The German proposal on EU enlargement: a bold plan or symbolic gestures?

With his EU enlargement proposal, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has injected fresh momentum into the debate. However, the suggested steps for integrating Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans raise fundamental questions about implementation and equal treatment of candidate countries, Marina Vulović and Valeska Esch write.

Dr. Marina Vulović and Valeska Esch are Visiting Fellows in the EU/Europe Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz has presented EU leaders with a proposal: associated membership for Ukraine and gradual integration for the Western Balkans, and possibly Moldova. The goal is to credibly reaffirm the perspective of full membership and make the enlargement process more dynamic.

Specifically, the proposal suggests integrating Ukraine as an associated member without voting rights in the Council, Commission, European Parliament, or European Court of Justice, while gradually opening individual EU programmes and offering the application of Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty as a security guarantee.

For the Western Balkan states, it proposes privileged access to the single market, observer status in European institutions, and joint meetings with the Commission or European Parliament. The proposal also emphasises the membership perspective for Moldova, without clarifying whether the Western Balkan measures would also apply to it.

While the Chancellor is contributing his own ideas to the enlargement debate, the proposal raises numerous questions.

Associated membership and observer status as symbolic politics

The proposal remains vague on key points. The practical difference – and thus the purpose of distinguishing – between associated membership for Ukraine and observer status for the Western Balkan states is not clearly defined. It also remains unclear where the boundaries of such observer status would lie, given that virtually all policy areas are relevant for future members.

Western Balkan representatives already occasionally participate in Council meetings. In addition, there are regular EU-Western Balkans summits, bilateral intergovernmental conferences, Growth Plan summits, and the Berlin Process. The added value of new formats is unclear. It is also questionable whether associated membership of this kind would even be possible without amending the EU treaties.

The same applies to privileged access to the single market: the Western Balkan countries already enjoy privileges under the Stabilisation and Association Agreements. Expanding this along the lines of the free trade agreements with Ukraine and Moldova would require ratification processes in all EU member states. Full single market membership would face similarly high hurdles, particularly regarding the implementation of EU standards in the region, and does not appear to be envisaged.

The commitment to reform-based, gradual EU integration is sensible, but without concrete operational steps it lacks credibility. Gradual integration must not become just another form of observer status; it needs to be backed by tangible measures that go noticeably beyond the existing Growth Plan. It would be worth examining the legal basis on which EU programmes, agencies, or processes could be opened stepwise to candidate countries. Early integration into areas such as the Digital Services Act, the FDI screening mechanism, or the European Public Prosecutor’s Office could deliver concrete benefits for both sides.

Risk of unequal treatment

The current proposal would create different integration paths within the same enlargement process: Ukraine would be more closely tied through associated membership than the Western Balkans via observer status. Moldova’s intended role remains unclear.

Within the EU-27, positions on differentiation diverge. Some member states demand equal offers for all candidate countries. While Russia’s war of aggression requires massive financial support for Ukraine and European security guarantees, the conditions for full EU membership apply equally to all candidates. Reforms to the accession process should therefore be applied consistently to avoid creating new political tensions and further doubts about the credibility of the enlargement process – particularly in the Western Balkans.

The crucial question remains: do the 27 EU member states actually have the political will to advance enlargement, substantially develop the accession process, and simultaneously implement internal reforms? Symbolic offers in any case will neither support Ukraine’s fight against Russian invasion nor alleviate frustration over the accession perspective in the Western Balkans.

The original publication in German can be found here.

Caption:German Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrives at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tivat, Montenegro, 5 June 2026. The high-level one-day summit brings together European Union (EU) leaders and their Western Balkan counterparts to discuss concrete integration measures and accelerate the region’s path toward bloc membership. EPA/BORIS PEJOVIC