EditU.S. military analyst on Ukraine: “I’m now more worried about air defence than the front line”
Michael Kofman, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the leading U.S. analysts of the Russia-Ukraine war, provided insight
Michael Kofman has spent years studying the Russian military and the war in Ukraine. He visits the country regularly, including front-line areas, and returns every few months to assess conditions on the ground. In late February to mid-March 2026 he travelled from Kharkiv to Zaporizhzhia. His latest assessment, shared in an extensive interview with EUalive’s partner Suspilne, is sobering yet measured: Ukraine enters 2026 in a stronger position than many expected, but the coming year will test its air defences far more than its ground lines.
Main impressions from his latest trip, evidence of changes in Ukrainian tactics or morale
Kofman keeps his comments general to protect operational details, but his overall picture is clear. Winter usually brings a pause in Russian momentum. By late autumn 2025, Russian units were exhausted and focused on replenishing infantry. Ukraine used that window effectively. On the Zaporizhzhia axis, where Russian forces had advanced but failed to consolidate, Ukrainian assault regiments and air-assault brigades launched local counterattacks. These operations demonstrated the maturing of drone-supported assault tactics that Ukrainian forces have refined over the past six months.
One of the most important developments Kofman observed is the evolving “kill zone” – the battle for drone dominance. Throughout 2025 Ukraine first held a clear advantage in unmanned systems, only to see Russia close the gap and, in some sectors, pull ahead in numbers and certain types of drones. By early 2026, however, Ukrainian units have once again expanded their strike range. Long-range strikes – 100 to 150 kilometres deep – are now hitting Russian concentrations more effectively. For months there had been a glaring gap: Ukraine possessed long-range drones for strategic infrastructure targets inside Russia and short-range tactical systems, but medium-range capability was weak. That gap is narrowing.
Yet the winter also highlighted a different kind of vulnerability. Russian forces launched approximately 6,500 kamikaze drones in March alone and dramatically increased ballistic-missile strikes, which are far harder to intercept. The pressure shifted from the front lines to civilian infrastructure and energy systems. “After what I saw this winter,” Kofman says, “I am now more worried about air defence than the front line.”
Russia has resumed offensive operations as spring weather improves. Should faster advances be expected?
Kofman expects the pattern seen in previous years to repeat, but with diminishing returns for the attacker. Early March still sees heavy mechanized assaults that usually fail. By late April, Russian forces shift to infantry infiltration and light motorized raids, taking advantage of new foliage (“zelenka” in Ukrainian military slang) for cover. Progress remains uneven and slow, varying sharply by sector depending on how well Ukrainian defences are organized.
The front itself is not a continuous line but a vast, porous grey zone with gaps. Ukrainian drone units have received significant resources, yet manpower shortages mean infantry cannot hold every position. Ukrainian brigades often act as “fire brigades,” rushing to plug breakthroughs. This dynamic is likely to persist through 2026.At the same time, Russia’s own problems are mounting. The human and material costs of 2025 operations have been high relative to mobilization gains. Sustaining offensive tempo will become increasingly difficult.
Moscow has declared the capture of all of Donetsk Oblast as its main goal for 2026. Is that realistic?
Kofman notes that this objective has been on Russia’s list for years. In practice, however, Russian forces advance wherever they can. Significant territorial gains in 2025 actually occurred in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions – precisely where Ukrainian attention was focused on defending Donetsk. The pattern illustrates a broader challenge: Ukraine’s finite resources force difficult choices about where to concentrate forces.
The most pressing concern: air and missile defence
Kofman’s deepest worry centres on Ukraine’s air-defence and missile-defence systems (PPO and PRO). Russia continues to produce ballistic missiles and improve their employment. Ukraine’s ability to intercept them depends heavily – in fact, almost entirely – on U.S. and Western supplies.
“Let’s be honest: if you look at the current war with Iran and how many interceptor missiles we and our allies have spent in a short time, it doesn’t add optimism about the amount of aid to Ukraine this year,” Kofman states. “And this problem will only grow. Especially if we assume that the war will last for the next year or two. And we have no reason to think otherwise. It is logical to consider this as the base scenario. So for me this is an area of particular concern.”
He points out that even with funding, Western production of interceptor missiles is not expanding rapidly enough in the near term. Ukraine will have to find ways to operate under persistent scarcity.
Balanced view: Ukrainian strengths and strategic gains
Kofman is careful not to paint a purely negative picture. Ukraine concluded 2025 better than many forecasts predicted. Its front lines have not collapsed despite intense pressure. Ukrainian forces have also shown growing effectiveness in striking Russian oil logistics, reducing Moscow’s oil revenues – a genuinely offensive element of Ukrainian strategy.
He highlights improvements in organization, the expanding drone kill zone, and the resilience of Ukrainian society and military after enduring one of the hardest winters of the war.
Outlook for 2026
The coming months will be tougher. Spring and summer traditionally bring intensified fighting. Russian advances will remain incremental and costly, but the cumulative strain on Ukrainian manpower and the growing demands on air defence could become decisive if not addressed.
Kofman’s message is neither alarmist nor complacent. Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable adaptability. Yet the asymmetry in resources – especially in missiles and manpower – means difficult trade-offs lie ahead. The war’s trajectory will depend on whether Kyiv can maintain drone superiority, manage its limited infantry effectively, and find creative solutions to the missile-defence shortfall.
Western partners, particularly the United States, will face their own choices about sustaining aid amid competing global demands. For Ukraine, the sky above its cities and front lines may prove as critical as the ground beneath its soldiers’ feet.
The original interview – a much longer text in Ukrainian – by our partner Supilne can be found here.
Caption: Michael Coffman, military analyst, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (USA). [Center for Strategic and International Studies]
Updated: April 17, 2026 - 09:43
