EditThe far-right Sweden Democrats demand a full share of power
Their ascent illustrates how migration pressures, security concerns, and cultural anxieties can reshape even the most progressive political orders
With just weeks until Sweden’s parliamentary election on 13 September, the far-right Sweden Democrats are no longer content playing kingmaker from the sidelines. After four years of external support that enabled a centre-right minority government to enact sweeping restrictions on immigration and crack down on gang violence, the far-right party now insists on cabinet posts and control over key ministries, or it will withdraw its backing entirely.
Party leader Jimmie Åkesson has made the demand crystal clear. “It’s been a clear demand from us ahead of this election. Either we are in government or we are in opposition,” he told Reuters in a recent interview. The stakes are high: fulfilling that ultimatum could fracture the right-wing alliance, alienate moderate voters, and potentially pave the way for a centre-left return to power. Yet the very fact that such negotiations are happening marks a seismic shift in Swedish politics.
From fringe movement to political force
The Sweden Democrats’ journey from political pariah to near-power broker reflects broader anxieties over immigration, integration failures, and national identity that have eroded Sweden’s long-standing social democratic consensus. Founded in 1988 as a nationalist group with early ties to extremist elements, the party spent decades on the margins. Successive leaders, including Åkesson, who took the helm in 2005 when support hovered around 2 percent, systematically purged radicals, banned extremist symbols, and rebranded as a mainstream voice for “ordinary Swedes.”
Today, the party consistently polls around 18-20 percent, making it one of Sweden’s largest. Åkesson, now 47, projects a relatable image: informal dress, life outside Stockholm, and blunt talk on issues long considered taboo. Critics, however, point to past statements and lingering scandals as evidence of underlying racism. However, Reuters notes that some of his statements remain controversial. One example is his claim that SD policies will ensure hardworking people live better than their neighbors “who sit at home with eight children and watch Arab TV series.”
Roughly half of Swedes still view the party negatively on that front, despite its internal “zero tolerance” policy for extremism. Opponents regularly invoke its origins, keeping the debate polarized.
The turning point came with the 2015 migration crisis. Sweden accepted one of Europe’s largest per-capita influxes of refugees, primarily from Syria and other conflict zones. In the following years, integration struggles intensified: residential segregation, high unemployment among newcomers, and a surge in gang-related shootings and bombings, particularly in immigrant-heavy suburbs. Official data from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) highlighted gun violence as a key driver of rising homicides, with hundreds of incidents recorded in peak years.
The Sweden Democrats seized on these challenges, arguing that unchecked multiculturalism and permissive asylum policies had strained the welfare state and public safety. They called for sharp cuts to refugee intake, stricter citizenship rules, faster deportations, and greater emphasis on cultural assimilation. Ideas once dismissed as extreme gradually entered the mainstream. By the 2022 election, the Moderates, Christian Democrats, and Liberals formed a government dependent on SD parliamentary support through the so-called Tidö Agreement.
Policy transformation and lingering resistance
This external arrangement produced some of Europe’s toughest immigration reforms in recent memory. Asylum processes tightened, benefits for new arrivals were curtailed, expulsions for criminal offenders became easier, and incentives for voluntary returns were introduced. Asylum applications reportedly reached their lowest levels since 1985. Additional measures, including a controversial “good behaviour” law passed earlier this year, allow revocation of residency permits for issues like unpaid debts, undeclared work, or perceived failure to respect Swedish norms – applying retroactively in many cases.
These changes have been credited with reducing some pressures, but challenges persist. Crime statistics remain a flashpoint, with debates over the precise links between migration and violence continuing among researchers. The government has pursued longer sentences, enhanced police powers, and targeted interventions against gang networks.
Despite these accomplishments, Åkesson argues the support-party model has run its course. He wants SD ministers in charge of at least three major portfolios, such as justice, defence, foreign affairs, or finance, if the right-wing bloc wins. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, who once drew firm “red lines” against cooperating with the party (famously telling a Holocaust survivor he would never do so), has since lifted them. Yet internal coalition tensions remain, particularly within the Liberals, and broader voter sentiment appears wary.
Recent polls paint a challenging picture for the incumbents. The centre-left bloc, anchored by the Social Democrats under former Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, leads with around 52-55 percent support, compared to roughly 42-45 percent for the centre-right alliance including the Sweden Democrats. While SD’s influence on policy endures, formal inclusion in government still provokes discomfort among many Swedes.
The normalszation of the Sweden Democrats has nonetheless forced ideological adjustments across the spectrum. Mainstream parties now stress integration requirements, law-and-order priorities, and limits on multiculturalism, positions that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Chief SD ideologist Mattias Karlsson and others advocate prioritizing Swedish cultural cohesion, restricting certain practices, and moving beyond what they see as failed multicultural experiments.
As the September vote approaches, Sweden stands at a crossroads. A right-wing victory could bring the far-right into formal government for the first time in the modern era, further entrenching the rightward shift on identity and security. A centre-left win might return the Sweden Democrats to opposition, though their policy legacy would likely remain. In either case, the old welfare-state consensus – built on openness, universalism, and Social Democratic dominance since the 1930s – has been fundamentally challenged.
Sources: FocusEurope.pl, Reuters, Le Monde
Sweden passes ‘good behaviour’ law to kick out misbehaving immigrants
Caption: Party leader Jimmie Åkesson has made the demand crystal clear. “It’s been a clear demand from us ahead of this election. Either we are in government or we are in opposition,” he told. (Jimmie Åkesson’s Facebook page)
Updated: July 24, 2026 - 04:50
