Ukrainian expert on the Iran war: the world will never be the same after two historic conflicts

The world will not be the same after the war in Iran – just as it was forever altered after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. One month into the U.S.-Israeli military operation that began with the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on 28 February 2026, the Middle East is undergoing a profound reconfiguration.

In an interview with EUalive’s partner Suspilne, Ihor Semivolos, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies and a researcher at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine’s Institute of Oriental Studies, offered a clear-eyed Ukrainian perspective on the conflict’s unexpected prolongation, its limited boost to Russia’s war economy, and the new openings it creates for Kyiv in the Gulf.

Semivolos noted that even before the first strikes, signs pointed to an inevitable confrontation. The original American strategy had focused on economic pressure: collapsing Iran’s banking system to create payment crises that would leave soldiers and officers unpaid. Calculations suggested rank-and-file troops might begin losing loyalty after about 60 days without salaries, with mid-level officers reaching a breaking point around 90 days. This could have triggered serious instability by April or May. Instead, the decision was made for immediate kinetic action, driven in part by an expiring ultimatum on Iran’s nuclear programme and supportive IAEA assessments.

The assumption was that eliminating Khamenei – the central figure holding the regime together since 1989 – would cause rapid collapse. It did not. Iran had been preparing since the short 2025 war, building internal safeguards against strategic decapitation. Initial chaos gave way within days to a system that proved more resilient than expected. Without a solid Plan B, the U.S. and Israel now appear to be scrambling for allies and even discussing ground operations that were never fully planned.

Public sentiment in Iran added another layer of complexity. Large-scale protests in December and January 2025–2026 had been the most significant since the 1979 Revolution, with many Iranians openly celebrating news of Khamenei’s death. Yet once the bombs began falling, fear of explosions, Basij militias, IRGC repression, and martial law quickly overshadowed discontent. Non-violent resistance became nearly impossible under such conditions. As Semivolos observed, the regime will either survive and grow even more repressive, or it will require sustained military pressure to force meaningful defections – a scenario that was never central to the initial planning.

The prolongation of the conflict has raised questions about decision-making in Washington. Donald Trump, who campaigned on ending endless wars and prioritising “America First,” found himself drawn deeper into the fray. Israeli pressure played a significant role, according to multiple reports, with expectations of a swift popular uprising that failed to materialise. Trump’s inner circle, relying on a narrow group of advisers rather than broad institutional expertise, appears to have underestimated Iran’s preparedness – including its long-standing contingencies for closing the Strait of Hormuz or striking Gulf targets. Political timing also mattered: neither the U.S. nor Israel wanted a drawn-out war heading into key election cycles.

On the economic front, the conflict has produced a speculative spike in global oil prices, delivering a short-term windfall to Russia through higher export revenues. However, Semivolos emphasised that a war lasting roughly one month will not rescue Moscow’s strained 2026 budget or reverse its underlying economic stagnation. Once the Strait of Hormuz stabilises and alternative supply routes – potentially including revived pipelines through Syria – become operational, prices are likely to moderate. Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure could further limit Moscow’s ability to capitalise on the surge. In short, this is no strategic black swan for the Kremlin; it is a temporary and insufficient reprieve.

Russia’s ties with Iran remain complex and ambivalent. While the two cooperate in forums such as BRICS and the SCO, and Iran has supplied Shahed drones and training used against Ukraine, historical mistrust runs deep. Iranians recall centuries of Russian and Soviet territorial encroachments. In Syria, Tehran bore the brunt of ground fighting while Moscow sought to play multiple sides for maximum political gain. In the current conflict, Russian support has been limited – some intelligence sharing, electronic warfare assistance, and modifications to Shahed drones drawing on Ukrainian battlefield experience – but Moscow lacks real leverage over the outcome. Its broader position in the Middle East has been eroding since at least 2024.

For Ukraine, the war is creating tangible strategic opportunities amid the regional upheaval. Gulf monarchies, long accustomed to purchasing American security guarantees to counter revolutionary Iran, are now reassessing their reliance on Washington. Some view U.S. demands for substantial “protection payments” as bordering on extortion, prompting them to explore alternative providers and internal security arrangements.

This shift plays to Ukraine’s strengths. President Zelenskyy and Ukrainian officials have actively offered Kyiv’s hard-earned expertise in countering Iranian-designed Shahed drones, including advanced anti-drone systems developed under Russian attack. Gulf markets have traditionally been dominated by American suppliers, yet Ukraine is gaining legitimate entry through demonstrated capability and genuine solidarity: Ukrainians who have endured years of drone terror are now positioning themselves as credible partners in defence. Pre-existing investments by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Ukrainian missile technology provide an additional foundation. What began as offers of help is translating into political goodwill, potential contracts, and a role for Ukraine as a recognised security contributor in the emerging architecture.

Semivolos concluded that the Middle East emerging from this conflict will look markedly different – much like Europe after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Old assumptions about U.S.-centric security guarantees are fraying, while new alignments and partnerships are forming. For Ukraine, the moment presents both risks and historic openings: to diversify its international ties, demonstrate value as a security provider beyond the European theatre, and constrain Russia’s financial lifelines. How effectively Kyiv capitalises on these developments could influence not only the course of its own war but its longer-term place in a rapidly changing global order.

The original full-size interview with Ihor Semivolos can be found here.

Caption: Ihor Smivolos, Suspilne.