Thessaloniki: An emerging hub of the Hungarian-Serbian strategic axis?

The Greek port city of Thessaloniki is quietly transforming into a significant node within the expanding network of cooperation between the regimes of Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Aleksandar Vučić in Serbia, according to an analysis by EUalive’s partner, BGNES.

Far from being a routine diplomatic adjustment, this development reflects a deliberate effort to forge deeper regional influence along an axis stretching from Central Europe through the Balkans to the Aegean Sea. The recent establishment of a Hungarian consular office in the Greek city exemplifies how traditional diplomacy is evolving into a mechanism for political coordination among like-minded governments.

A symbol of deepening political coordination

Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djurić and Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó jointly inaugurated on 26 January the Hungarian consular office in Thessaloniki. Officially described as a practical step to assist the rising number of Hungarian tourists visiting northern Greece – particularly during the peak summer season from April to October, the office operates within the premises of Serbia’s Consulate General. This co-location arrangement is far more than logistical convenience; it serves as a visible emblem of the tight alignment between Budapest and Belgrade.

Djurić emphasized during the ceremony that in an era of growing global uncertainty, trust has become one of the rarest commodities in international relations. He highlighted the strong bilateral ties built over the past 15 years, including the historic reconciliation agreement signed in 2013. Today, Hungarian-Serbian cooperation spans multiple domains, with energy security standing out as particularly vital.

A key recent development is the agreement allowing Hungary’s MOL to acquire the Russian stake in Serbia’s oil company NIS, previously held by Gazprom Neft. Valued at up to around 1 billion euros for the 56.16% majority share, this transaction – pending final approvals including from the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control, aims to shield Serbia from the effects of American sanctions on the Russian-linked entity, while ensuring long-term energy stability and predictable fuel prices for Serbian consumers.

The move underscores how the two countries leverage economic partnerships to reinforce political solidarity.

This shared diplomatic footprint in Thessaloniki mirrors similar arrangements elsewhere. In Edirne, Turkey, the consulates of North Macedonia and Serbia already operate from the same building, extending the collaborative logic seen in initiatives like the “Open Balkans.” Such models illustrate a pattern: regimes that prioritize centralized authority and pragmatic maneuvering among Brussels, Moscow, and Beijing are constructing parallel structures of mutual support outside conventional EU frameworks.

Infrastructure as geopolitical leverage

The consular opening coincides with accelerated progress on major infrastructure projects that bind Hungary, Serbia, and North Macedonia more closely together. Chief among these is the Belgrade-Budapest high-speed railway, part of Pan-European Corridor 10.

Hungarian Minister of Construction and Transport János Lázár confirmed late last year that the Hungarian section would become operational on 20 February, with freight services starting shortly thereafter and passenger trains following in mid-March. Trains on the Hungarian portion are designed to reach speeds of up to 160 kilometers per hour, significantly reducing travel time between the two capitals. While Chinese financing and participation have driven much of the project, though specific loan terms, including interest rates and repayment conditions, remain classified under Hungarian law for a decade. the line has also benefited from a substantial loan of nearly 800 billion forints (approximately 2.1 billion euros) from the European Investment Bank to support broader Hungarian rail upgrades.

Corridor 10 is evolving beyond a mere transport link into a strategic corridor that channels investment, trade, and influence toward an alternative regional alignment. In contrast, Corridor 8 – the vital NATO-oriented route connecting the Black Sea to the Adriatic via Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Albania, has faced persistent delays. This 1,220–1,350 km corridor, encompassing railways, roads, ports, and airports, promises direct links from Italian ports like Bari and Brindisi through Durrës and Vlorë in Albania to Skopje and onward to Bulgarian cities such as Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, and Varna. Yet decades after its initial conception, progress remains slow due to a mix of logistical hurdles, funding disputes, and geopolitical choices.

The Sofia-Skopje railway segment highlights these challenges. Despite a 2017 memorandum committing to completion by 2027, the line—whose origins trace back over 150 years—has seen limited advancement. A short section operated briefly in the mid-20th century before closing in 1994 due to deterioration. In 2024, North Macedonia redirected EU and EBRD funds originally earmarked for Corridor 8 toward modernizing segments aligned with Corridor 10, prompting frustration in Sofia. Bulgaria responded by postponing upgrades on its side until March 2025 amid disagreements over tunnel agreements. More recently, however, positive steps emerged in late 2025, including a bilateral agreement signed in November for the design, construction, and operation of a cross-border railway tunnel at Deve Bair/Gyueshevo, alongside ongoing EU-supported electrification and construction on North Macedonian sections.

The divergence between the two corridors is not accidental. While Corridor 10 advances with Chinese backing and strong Hungarian-Serbian commitment, Corridor 8’s stagnation redirects regional flows toward a bloc characterized by authoritarian governance tendencies and reliance on non-Western partners.

The Hungarian consular presence in Thessaloniki thus forms one piece of a larger strategy: blending diplomatic symbolism, infrastructure connectivity, and external financing to reshape Balkan geopolitics around the priorities of the Orbán and Vučić governments, with China and Russia playing influential supporting roles.

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Caption: On 26 January Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djurić and Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Péter Szijjártó jointly inaugurated a Hungarian consular office in Thessaloniki. The new facility is situated within the building of the Serbian Consulate General in the northern Greek city. (BGNES)