The price of bad justice: how Bulgaria keeps paying for systemic flaws

The Bulgarian state spends hundreds of millions of euros every year on its judiciary. Judges, prosecutors and investigators are among the best-paid public officials in the country, while judicial spending has grown steadily over the past decade and is projected to approach €800 million annually in the coming years.

Yet alongside this growing investment runs a less visible financial stream: compensation paid by taxpayers for unlawful prosecutions, wrongful detention, excessively lengthy proceedings, violations of property rights and other failures of the justice system.

Measured through the State and Municipal Liability for Damages Act (SMRDA), the domestic compensation mechanism for delayed proceedings and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the cost of poor justice in Bulgaria amounts to millions of euros every year.

Those payments reveal more than isolated mistakes. They offer a glimpse into recurring structural problems that continue to generate both financial losses and public distrust.

The question is no longer whether judicial failures cost money. The question is whether the Bulgarian state is learning from them.

The evidence points toward structural inertia rather than active reform. The Prosecutor’s Office’s internal response to SMRDA liabilities typically centers on seeking legislative changes to shield the institution from financial responsibility, rather than improving the quality of its investigations. In consecutive annual reports, the prosecution has argued for amendments that would limit its liability to cases involving proven, flagrant violations of the law. The 2025 report restated this position: “Under the current legislative framework, the prosecution is condemned under the SMRDA in a multitude of cases despite the fact that its organs acted exclusively in fulfillment of their statutory powers and in strict accordance with the provisions of procedural law.” While the 2024 report noted the need for a comprehensive five-year analytical review of SMRDA case law to identify recurring errors, no such study was ever made public. By 2025, the institution’s formal goals had shifted to general statements about “continuing targeted efforts to limit the prerequisites that justify the condemnation of the prosecution.”

A growing bill for failed prosecutions

One of the clearest indicators of problems within the criminal justice system is the number of successful claims brought against the prosecution service.

Under Bulgaria’s State and Municipal Liability for Damages Act, citizens can seek compensation when they have been unlawfully accused, unlawfully detained, convicted and later acquitted, or otherwise harmed by the actions of investigative authorities, prosecutors or courts.

The mechanism is intended to restore justice after state institutions have caused harm. At the same time, it provides a measurable indicator of how often criminal proceedings collapse when subjected to judicial scrutiny.

Recent figures suggest that the financial consequences are becoming increasingly significant.

According to the prosecution service’s latest annual report, 444 final judgments under the SMRDA entered into force against the institution in 2025. This represented a dramatic increase from 287 in 2024 and 281 in 2023.

The number of successful claimants rose from 292 in 2023 and 291 in 2024 to 453 in 2025. Compensation awarded reached €3.43 million. This compares with BGN €1.75 million in 2024 and €1.44 million in 2023.

The trend is unmistakable. Within just two years, compensation payments more than doubled.

Yet even these figures understate the true financial burden.

The prosecution’s annual reports do not include legal costs and interest payments, although these are ultimately borne by taxpayers as well.

Information obtained under Bulgaria’s Access to Public Information Act shows that those additional expenses are substantial. In 2025 alone, the prosecution paid €378,000 in legal costs and €1.52 million in interest. The previous year, legal costs reached €259,000, while interest payments amounted to €1.14 million. In 2023, taxpayers covered €250,000 in legal costs and €1.05 million in interest.

Taken together, compensation, interest and legal costs arising from unlawful prosecutorial actions reached approximately €5.33 million in 2025. That means Bulgarian taxpayers paid around €14,593 every day for prosecutorial actions later found by courts to have caused unlawful harm.

Such figures raise uncomfortable questions about efficiency, accountability and institutional learning.

Why the numbers matter

Compensation claims are often dismissed as unfortunate but unavoidable side effects of criminal justice.

The statistics suggest otherwise. The prosecution service lost 69.1% of all completed SMRDA cases in 2025. In other words, nearly seven out of every ten lawsuits concluded against it resulted in liability. At the same time, 58% of all claims involved sums exceeding €12,800.

The overwhelming majority of successful cases concern unlawful accusations that ultimately ended in acquittals.

Others involve excessive detention, violations of the right to a trial within a reasonable time, and, more rarely, unlawful use of special surveillance measures.

