Turkish intercontinental missiles for Germany?

The defence trade climate between Germany and Turkey has improved markedly, writes Günter Seufert.

Günter Seufert is the former Founding Director of the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. He wrote this op-ed in personal capacity.

“Where there’s no fire, there’s no smoke,” goes a Turkish proverb – suggesting that rumours tend to carry a kernel of truth. The saying appears apt in light of a report published by Die Welt on 26 May under the sensational headline: “The Remarkable Secret Plans for a Missile Deal with Erdoğan.” According to the article, Berlin is “actively working” on acquiring Turkey’s intercontinental missile Yildirimhan, with a range of 6,000 kilometers, as well as the “hypersonic long-range missile Tayfun Block-4.” A possible deal, it claims, could be announced as early as July at the NATO summit in Ankara.

In reality, these claims are unfounded. The Yildirimhan ballistic missile exists only as a mock-up and has not yet undergone testing. Moreover, there is currently no political appetite in Germany for deploying intercontinental missiles. Berlin continues to rely, at least in part, on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, while also viewing the nuclear capabilities of the United Kingdom and France as complementary guarantees.

The Turkish hypersonic missile Tayfun-4 presents a more plausible – though still premature – case. In theory, it could serve as a substitute for U.S.-made medium-range Tomahawk cruise missiles. The deployment of Tomahawks had been agreed upon by Joe Biden and Olaf Scholz without consultation of the Bundestag, but the delivery was later canceled by Donald Trump, likely due to depleted U.S. stockpiles following extensive use in the war against Iran. Nevertheless, despite having undergone several tests, the Tayfun-4 has not yet entered serial production – a basic prerequisite for any serious procurement negotiations.

While the Welt report clearly overstates the situation, it does point to a broader and more significant trend: Berlin’s growing openness to defense-industrial cooperation with Turkey. This shift was evident at the SAHA 2026 defense exhibition held in Istanbul in May, where German firms were represented for the first time in years and in large numbers. With 69 exhibitors, Germany led all European participants, surpassed only by China and the United States. Notably, German staff officers also attended the event, marking a renewed level of engagement.

According to Defence Network, while German procurement of Turkish missile systems remains unlikely, other forms of cooperation are under discussion. These include the potential purchase of 155 mm artillery ammunition and unmanned naval systems. Turkey has been producing maritime drones for several years and has demonstrated their effectiveness in Mediterranean exercises.

More broadly, the defense trade climate between Germany and Turkey has improved markedly. During the 2010s, Germany effectively maintained an informal arms embargo on Turkey, with exports at times falling below €10 million per year. This was driven by concerns over human rights violations and Turkish military invasions in northern Syria. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics – including Russia’s war in Ukraine, the unpredictability of U.S. policy under Donald Trump, and growing uncertainty about NATO’s future – have fundamentally reshaped priorities.

Under Germany’s current government, which marked its first year in office in May, Turkey has become – after Norway – the second-largest recipient of German arms export approvals, totalling €725 million. The Eurofighter program accounts for the largest share of this figure.

This shift also reflects a broader political reorientation. During Angela Merkel’s 16-year tenure, Germany – alongside France and Austria – was among the most consistent opponents of Turkish EU membership. Today, however, Turkey’s democratic and rule-of-law standards diverge more sharply than ever from EU norms. Yet in May 2026, CDU Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul nonetheless stated: “If Turkey seeks to move closer to the European Union, it will find Germany to be a friendly and reliable partner.”

Domestic attitudes within Germany have also evolved. Arms production, once regarded as economically secondary and morally contentious, has gained new legitimacy. In late 2024, the previous government adopted a defense industrial strategy explicitly aimed at strengthening key military technologies.

Viewed through this lens, Turkey is increasingly seen not as a liability but as a potential model. A Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung headline from 13 May – “What NATO Can Learn from Turkey” – captures this shift. The accompanying report on SAHA 2026 highlights several key developments: Turkey’s transformation from arms importer to exporter, a fortyfold increase in defense exports since 2002, and the rise of ASELSAN – valued at $30 billion – as the leading force on the Turkish stock market.

These achievements are rooted in deliberate state strategy: targeted industrial policy, sustained government procurement, export promotion, centralized decision-making, close coordination between public and private sectors, and strong linkages between academia, research institutions, and industry. Haluk Bayraktar, the drone manufacturer behind the SAHA exhibition, has announced plans to invest revenues into technical education centres. Across all 81 provinces, “drone parks” are to be established to train young people in building, testing, and operating unmanned systems.

Notably, some limitations of Turkish defense products receive less attention in mainstream coverage. According to Defence Network, German officers at the exhibition – while impressed – expressed reservations. Across the board, Turkish systems are not yet as advanced as often portrayed. Critical data on missile performance – such as range, payload, maneuverability, and resistance to air defense systems – remain unclear. Even in the drone sector, Turkey’s flagship domain, Ukraine has recently outpaced Ankara through rapid innovation cycles.

Nonetheless, Turkey remains a highly competitive player in terms of cost-effectiveness. This helps explain why Foreign Minister Wadephul has argued that Turkey should be “taken into account” in the development of EU defense and industrial policy. Ankara shares this interest, though its strategic objectives differ. While the EU seeks to build an integrated defense industry to enhance collective strategic autonomy, Turkey aims for full independence. As the deputy head of Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries has stated, the goal is “a completely independent defense industry.” Haluk Bayraktar has similarly warned against the risks of “digital servitude” and “techno-feudalism” – terms he uses to describe the vulnerabilities inherent in external dependence.

Caption: Turkish aerospace giants TUSAS and Baykar are both working on their own 6TH-GEN fighter designs, with first mock ups/prototypes expected to be unveiled to the public next year. [@TurkishCentury on X]