EditThe end of the Russian era: Visegrad Group nations forge a new nuclear future
Central Europe is terminating decades of dependence on Moscow’s reactors and fuel, but the transition raises fresh questions
Across the Visegrad Group, a profound transformation is underway in the energy sector. Countries that once relied on Soviet-designed reactors and Russian uranium are now pivoting toward American, French, and South Korean technologies. These are the conclusions of an analysis published in our partner media Focus Europe.pl.
This shift, accelerated by Russia’s war against Ukraine, is reshaping not only electricity generation but also the broader geopolitical landscape of Central Europe. What began as a security-driven decision to reduce vulnerability to Moscow is evolving into a complex realignment with new suppliers, regulatory hurdles from Brussels, and unresolved challenges in waste management. While the move promises greater energy independence, it also risks replacing one form of dependence with another.
The Visegrad countries – Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary, enter this process from markedly different starting points. Slovakia, Czechia, and Hungary have operated Soviet-era nuclear plants for decades, creating deep technological and industrial ties with Russia. Poland, by contrast, abandoned its communist-era nuclear ambitions and is now advancing more aggressively to close the gap. Despite these disparities, all four nations share a common recognition: reliance on Russian nuclear technology and fuel represents an unacceptable strategic risk in the current security environment. Their responses, however, vary in pace, technology choices, and political complications.
Poland: racing toward a nuclear breakthrough
Poland stands out as the most ambitious player in the regional shift. On 31 March Polish Nuclear Power Plants submitted a massive application, over 40,000 pages prepared by more than 200 experts, to the President of the National Atomic Energy Agency for permission to build the country’s first nuclear power plant at Lubiatowo-Kopalino. The project centers on Westinghouse AP1000 technology, featuring three reactors with a combined capacity of 3,750 MW. A €42 billion state aid package, approved by the European Commission in December 2025, underpins the effort, with major construction expected to begin in 2028.
This initiative represents more than energy planning; it symbolizes Poland’s determination to overcome historical delays and secure a stable, low-carbon power source. By selecting American technology early, Poland has positioned itself at the forefront of the V4’s diversification drive. The project faces rigorous regulatory scrutiny, but its momentum reflects a broader national consensus on nuclear power as essential for energy security and economic competitiveness. Success here could serve as a model for the region, demonstrating that rapid scaling is possible even without prior operational experience in large-scale nuclear generation.
Divergent strategies: from Slovakia’s Western pivot to Hungary’s Russian entanglement
Slovakia is following a parallel Western-oriented path. Plans for a new AP1000 reactor at Jaslovské Bohunice, estimated near €15 billion, involve close cooperation with the United States. The JESS project company is advancing technical analyses, contracts, and permitting. At the same time, Slovakia is securing French fuel from Framatome to replace Russian supplies from TVEL. This dual-track approach – American reactors paired with French fuel, aims to create redundancy and reduce single-supplier risks, though challenges remain around EU regulations and long-term radioactive waste storage.
The Czech Republic has taken yet another route. After excluding Russia’s Rosatom from a 2021 tender, Prague selected South Korea’s KHNP for expanding the Dukovany plant. Construction is slated to start in 2029, with the first unit online by 2036. Czech operators are also diversifying fuel: Westinghouse has delivered initial batches for Temelín, and Framatome is set to follow, while collaborative efforts develop new fuel assemblies for older VVER-440 reactors. These moves highlight Prague’s pragmatic balancing act—pursuing reliable non-Russian options while navigating EU state aid investigations.
Hungary remains the outlier. The Paks II project, signed in 2014 between Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin, envisions two new Rosatom reactors largely financed by a Russian loan covering 80 percent of costs. Awarded without tender and shrouded in secrecy, the project has faced repeated delays. Following a political shift with the Tisza party’s rise, incoming leadership under Péter Magyar has signaled a review, describing the deal as overpriced while still affirming nuclear energy’s importance. Any pivot westward would require Hungary to confront the same regulatory and financing complexities already encountered by its neighbors, potentially altering energy dynamics across the entire region.
France’s subtle ascendancy and the region’s lingering challenges
Geopolitics, rather than purely environmental concerns, drives much of this nuclear renaissance. Leaders recognize nuclear power’s unique advantages: compact fuel supply chains that enhance energy security compared to imported fossil fuels. At the March Paris Summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen acknowledged past skepticism toward nuclear energy as a strategic error, offering renewed EU-level backing.
In this realignment, France is emerging as a quiet but significant beneficiary. While Westinghouse and KHNP secure major reactor contracts, Framatome is strengthening its role in fuel supply. Agreements with operators from all four V4 countries aim to create a European fuel cycle for VVER reactors, with production in France and Germany. Deliveries for Slovak and Czech plants are ramping up, and France is even positioned as a potential partner for Poland’s second nuclear project following high-level talks. Fuel, being a highly specialized, reactor-specific product, creates long-term dependencies that may prove more enduring than individual construction deals.
Yet significant obstacles persist. The proposed EU Industrial Accelerator Act, with its “Made in EU” preferences, could complicate contracts with American and Korean partners, even as it favors French solutions. None of the V4 countries has fully resolved final nuclear waste disposal; deep geological repositories remain distant goals, raising questions about access to sustainable financing under EU taxonomy rules. Technical transitions are inherently slow, developing alternative fuels for Soviet-designed reactors took years of effort post-2022 invasion.
The Visegrad Group’s nuclear transformation marks a historic break from Russian influence. Billions of euros are flowing into new builds and supply chains, promising enhanced energy security and reduced geopolitical vulnerability.
True sovereignty will depend not merely on signing contracts but on building resilient, diversified capabilities over the coming decade.
The original analysis in Polish by EUalive’s partner Focus Europe.pl can be found here.
Caption: An old chapel stands in a field in front of cooling towers operating at the Dukovany nuclear power plant operated by CEZ AS, near the village of Dukovany, Czech Republic, 12 May 2025. European Commission Vice-President Stephane Sejourne asked the Czech Republic, by letter to the Czech industry and trade minister, to postpone the signing of the contract for the construction of two new nuclear units at the Dukovany power plant. The tender was won by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) and lost by the French company EDF. The signing of the final agreement on Dukovany at the initiative of EDF was blocked last week by a Czech court with a preliminary injunction. EPA/MARTIN DIVISEK
Updated: May 14, 2026 - 10:19