These are not technical irregularities. They are cases in which courts concluded that citizens suffered real harm because the justice system failed to function properly.

Moreover, compensation is only the final stage of the process. Before a claim is ever filed, prosecutors, investigators, judges, court staff, experts and police officers may have spent years working on proceedings that ultimately collapse.

The compensation award reflects only the visible financial consequence. The institutional resources consumed beforehand are far harder to calculate.

Ten years under prosecution

А case that illustrates the human cost is that of former Dospat mayor Krasimir Dolev.

His prosecution began in 2008 and ended nearly a decade later with a final acquittal. Dolev had been accused over a PHARE-funded eco-trail and bicycle lane project completed in 2006. Prosecutors alleged that the municipality had suffered damages of nearly €83,000. He was also accused of securing unlawful benefits for his brother through a construction contract connected to the project. The case moved repeatedly between judicial instances. Only in February 2017 did the proceedings finally end with a definitive acquittal.

Subsequently, Dolev sued the state and obtained more than €42,000, including costs and interest, for the damage caused by the proceedings. The Supreme Court of Cassation concluded that the case had exceeded reasonable time limits. The courts accepted that the prosecution had harmed Dolev’s reputation, career, dignity and standing within the community. The financial compensation represented recognition of that harm. It also represented a cost ultimately paid by taxpayers.

Detention as punishment

Another prominent example concerns Elena Dineva, the wife of Magnitsky-sanctioned businessman Vassil Bozhkov.

Dineva spent eight months in pre-trial detention in 2020, the maximum period permitted during the investigative stage. She remained behind bars while prosecutors pursued allegations linked to the high-profile gambling case involving Bozhkov. When the detention period finally expired, she was released.

The Sofia City Court later ruled that she should receive more than €15,000 in compensation for the prolonged detention. The criminal proceedings themselves remain ongoing. The case highlights a recurring concern within the Bulgarian justice system: the extensive use of pre-trial detention, particularly in high-profile cases, long before guilt or innocence has been established.

Even when courts eventually recognise that detention was excessive, compensation comes years later. The financial cost becomes visible only after the damage has already occurred.

Justice delayed, justice denied

The collapse of a building on Sofia’s central Alabin Street remains one of the most emblematic examples.

On 19 September 2006, the building collapsed and crushed a passing vehicle, killing two young women, Denitsa Chenisheva and Petrina Hristova.

The tragedy shocked the country.

The subsequent investigation became a symbol of judicial dysfunction.

The criminal investigation alone lasted around ten years. Court proceedings continued for another five years. The prosecution case relied heavily on testimony that courts eventually found unreliable. Ultimately, all defendants were acquitted. The courts concluded that the individuals responsible for the collapse had never been identified.

In February this year, the Supreme Court of Cassation awarded approximately €62,000 to Alexandrina Chenisheva, the mother of one of the victims, for the violation of her right to have the case examined within a reasonable time.

The judgment became one of the largest awards ever granted in Bulgaria for delayed justice. The case demonstrates how judicial inefficiency can generate costs long after the original tragedy has faded from public attention.

Paying for delay

Bulgaria introduced a special domestic mechanism to compensate victims of excessively lengthy proceedings after repeated criticism from Strasbourg. It is managed by the Inspectorate to the Supreme Judicial Council (ISJC) and the Ministry of Justice.

The idea was straightforward. If citizens could obtain compensation at home, fewer would need to seek justice before the ECHR. The mechanism allows complainants to submit applications to the Inspectorate of the Supreme Judicial Council. If delays are established, compensation of up to €5,100 may be awarded.

The mechanism has undoubtedly reduced some pressure on the Strasbourg court.

But it also serves as evidence that delays remain endemic. Among the “record-holders” uncovered by this procedure are a civil property dispute that dragged on for 19 years, 3 months, and 10 days because it was frozen in a domino-effect chain of three separate pending lawsuits, a foreign travel allowance claim that took over 15 years to resolve, and a massive embezzlement criminal trial against 20 defendants that paralyzed the system for 18 years and 5 days.

Compensation addresses the consequences of delay.

It does not necessarily eliminate the causes.

