Weaponising history: Israel recognises the Armenian genocide – but not the Ukrainian Holodomor

Israel’s stance rests on two pillars: zealous defence of the “absolute uniqueness of the Shoah (Holocaust)” and pragmatic dealings with the Kremlin, writes Ihor Semyvolos.

Ihor Semyvolos is Executive Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies

On Monday Israel’s government, at the initiative of Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, unanimously adopted a resolution officially recognising the Armenian Genocide of 1915. This move is a textbook example of how historical memory is weaponised in great-power geopolitics.

The decision breaks with decades of Israeli realpolitik, which kept the Armenian tragedy in the “diplomatic taboo” drawer to avoid damaging relations with Turkey. Today, a declared moral imperative masks a cold, hard calculation whose ripple effects will reshape the wider region.

Israel itself is the primary beneficiary. The move delivers an asymmetric blow to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Since Hamas’s attack on 7 October 2023, Erdoğan has crossed every red line in Tel Aviv’s eyes with his anti-Israel rhetoric. With bridges already burned, Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet has decided to raise the stakes, demonstrating internal unity and punishing Ankara for its regional stance.

Turkey’s reaction is predictable: it could range from a full diplomatic rupture to strong protests and appeals to Washington. A complete break is unlikely. Given the recent warming of U.S.-Turkish ties, Turkey’s role in any Ukraine settlement, and Donald Trump’s business interests, Ankara will probably turn to the White House – especially ahead of a NATO summit. How successful that appeal will be is another matter. Transactional US politics remains unchanged; Trump is likely to bargain hard with both sides, weighing Israeli security needs against Turkish demands for arms supplies.

This great-power bargaining significantly alters the calculus for South Caucasus states.

Official Baku has issued a formal diplomatic protest in solidarity with Turkey, but it operates in a new regional reality. Azerbaijan’s strategic dependence on Israeli defence technology against Iran has eased following the U.S.-Iran memorandum and the pragmatic reset with Masoud Pezeshkian’s government (including agreements on the North-South transit corridor). With more room to manoeuvre, Baku will avoid rash moves but will use its oil leverage and new geopolitical balances – together with Turkish lobbyists – to water down and delay final passage of the resolution in the Knesset.

The most paradoxical position belongs to Armenia itself. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has consistently pursued the doctrine of a “Real Armenia,” based on a difficult but necessary reconciliation with Turkey, border opening, and escape from long-term isolation. For this, Yerevan has even been willing to dismantle old historical narratives domestically.

A sudden “pass” from Israel is the last thing Pashinyan needs right now. It fuels nationalist hysteria in Turkey, derails fragile negotiations, and hands Armenia’s revanchist opposition a cast-iron argument to accuse him of weakness compared with decisive Tel Aviv.

Moreover, Armenia cannot loudly thank Israel without risking its critical logistical window to the world through Iran.

A separate major dimension of this debate is Israel’s long-standing refusal to recognise the Holodomor of 1932–1933 in Ukraine as genocide. The Knesset has maintained a firm defence on this issue for years. The topic is too large to confine to Middle Eastern conflicts; it highlights fundamental differences in Israel’s philosophy of memory. Israel’s stance rests on two pillars: zealous defence of the “absolute uniqueness of the Shoah (Holocaust)” and pragmatic dealings with the Kremlin.

As long as Israel thinks in terms of immediate tactical threats, the historical tragedies of other nations – whether Armenian or Ukrainian – will continue to be viewed in Tel Aviv’s offices not through the lens of universal morality, but as assets or risks on the current chessboard.

The opinion article in Ukrainian published with EUalive’s partner European Pravda can be found here.

Caption: Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar attends a joint press conference with the Czech foreign minister following their meeting at the Czernin Palace in Prague, Czech Republic, 20 May 2026. EPA/MARTIN DIVISEK