The masquerade called “Funeral of the Century”: what the world’s media didn’t show

We are convinced that many Iranians today genuinely rejoice at Ali Khamenei’s death and await the fall of the existing regime, write Zaur Hasanov and Amid Aliyev.

Zaur Hasanov is a U.S.–based expert on Eurasia connectivity and security. Dr. Amid Aliyev is a political scientist and expert on Iran/Middle East

For nearly fifty years – since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 – Iran has consistently and deliberately constructed its own information strategy, presenting itself not merely as a state but as the spiritual centre and defender of the entire Shia world. This policy extended not only to domestic audiences but was also calculated for international public opinion. The Islamic Republic has had a clearly defined line for decades, and it was very effectively implemented at the funeral of Ali Khamenei.

In this article, we will examine the informational traps that, in our view, many leading global media outlets – such as Reuters, Associated Press, BBC, Al Jazeera, Euronews, and a number of European publications – fell into. We will also describe details that remained off-camera during international broadcasts, even though these very details should have been the primary focus of foreign media attention.

For instance, the world’s leading media did not report on the enormous preparatory work undertaken by the regime to accommodate an extraordinarily large number of people – approximately 40 million, nearly half the country’s population.

Reportedly, around 50 million loaves of bread were prepared for funeral attendees, along with 5,000 mosques and 700 schools designated to house arriving participants and pilgrims. Grocery stores were ordered to operate 24 hours a day throughout the mourning events, with prices set 50 percent below market rates. All of this took place amid a severe economic crisis in the country; according to official figures, food price inflation had reached approximately 70 percent.

It was reported that ten free high-speed fiber-optic internet access points were installed in Tehran to ensure communications – even though, just a few months earlier, during the January uprising triggered by economic hardship, Iranian authorities had completely shut down internet access and restricted telephone communications nationwide. The death toll from the suppression of those protests was estimated at approximately 30,000 according to official figures, while some unofficial sources cited numbers as high as 45,000.

The Iranian Red Crescent set up 1,000 tents in Mellat Park for visitors and mourners. Tehran hotels offered 50-percent discounts during the funeral period, and more than 1,000 free taxis were deployed in the city to transport participants in the ceremony.

Meanwhile, almost no one raised the question of how the extensive filming – including aerial footage of the funeral procession – was organised, given that Iranian airspace was under restrictions at the time due to the threat of possible attacks by the United States or Israel.

World media were saturated with images of weeping women and men carrying portraits of Ali Khamenei.

A great many of the women weeping before the cameras were performing so-called Navvāheh – traditional mourning laments, dirges, and religious chants that form part of Shia funerary culture.

The same applies to the men, who performed Marsiyeh – mourning religious songs and verses. Performers of marsiyeh, known as Marsiyeh-khān, are traditional participants in such ceremonies, and this role is most often filled by men.

This is a centuries-old religious tradition that accompanies nearly all major Shia mourning ceremonies. Yet it was precisely these historical and cultural features that world media reported almost nothing about, confining themselves instead to the visual spectacle of mass mourning.

Another symbolic moment that world media largely failed to notice took place in the main mourning complex, the Imam Khomeini Grand Mosalla, where representatives of foreign delegations entering the hall could see an inscription in Farsi directly above the coffin of the deceased, beginning with a verse from Surah Saba (34:46):

“I exhort you to but one thing: that you stand up for Allah’s sake in pairs and singly…”

Following this, as each foreign delegation arrived, specific Quranic verses were recited. These were not random excerpts: they constituted specific messages directed at specific states – a precise diplomatic language encoded within religious text, one that entirely escaped the attention of world media.

The episode involving the delegation of the United Arab Emirates drew particular attention.

In recent years, Iranian leadership has repeatedly accused the UAE of maintaining overly close ties with Israel, which is frequently referred to in official Iranian rhetoric as the “Zionist regime.” Following the normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel under the Abraham Accords, Tehran came to view Abu Dhabi as one of Israel’s regional partners. These accusations grew particularly pointed during periods of heightened tension between Iran and Israel.

For the delegation of the United Arab Emirates specifically, a verse from Surah Al-Hadid (57:20) was recited during the ceremony:

“Know that the life of this world is but amusement and diversion and adornment and boasting to one another and competition in increase of wealth and children…”

Its selection for the UAE delegation may be interpreted as a symbolic message — one that could be read as an allusion to a departure from traditional Islamic values in favour of close ties with the West and Israel, as well as a reminder that the pursuit of wealth and influence should not supplant religious and political principles.

