EditTrump’s Abraham Accords gamble: pie in the sky or grand master plan?
With Gaza still burning and Riyadh demanding a Palestinian roadmap, the whole vision risks looking more like optimistic deal-making than realistic geopolitics
U.S. President Donald Trump has reopened one of the Middle East’s most sensitive geopolitical questions by reportedly urging several Muslim-majority countries to join the Abraham Accords as part of a broader regional understanding linked to negotiations with Iran. The Abraham Accords are the U.S.-brokered normalisation agreements launched in 2020 between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
According to reports by Axios, Trump raised the issue directly during calls with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan, arguing that expanded participation in the Abraham Accords could become part of a wider geopolitical framework tied to a future agreement with Tehran.
Reuters separately reported that Pakistan rejected the proposal, while the other states involved have so far avoided public commitments.
The initiative reflects a broader shift in how Washington increasingly views the Abraham Accords. What began in 2020 as a diplomatic normalisation process between Israel and several Arab states is now evolving into something much larger: a connected political, economic and logistical architecture stretching from the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean and potentially South Asia.
At the centre of that vision is the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, a project designed to connect India with Europe through Gulf ports, rail infrastructure, energy links and digital connectivity.
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In that context, Arab-Israeli normalisation is no longer viewed solely through a diplomatic or security lens. It is increasingly tied to trade corridors, supply chains, investment flows, transport infrastructure and data connectivity.
Yet the regional environment has changed dramatically since the original Abraham Accords were signed in Washington in September 2020 by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
The Gaza war has significantly complicated the political environment surrounding any future normalisation process, particularly for Saudi Arabia.
Before October 2023, many analysts believed Riyadh could eventually move toward establishing relations with Israel even without major progress on the Palestinian issue. That calculation has shifted substantially since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has invested heavily in presenting Saudi Arabia both as a modernising regional power and as a leading actor in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Open normalisation with Israel while the Gaza issue remains unresolved carries considerable political and reputational risks for Riyadh domestically and across the broader region.
Saudi Arabia has long maintained that it will not formally recognise Israel without a credible roadmap toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.
The issue carries particular symbolic importance because of the kingdom’s role as custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, a position tied closely to both the legitimacy of the Saudi royal family and the wider Sunni Muslim world.
Qatar faces a different set of calculations.
Doha hosts a major U.S. military base and maintains communication channels with Israel when necessary. At the same time, part of Qatar’s regional influence derives from its ability to speak with actors many other states avoid, including Hamas and Iran.
Full participation in the Abraham Accords could complicate that balancing role.
Turkey and Egypt would also face significant political sensitivities.
Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has maintained trade and intelligence links with Israel despite increasingly harsh rhetoric over Gaza, formally joining the Abraham Accords would represent a major political shift for Ankara.
Egypt already has diplomatic relations with Israel through the Camp David framework, but Cairo may remain cautious about joining a U.S.-led structure that increasingly appears designed not only to counter Iran, but also to reshape regional trade routes around American strategic priorities.
Despite those obstacles, the geopolitical implications of even partial success would be significant, especially if Saudi Arabia moved toward normalisation.
A Saudi-Israeli breakthrough would likely trigger one of the most important economic and strategic realignments in the Middle East in decades. Investment flows, defence cooperation, logistics integration, technology partnerships and energy coordination could accelerate rapidly across the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean.
If Qatar later joined, alongside wider participation from Turkey or Egypt, IMEC itself could gain substantial momentum, transforming from a strategic concept into a more credible commercial corridor linking India, the Gulf, Israel and Europe.
Countries such as Cyprus, Greece and the United Arab Emirates would likely position themselves to benefit from expanded shipping, finance, energy and digital connectivity linked to the corridor.
At the same time, a rapid push for normalisation without visible progress on the Palestinian issue risks deepening public anger across the Arab world and strengthening more hardline regional actors.
Critics of the Abraham Accords have long argued that the framework focused too heavily on strategic alignment against Iran while leaving unresolved political realities in the background.
Trump nevertheless appears convinced that transactional diplomacy can still reshape the regional order.
The diplomatic push coincided with renewed military tensions involving Iran.
The United States confirmed new strikes against southern Iran targeting missile sites and vessels allegedly attempting to deploy mines. United States Central Command said the strikes were carried out in self-defence to protect American troops during the ongoing ceasefire period.
Iranian state media reported explosions in the Bandar Abbas area, although it remained unclear whether the incidents occurred on land or at sea.
The strikes came while Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf was visiting Qatar alongside Iran’s foreign minister and central bank governor to discuss the release of Iranian assets frozen during the early implementation phase of a possible memorandum of understanding with Washington.
Trump made clear that he views the Iran negotiations and Abraham Accords expansion as interconnected processes.
Writing on Truth Social, he said any future agreement with Tehran would either be “great” and “meaningful” or there would be “no deal at all”. He also publicly called on additional Muslim-majority states to join the Abraham Accords, describing the initiative as part of an “unprecedented global coalition”.
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Sources: EUalive’s partners LevantIntel and Focus Europe Italy
Caption: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks on the phone inside a vehicle as he returns to the White House in Washington, DC, USA, 25 May 2025. EPA/AARON SCHWARTZ / POOL
Updated: May 27, 2026 - 05:27

