EditTrump’s “War Department” and the unravelling of American alliances
The irony is striking: even as Trump courts a Nobel Peace Prize, he has rechristened the Department of Defence as the Department of War
On 5 September President Donald Trump signed an executive order renaming the Pentagon the Department of War. Legally, the order required congressional approval and carried no operational implications for the military chain of command. Yet its symbolism was profound, writes Ilian Vassilev.
Ilian Vassilev is a former Bulgarian ambassador to Moscow, now a media publisher and commentator. His website Alternativata is a content partner of EUalive.
From symbol to strategy
For the first time since the National Security Act of 1947, the United States abandoned the language of “defence” for “war.”
The White House framed the change as embodying “peace through strength.” However, for many in Washington and abroad, it marked a rupture with the principles of collective security and restraint that underpinned the U.S.-led postwar order. The renaming crystallised a broader shift in American foreign policy during Trump’s second term: a retreat from alliances, an embrace of unilateral coercion, and an erosion of trust among partners. Strategists and historians now face a critical question: does this represent a temporary deviation or the definitive unraveling of the postwar order?
From defence to war: undoing 1947
Words carry weight. The Department of War was the cornerstone of U.S. military power until 1947, when the Truman administration established the Department of Defence. That shift was more than semantic; it reflected America’s commitment to collective defence through NATO, ANZUS, bilateral Asian pacts, and the UN Charter’s prohibition on aggressive war.
By reviving “War,” Trump evoked an earlier, more isolationist and transactional America, when neutrality acts and domestic politics kept the nation aloof from global responsibilities. Allies saw the move as more than rebranding; it signalled a pivot away from collective defence toward a doctrine of coercive unilateralism.
Since 1945, U.S. leaders from Truman to Reagan defined American credibility by the reliability of its commitments. Trump’s renaming suggests a reversal: foreign policy as transactional bargaining rather than enduring partnership.
Transactionalism comes of age
This shift did not begin in 2025. Trump’s first term already revealed his tendency to treat alliances as commercial deals rather than strategic assets. He castigated NATO members as “free riders,” threatened troop withdrawals from South Korea and Japan, and imposed tariffs on Canada and the EU.
In his second term, this approach solidified into doctrine. South Korea faced pressure to channel billions into U.S. funds for tariff relief. Europe was compelled to buy American LNG and weapons while facing 15–50 percent tariffs on exports. Mexico endured threats of unilateral military strikes, and Canada was mocked over Arctic sovereignty.
The cumulative effect is clear: U.S. commitments have become bargaining chips. What once distinguished Washington from Moscow or Beijing—the predictability of its alliance leadership—has eroded.
Ukraine: a test of credibility
Nowhere is this more evident than in Ukraine. After Russia’s 2022 invasion, the Biden administration led NATO in its strongest display of unity since the Cold War, providing Ukraine with tens of billions in aid and welcoming Finland and Sweden into the alliance.
Trump reversed course. He suspended U.S. military assistance, belittled President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and floated territorial concessions to Moscow. Vice President J.D. Vance went further, dismissing Ukraine as “irrelevant” to U.S. interests.
For Kyiv, the impact was devastating. A March 2025 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey found 73 percent of Ukrainians viewed Trump’s presidency as detrimental to their country’s survival, up from 21 percent in late 2024.
For Europe, the lesson was stark: U.S. support could vanish overnight. The EU scrambled to launch joint defence initiatives and pledge more air defences, but it remains overstretched. Ukraine now symbolizes a fractured West, not a transatlantic division of labor.
Asia: losing India, empowering China
The Indo-Pacific was meant to be the cornerstone of 21st-century U.S. foreign policy. Successive administrations strengthened the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia) to counter China. Yet Trump’s second-term policies have strained this framework. Tariffs on Indian exports, justified by Delhi’s continued purchase of Russian oil, coincided with public disputes over Trump’s exaggerated claims of brokering “peace” between India and Pakistan.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi declined to endorse Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, relations soured further. The result has been a cooling of U.S.-India ties. Delhi has edged closer to Moscow and Beijing within BRICS, with Indian officials describing U.S. reliability as “conditional at best.” The strategic fallout is profound: by alienating India, Trump has undermined Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and bolstered Beijing’s efforts to build an anti-American bloc.
The cost of eroded trust
From Seoul to Berlin, Ottawa to Delhi, allies now view Washington less as a dependable guarantor and more as an unpredictable hegemon. Trust – long America’s greatest strategic asset – has frayed.
This erosion manifests in procurement and planning. Europe is investing in missile and drone programs independent of the U.S. Asian partners are diversifying trade. Middle Eastern states are hedging toward China and Russia.
The result is not a formal rupture but a gradual hollowing-out: U.S. military dominance without the political cohesion that gave alliances weight.
Europe’s hesitant autonomy
Ironically, Trump has accelerated Europe’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy.” Initiatives once dismissed as bureaucratic – PESCO projects, the European Defence Fund – now carry urgency. Bilateral arms programs with Ukraine and Franco-German missile projects signal an emerging European defence identity.
Yet autonomy remains fragile. Fragmentation among EU members, tight budgets, and reliance on U.S. technology constrain progress. Still, leaders in Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw increasingly discuss preparing for a post-American Europe. Trump may have triggered the very outcome he derides: a Europe less willing to buy U.S. weapons or support U.S. global ambitions.
Domestic war, global retreat
The renaming of the Department of Defence to the Department of War may be remembered as a footnote—or a turning point. If the erosion of alliances persists, historians may mark 5 September, 2025, as the day America symbolically abandoned the order it built after 1945, awaiting a new Pearl Harbor.
The broader verdict hinges on what follows. If future administrations restore U.S. credibility, this period may be seen as a temporary aberration. But if allies continue to hedge, rivals consolidate gains, and the U.S. remains consumed by internal battles, Trump’s war will not be merely semantic. It will be the war America waged against its own legacy of leadership.
The verdict of history
Trump’s defenders argue he has stripped away comforting illusions, forcing allies to shoulder greater burdens and exposing the transactional nature of global politics. Critics counter that he has squandered America’s most valuable strategic asset: the trust and goodwill of its partners.
Whether the Pentagon’s renaming is remembered as a historical footnote or a genuine turning point depends on what follows.
The irony is striking: even as Trump courts a Nobel Peace Prize, he has rechristened the Department of Defence as the Department of War. If allies continue to hedge, rivals consolidate gains, and America remains mired in domestic battles, 5 September 2025, will be remembered not as a symbolic act but as the day Washington began to abandon the order it created after 1945.
The original version of this article can be found here.
Caption: US President Donald Trump (L), speaks to the media while signing executive orders including the re-naming of the Department of Defense to the Department of War as U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (C), and Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine (R,) look on during a press availability in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, USA, 5 September 2025. EPA/FRANCIS CHUNG / / POOL
Updated: September 9, 2025 - 08:34