As a result, taxpayers often end up financing a parallel system that compensates citizens for deficiencies in the primary justice system.

While the law mandates that the Ministry of Justice and the ISJC must report these breaches to the Supreme Judicial Council every three months, and that the SJC must analyze the root causes of these delays semi-annually to enforce corrective measures, this entire accountability loop remains purely pro forma, serving as a bureaucratic rubber stamp rather than a disciplining tool for the judiciary.

Strasbourg’s view of Bulgaria

The European Court of Human Rights offers a different perspective on the state of Bulgarian justice.

While domestic compensation mechanisms focus on individual cases, Strasbourg judgments reveal broader patterns.

Official statistics show that Bulgaria paid: €393,000 in 2019; €403,000 in 2020; €392,000 in 2021; €542,000 in 2022; €2.12 million in 2023; €262,000 in 2024.

Yet former ECHR judge Yonko Grozev warns against simplistic interpretations.

“The statistics of the European Court of Human Rights cannot be manipulated because all cases are public,” Grozev says.

“The number of cases and outcomes depends on many factors and cannot be treated as a direct indicator of the quality of justice in a country.” For him, the more revealing question concerns the nature of the violations.

“We have problems relating to property rights. We have problems with confiscation legislation. For twenty years it has been clear that we have a problem concerning accountability and the lack of effective control over the Prosecutor General. We have problems with ineffective investigations. We have problems involving the abuse of surveillance measures.”

According to Grozev, these recurring categories reveal structural weaknesses rather than isolated errors. “This is indicative of a judicial system where there is insufficient public control and where abuse occurs.”

The lessons Bulgaria still struggles to learn

One of the most striking features of Bulgaria’s Strasbourg record is that many problems recur repeatedly.

The ECHR identifies a violation. Compensation is paid. The judgment becomes final. Yet similar cases continue to appear years later.

According to legal experts, the issue is often not the individual judgment itself but the state’s failure to adopt adequate general measures.

Lawyer Mihail Ekimdzhiev, who specialises in Strasbourg litigation, also argues that some violations continue reproducing themselves because underlying legislation and institutional practices remain unchanged. “The problem is that there are violations for which the state does not take the necessary general measures, such as legislative changes or changes in practice, that would stop them from recurring,” he says.

The result is a cycle in which compensation becomes routine. The state pays, but the same deficiencies remain.

The coming wave of confiscation cases

One area that may generate substantial future liabilities involves confiscation proceedings.

Both Grozev and Ekimdzhiev point to the consequences of ECHR judgments criticising aspects of Bulgaria’s confiscation regime.

The Strasbourg court concluded that the legislation failed to establish a sufficiently clear connection between alleged criminal conduct and confiscated assets. The implications are potentially enormous.

According to Grozev, the anti-corruption and confiscation authorities have already begun terminating cases that should never have been initiated. Those terminated proceedings are likely to be followed by damages claims.

“The major public expense will not come from Strasbourg,” Grozev predicts. “It will come from Bulgarian courts awarding compensation under the State Liability Act.” The financial impact could unfold over many years.

The hidden financial tornado

For Ekimdzhiev, focusing solely on compensation payments misses the bigger picture.

“The biggest problem is not the compensation itself,” he says. He describes complex cases that can last fifteen or twenty years. During that time, judges, prosecutors, investigators, confiscation officials, court experts and administrative personnel devote countless hours to proceedings that may eventually collapse. “Imagine how many judges, prosecutors, experts and officials are involved. Imagine how many salaries are paid.” The cumulative cost is rarely calculated.

When compensation is finally awarded, public attention focuses on the final payment. Much less attention is paid to the years of institutional spending that preceded it.

Ekimdzhiev calls the phenomenon “a financial tornado”. “The state machine is not merely operating inefficiently. It is generating losses.”

In his view, some proceedings continue long after it becomes clear that they are unlikely to succeed. The result is a multiplication of costs that far exceeds the eventual compensation.

Should magistrates bear responsibility?

The debate over accountability inevitably leads to a controversial question.

Should individual magistrates bear financial responsibility when their conduct causes unlawful harm?

