EditU.S. invites EU to stop importing Russian gas in the next 6 to 12 months
The EU Commissioner acknowledged the appeal but cautioned against haste, to prevent "price spikes or supply shortages"
In a bold assertion amid escalating transatlantic pressure on Moscow, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright declared on 12 September that the European Union could sever its remaining ties to Russian natural gas within six to 12 months by pivoting to American liquefied natural gas (LNG).
Speaking in Brussels after a meeting with EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen, Wright emphasized that the U.S. has conveyed this feasibility to EU officials, urging a compression of the bloc’s current timeline – which targets a full phase-out of Russian oil and gas imports by January 2028.
“I think this could easily be done within 12 months, maybe within six months,” Wright told Reuters, adding that accelerating the process would intensify economic leverage against Russia’s war funding in Ukraine.
This intervention underscores a deepening U.S.-EU energy alliance, forged in the fires of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. has positioned itself as Europe’s indispensable LNG supplier, providing 55% of the bloc’s LNG imports so far in 2025, up from negligible shares pre-invasion.
Yet, as Wright pushes for haste, the proposal invites scrutiny: How much Russian gas does the EU still consume, and can U.S. LNG realistically fill the void without triggering shortages or price shocks?
Current Russian gas consumption: a shrinking but sticky dependency
The EU’s reliance on Russian gas has plummeted since 2022, when it supplied 45% of imports, but it lingers as a critical revenue stream for Moscow – estimated at €21.9 billion in the third year of the war alone.
In 2024, Russian gas accounted for less than 19% of total EU imports (pipeline and LNG combined), with pipeline flows dropping to about 11% and LNG hitting a record 17.5–17.8 million tonnes (roughly 24–25 billion cubic meters, or bcm).
For 2025, projections indicate further erosion: pipeline imports could halve to 10.5 bcm, while LNG holds steady at around 21 bcm, totalling approximately 31.5 bcm from Russia.
Against this, the EU’s overall natural gas consumption has contracted sharply amid efficiency drives and mild winters, stabilizing at 332 bcm in 2024 after an 18% drop from 2019–2021 averages.
Estimates for 2025 peg total demand at 320–330 bcm, reflecting a further 3–5% decline driven by renewables’ rise (now 47% of the power mix) and REPowerEU’s 15.6% reduction target for April 2024–March 2025.
Thus, Russian volumes represent about 9–10% of EU needs today—manageable on paper, but concentrated in holdout nations like Hungary and Slovakia, which oppose faster bans due to infrastructure lock-in.
The EU’s LNG pledge: a $750-billion bet on U.S. supply
Wright’s optimism hinges on the EU’s July 2025 trade pact with the U.S., committing to $750 billion in energy purchases by 2028 – including LNG, oil, and nuclear fuel – to avert tariffs and cement alliance ties.
This equates to $250 billion annually, with LNG as the linchpin to replace ~25 million tonnes (33 bcm) of Russian gas annually by 2028.
The U.S., already exporting 14.2 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d, or ~130 bcm/year) in 2025, will ramp to 16.4 Bcf/d (150 bcm) in 2026.
North American capacity overall could double to 24.4 Bcf/d by 2028, with U.S. projects contributing 9.7 Bcf/d.
Feasibility: achievable in volume, risky in execution
Technically, yes – the U.S. could absorb the EU’s Russian gas displacement, as its 2025–2026 exports already exceed Europe’s total LNG needs (~120 bcm/year).
The EU imported 45.1 bcm from the U.S. in 2024, and with flexible contracts, it could redirect 30–40 bcm more within months via spot markets, especially as Asian demand moderates.
Jørgensen acknowledged the appeal but cautioned against haste, citing the 2028 plan’s design to prevent “price spikes or supply shortages.”
Politically, the push aligns with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for swifter sanctions, but analysts warn of overcommitment: declining EU demand (projected 25% import drop by 2030) risks oversupply and stranded assets, clashing with decarbonization goals.
Wright’s retort – “The faster we phase out, the sooner you put pressure on Russia” – carries weight, as gas revenues fund 40% of Moscow’s war machine.
Yet, feasibility turns on winter weather, regasification capacity (EU terminals are near-maxed at 200 bcm/year), and avoiding a 2022-style crisis.
With Reuters, edited by g.g.
Caption: Dan Jørgensen, European Commissioner for Energy and Housing, receives Chris Wright, US Secretary for Energy, 11 September 2025, © European Union
Updated: September 12, 2025 - 14:51
