add contextual information panels, have been cautious and limited.

A battle still being fought

Across the four countries the pattern is clear. Poland confronts the Soviet memorial landscape directly. Slovakia and Hungary accommodate or actively promote the Russian narrative. Romania remains constrained by legal obligations and administrative inertia. Meanwhile Moscow continues to treat the physical remains of its wartime dead as living assets in a hybrid campaign – one that seeks to lock the history of 1944–45 into a single, politically useful story and to punish any state that dares to revise it.

In the fifth year of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the ghosts of the Red Army are not merely historical. They are instruments of present-day power.

The original article in Romanian by EUalive’s partner PressOne can be found here.

Caption: Manifestations of the “Immortal regiment” in Slovakia in the run up to the 9 May Victory Day celebrations in 2026. [Facebook account of the Russian ambassador in Slovakia]