For Turkey, a verse from Surah An-Nisa (4:95) was recited during the ceremony, addressing the distinction between those who strive in the path of Allah and those who remain passive.

Some observers saw in this a symbolic hint at an expectation that Ankara adopt a more active role in regional affairs.

For Azerbaijan, a verse from Surah Al-Anfal (8:61) was recited:

“And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah…”

This choice may be read as a symbolic signal favoring de-escalation and mutual understanding in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations, which have undergone a difficult period in recent years.

The verses recited for the Russian delegation likewise drew particular attention.

Two passages were recited for Russian representatives.

The first, from Surah Al-Qasas (28:83):

“That home of the Hereafter We assign to those who do not desire exaltedness upon the earth or corruption. And the [best] outcome is for the righteous.”

The second, from Surah Al-Anfal (8:13):

“That is because they opposed Allah and His Messenger. And whoever opposes Allah and His Messenger — indeed, Allah is severe in penalty.”

For the Pakistani delegation, a verse from Surah Al-Isra (17:80) was recited during the ceremony:

“My Lord, cause me to enter a sound entrance and to exit a sound exit and grant me from Yourself a supporting authority.”

But the mourning events were not confined to Tehran alone.

The holy cities of the Shia world – Najaf and Karbala in Iraq – held particular significance.

Najaf is the burial site of Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, whom Shia Muslims regard as the first imam and one of the principal spiritual founders of the Shia tradition.

Karbala is associated with the name of Imam Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Shia imam, who was killed in the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. For Shia Muslims worldwide, Karbala remains one of the holiest sites, a symbol of struggle, sacrifice, and resistance against injustice.

The staging of mourning events in these cities carried deep symbolic meaning, intended to demonstrate that reverence for Ali Khamenei extended beyond the borders of the Islamic Republic and was tied to the broader history of the Shia world.

All of this constituted an entirely false narrative. The Iran we came to was something else entirely.

Over the course of numerous assignments in various countries, we have always encountered people holding differing political views – in some places committed supporters of the government, in others its opponents. Iran proved to be the sole exception for me.

The authors of this text rarely met anyone who genuinely supported the regime or Ali Khamenei personally. On the contrary, what we most often encountered was fear, resentment, and hatred toward the authorities.

Our perception of the regime crystallized particularly sharply following the tragic earthquake in the city of Bam, which occurred on 26 December 2003.

Before us lay a city all but erased from the earth. People dug through the rubble with their bare hands, hoping to find their relatives alive. There was no rescue equipment, no organised relief effort, and a severe shortage of food and water. Desperate residents struggled to survive amid total chaos.

In search of basic necessities, people began looting shops, food warehouses, and army and police supply depots.

International aid – rescue teams, specialized equipment, and humanitarian shipments from various countries – only began arriving some time later. But in the first hours and days after the disaster, the residents of Bam were effectively left to face the catastrophe’s aftermath entirely on their own.

One episode has stayed with us in particular.

A few days after the earthquake, a helicopter began circling overhead.

We were told that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was aboard. Many expected he would land, step out among the people, walk through the ruined homes, and speak with the survivors.

That did not happen.

We remember clearly how the residents of Bam reacted. Instead of words of greeting or gratitude, I heard something quite different. People who had lost loved ones and been left without even basic assistance openly voiced their anger and cursed the authorities – and the Rahbar personally.

So all the regime’s efforts to construct a martyr’s image through an elaborate ceremony, symbolism, and diplomatic messaging did not alter the fundamental perception of the regime and its leader within Iran itself.

For many people in that country, the very Rahbar who for decades had called the United States and Israel “the Great Satan” had himself become, in their eyes, an embodiment of evil and violence.

And we are convinced that many Iranians today genuinely rejoice at his death and await the fall of the existing regime.

But the world’s media will not write about that.

Caption: A handout photo made available by the Iranian Supreme Leader Office shows crowds taking part in the burial of late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the city of Mashhad, Iran, 09 July 2026. Khamenei will be buried in his hometown of Mashhad, home to the shrine of Imam Reza, Iran’s holiest Shia Muslim site, following several days of ceremonies and processions across the country. EPA/IRANIAN SUPREME LEADER OFFICE HANDOUT RESTRICTIONS: NO Access Israel Media/Persian Language TV Stations Outside Iran/Strictly No Access BBC Persian/VOA Persian/Manoto TV/Iran International TV. (As mandated by Iran’s Directorate General for Foreign Media) — HANDOUT