Historically, the answer was largely negative. The prevailing view held that judges and prosecutors needed strong protection from personal liability in order to safeguard judicial independence.

Ekimdzhiev believes that the discussion is evolving. He notes that European jurisprudence increasingly recognises exceptions involving bad faith or gross professional negligence. “My position is that there should be at least limited financial liability,” he says. “There could be a ceiling of three to five salaries. But people should know that they cannot act maliciously and then hide behind the fact that they bear no responsibility.”

Whether such proposals will gain political support remains uncertain.

But they reflect growing frustration with a system where institutional costs are socialised while individual accountability remains rare.

More money, limited trust

The debate over compensation takes place against a backdrop of steadily rising budgets.

Bilyana Gyaurova-Wegertseder, founder and director of the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives, believes the mismatch between spending and results is becoming increasingly difficult to justify.

“The increase in spending on the Interior Ministry and the judiciary without real results in return is a time bomb,” she says. “We are neither safer, nor is the judiciary more independent, nor has the prosecution become more accountable.”

Her criticism comes as Bulgaria continues increasing allocations to law enforcement and judicial institutions.

For 2026, the projected judicial budget stands at approximately €787.6 million. It is expected to rise to €789.5 million in 2027 and €793.3 million in 2028. Only months earlier, discussions had included an even larger proposal approaching €1 billion.

According to Gyaurova-Wegertseder, the problem is not that magistrates are well paid. “They should be well paid because that is linked to their independence,” she says.

The issue is the absence of convincing explanations regarding performance and outcomes. “In recent years we have not seen positive news coming from the judiciary. We have seen scandals and backstage arrangements.”

She also points out that Bulgarian magistrates rank among the best-paid public officials and compare favourably with many of their European counterparts.

At the same time, public confidence remains persistently low.

A system with insufficient accountability

Grozev argues that the root cause lies in institutional design. “There is a serious defect in the balance of power,” he says. For years, attempts to address the problem have focused on limited organisational changes. According to Grozev, such measures cannot solve a fundamentally constitutional issue.

“The problem is the lack of effective accountability and control mechanisms.”

Without stronger oversight, he believes the same deficiencies will continue producing the same outcomes.

Compensation payments may fluctuate. Budgets may increase. Yet the underlying incentives remain unchanged.

The double price of bad justice

The financial cost of poor justice is substantial. Millions of euros are paid annually through compensation claims, delayed proceedings mechanisms and Strasbourg judgments. Yet focusing solely on those figures risks understating the problem.

As Ekimdzhiev notes, compensation represents only the final visible cost.

The hidden costs include years of salaries, court time, expert reports, administrative resources and institutional effort devoted to proceedings that ultimately fail.

There is also a broader social cost. Citizens lose confidence in institutions. Victims wait years for closure. Defendants spend years under suspicion before being acquitted. Public trust erodes.

This is why Grozev describes the issue as one of accountability rather than statistics. And why Gyaurova-Wegertseder warns that growing budgets without corresponding results risk undermining public patience.

The price of bad justice in Bulgaria is therefore paid twice. First, through compensation and direct financial losses. Second, through the failure to provide the effective, timely and accountable justice that citizens expect in return for that generously funded judicial system.

Unless the state transitions from simply paying for its structural errors to actively reforming its procedural practices and introducing individual accountability, the judicial system will continue to operate as a major financial drain – consuming significant public resources while failing to deliver stable, predictable justice.

As for now the available evidence suggests that Bulgaria has become better at compensating some of the consequences of judicial failure. What remains far less clear is whether it has become better at preventing those failures in the first place.

Doroteya Dachkova is a judicial journalist for the online publication Sega, who has been observing and analyzing the developments and structural processes within the Bulgarian judicial system for 25 years.

This article is part of the Bulgaria International Journalism Fellowship (BIJF), and implemented by AUBG’s Center for Information, Democracy, and Citizenship (CIDC).

Caption: The collapsed building on Alabin Street has become a stark symbol of delayed and ultimately denied justice in Bulgaria. Years after the tragic incident, the mother of one of the victims successfully sued the Prosecutor’s Office for the systemic delays./Sega

• Bulgaria
• European Court of Human Rights
• judicial system

Updated: June 9, 2026 - 06:26