EditUkraine’s emerging security quartet: building Europe’s defence beyond the EU
Zelenskyy champions a flexible alliance with the UK, Turkey, and Norway to deliver maritime control, air defense, and superior land power
Ukraine is increasingly signalling a shift in how it sees Europe’s future security architecture, arguing that the European Union alone will not be sufficient to guarantee stability if U.S. engagement continues to recede.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently stated that closer coordination with non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom, Turkey, Norway and Ukraine itself would be essential to ensuring Europe’s security autonomy. Speaking on the British podcast “The Rest is Politics”, Zelenskyy said that this group of four could collectively provide control over maritime space, secure air defence and the largest land-based military capacity on the continent.
According to Zelenskyy, Europe would struggle to match Russia militarily without the combined weight of Ukraine and Turkey. When paired with the United Kingdom and Norway, however, the aggregate capability would significantly exceed that of Moscow. He reiterated the same argument in a domestic interview on 21 April, describing the four countries as both a potential reinforcement for the EU and a strong standalone alignment.
These statements reflect more than rhetorical positioning. They form part of a broader strategic narrative promoted by Kyiv, which is increasingly exploring flexible security formats beyond the EU’s institutional framework.
The timing is notable. On 14 April, Ukraine and Norway signed a declaration on defence partnership, underscoring the growing depth of bilateral cooperation. This development comes amid wider geopolitical shifts, including the war in the Middle East, debates about a possible U.S. withdrawal from NATO, unresolved tensions surrounding Greenland, and the broader foreign policy direction of U.S. President Donald Trump.
Against this backdrop, each of the four countries identified by Kyiv plays a distinct role. Norway, in particular, illustrates how bilateral cooperation is evolving into a more structured and strategic partnership.
At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Norway moved quickly to support Ukraine, reflecting its own proximity to Russia and direct exposure to security risks in the High North. Early assistance focused on portable air defence systems, anti-tank weapons, ammunition of both Soviet and NATO calibres, as well as non-lethal support such as equipment, communications and protective gear.
In parallel, Norway contributed to multinational training missions for Ukrainian forces. This initial phase was characterised by rapid decisions aimed at stabilising the frontline.
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By 2024, Norwegian assistance had become more systematic. Priorities shifted towards strengthening air defence, including the supply of NASAMS systems, as well as unmanned systems, counter-drone capabilities, maritime security and intelligence. Integration into NATO-linked logistics and training frameworks also gained importance. By early 2025, Norway’s total military assistance had reached approximately €1.8 billion.
A central mechanism underpinning this support has been the Nansen Programme for Ukraine, a long-term framework established in 2022 and named after Nobel laureate Fridtjof Nansen. While the programme has undergone several adjustments and funding increases, it has also faced criticism over the scale of contributions relative to Norway’s energy revenues.
The period between 2025 and 2026 marks a qualitative shift. Norway has moved from short-term aid packages towards a strategic approach aligned with a prolonged war of attrition. Additional funding decisions include 50 billion Norwegian kroner (€2.65 billion) in 2025 and a further 70 billion kroner (€3.7 billion) in 2026. Total support is expected to exceed €19.4 billion by the end of 2026, alongside additional allocations for energy and budgetary assistance.
This trajectory reflects a recognition of the nature of the conflict, with emphasis on ammunition, air defence and the long-term resilience of Ukraine’s armed forces.
The partnership is also anchored politically. In 2024, Ukraine and Norway signed a bilateral security agreement linking Ukraine’s security directly to that of Europe and identifying Russian aggression as a systemic threat. The agreement embeds support for Ukraine within Norway’s strategic policy, including budget planning, defence cooperation and coordination within NATO.
This framework goes beyond immediate assistance, focusing on the development of interoperable and sustainable Ukrainian defence capabilities and their integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system. It also includes coordination on sanctions and accountability measures against Russia.
For Norway, this strategy is shaped less by abstract solidarity and more by geography and security realities. As a key NATO member on the Alliance’s northern flank and a major energy supplier to Europe, Norway faces direct exposure to Russian military activity near its borders and territorial waters.
The Arctic and the North Atlantic remain areas of direct strategic competition. This includes control over maritime routes, resource access and the positioning of Russian strategic forces.
The Svalbard archipelago illustrates these dynamics. While under Norwegian sovereignty, it operates under a unique international legal framework established by the 1920 treaty, granting Russia rights to economic activity and visa-free access. Moscow maintains a presence there, including subsidised coal mining operations, in part to preserve a strategic foothold in a demilitarised zone within NATO’s broader sphere.
At the same time, Svalbard provides a vantage point for monitoring key maritime areas, including the Barents, Norwegian and Greenland seas, through which Russian forces from the Kola Peninsula access the Atlantic. Control and observation of these routes are central to northern security.
Within this context, Norway does not view Ukraine as a separate theatre. A resilient Ukraine effectively ties down significant Russian resources, limiting Moscow’s ability to project power in other regions, including the Arctic. For Oslo, this is a matter of national security rather than political alignment.
On a practical level, cooperation between Ukraine and Norway has expanded beyond arms deliveries. It includes training, operational exchange and the adaptation of military systems. Norwegian training has covered a range of Ukrainian personnel, from unit commanders to operators of advanced air defence systems.
Combat use of NASAMS in Ukraine has demonstrated effectiveness in more complex scenarios than originally anticipated, influencing how the system is assessed and potentially deployed by Norway itself.
Unmanned systems represent another growing area of cooperation. An agreement signed in late 2025 provides for the production of drones in Norway, integrating battlefield experience into technological development.
Coordination between military leadership structures has also intensified, including interaction at the level of general staffs and direct engagement between senior commanders.
More broadly, a shared geostrategic interest has emerged between Ukraine and Norway, reflected in long-term funding decisions, joint initiatives and institutionalised security arrangements. This process is reciprocal: Norway supports Ukraine while simultaneously adapting its own defence posture based on lessons from the war.
In this light, the idea of a broader security format involving Ukraine, Norway, the United Kingdom and Turkey appears less theoretical. Elements of such cooperation are already in place, and the Norwegian case demonstrates how they are beginning to take shape in practice.
The original article in Ukrainian by EUalive’s partner European Pravda can be found here. Its author Maksym Pleshko is a political scientist, candidate of philosophical sciences.
Caption: Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store (L) welcomes Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the government’s representative residence in Oslo, Norway, 14 April 2026. Ukrainian President Zelensky arrived to Oslo to meet with Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store. EPA/CORNELIUS POPPE
Updated: April 27, 2026 - 18:01
