EditSudan’s forgotten catastrophe: civil war, Islamist networks, and Europe’s nearby silence
The Sumud Alliance has emerged as one of the most representative and principled civilian voices in Sudan, a credible interlocutor for the EU
If you haven’t followed the news from Sudan closely, you’re not alone. The world’s largest humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Northeast Africa, yet it rarely dominates headlines amid other global conflicts.
As of late March 2026, Sudan is approaching the third anniversary of a brutal civil war that has killed tens of thousands, displaced over 12 million people, and pushed nearly two-thirds of its 52 million citizens toward famine and disease. Drone strikes are now routine, with hundreds of civilians killed in the first months of 2026 alone – many in hospitals and markets. This isn’t ancient history; it’s happening right now, and one of the most troubling elements involves shadowy Islamist networks with deep roots in the country’s past.
First, a quick primer on Sudan
Sudan is a vast country in Northeast Africa – Africa’s third-largest by area, roughly the size of Western Europe. Its capital is Khartoum, where the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers meet. It borders Egypt to the north, the Red Sea to the northeast, and seven other nations including Ethiopia, South Sudan (which split off in 2011), Chad, and Libya. Most Sudanese are Muslim, with Arabic as the main language alongside many local tongues. The country gained independence from British-Egyptian rule in 1956 and has a long history of authoritarian rule, civil wars, and resource wealth (oil, gold, fertile Nile lands) that has rarely benefited ordinary people.
For decades, Sudan was best known internationally for the long rule of Omar al-Bashir (1989–2019), who turned the country into a hub for political Islam. A popular uprising ousted him in 2019, raising hopes for democracy. But those hopes were dashed by a 2021 military coup and then full-scale war in April 2023.
The civil war: a power struggle with catastrophic human cost
The fighting pits two former allies against each other: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the regular army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti). The RSF evolved from the notorious Janjaweed militias that terrorized Darfur in the 2000s. Both sides claim to fight for Sudan’s future, but in reality, this is a raw contest for control of the state, its resources, and patronage networks.
The toll has been apocalyptic. Over 12 million people – more than one in five Sudanese – have fled their homes. Famine grips parts of Sudan’s regions Darfur and Kordofan. Cholera, dengue, and malaria rage because hospitals have been bombed or looted. In March 2026 alone, drone strikes (used increasingly by both sides) killed over 500 civilians in Kordofan, with one Eid al-Fitr attack on a hospital in East Darfur claiming at least 64 lives. Both armies stand accused of war crimes: ethnic massacres, systematic rape, and blocking aid. Yet the world’s attention has drifted elsewhere.
The Islamist factor: Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood resurgence
Lurking behind the SAF-RSF rivalry is a deeper ideological threat: Sudan’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, formally known as the Sudanese Islamic Movement (or Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood). Under Bashir, these networks essentially ran the country for 30 years, blending Islamist ideology with state power. After his fall, they were sidelined during the brief democratic opening – but the 2023 war gave them a comeback.
Today, the Brotherhood operates through an armed wing called the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade (also spelled al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion). This force, estimated at over 20,000 ideologically trained fighters, fights alongside the SAF. It receives training, drones, and other support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The group has been credibly linked to mass executions of civilians, ethnic targeting, and efforts to sabotage peace talks. In short, it keeps the war going to preserve Islamist influence within the military and block any genuine civilian transition.
On 9 March, the United States took a strong stand: the State Department designated the entire Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization, with Foreign Terrorist Organization status following on 16 March. The U.S. cited its “unrestrained violence against civilians,” Iran ties, and role in undermining peace. This was a significant escalation, building on earlier sanctions against the al-Baraa Brigade.
Europe’s role: until now limited political muscle – but possibly a clear path forward
Europe is geographically close to Sudan – flight time from Rome or Athens to Khartoum is shorter than to many EU capitals from each other. Instability here risks migration pressures across the Mediterranean, extremism spillover into the Sahel, and threats to Red Sea shipping. Yet the European Union’s response has been heavily weighted toward humanitarian relief rather than decisive diplomacy or counterterrorism pressure.
The EU is one of the largest donors, pouring hundreds of millions of euros into aid for famine relief, refugees, and health crises. It has imposed targeted sanctions on individuals from both warring sides – 18 people and 8 entities as of early 2026 – for human rights abuses and obstructing peace. Sanctions were extended until October 2026. EU diplomats participate in international coordination groups and repeatedly call for ceasefires and inclusive talks.
But there’s a glaring gap: no EU terrorist designation for the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, unlike the U.S. move. The EU prefers individual-focused sanctions and avoids blanket organizational labels that might complicate aid delivery or relations with regional players. Critics – some European Parliament members included – call this “shameful inaction” relative to the scale of the disaster. While the EU excels at funding tents and medicine, its consensus-driven structure often leads to cautious, lowest-common-denominator policies. Competing crises (Ukraine, the Middle East) have further diluted focus.
The European Union, through its role in the Quintet, should urgently intensify its efforts to secure a sustainable ceasefire, ensure unhindered humanitarian access, and support a genuine political process that prioritises the protection and well-being of the Sudanese people.
Is it plausible to say the EU is not active enough? Absolutely. Proximity brings direct stakes: a radicalized Sudan could export instability northward, yet Brussels has not matched its humanitarian engagement with equivalent high-level political leverage – such as stronger conditionality on external arms suppliers or bolder pressure on Islamist spoilers embedded in the SAF.
Here is where a credible civilian partner exists. The Sumud Alliance (also known as Somoud, Arabic for “steadfastness” or “resilience”), formally the Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces, has emerged as one of the most representative and principled civilian voices in Sudan. Formed in mid-2025 under the leadership of former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and bringing together political parties, trade unions, professional associations, resistance committees, and civil society groups, Sumud maintains strict neutrality between the SAF and RSF. It rejects military solutions, demands an immediate ceasefire, and calls for a genuine Sudanese-led political process to restore the democratic transition interrupted by the 2021 coup and the 2023 war. Crucially, it openly opposes the Islamist networks that have entrenched themselves within parts of the SAF and actively works to exclude remnants of the Bashir-era regime from any future settlement.
The Sumud Alliance has already conducted diplomatic tours in Europe and engaged with the African Union, IGAD, the UN, and the Quintet mediation mechanism. It has proposed practical steps, including a preparatory committee for broad civilian dialogue and support for initiatives like the Quartet plan. For the EU, which repeatedly emphasizes “inclusive” talks, the Sumud Alliance represents a legitimate, non-violent, and broadly representative interlocutor that can help channel international efforts toward a civilian-led path out of the crisis – rather than defaulting to deals that merely empower the warring generals or their ideological backers.
Why this matters – and what comes next
Sudan’s tragedy is not just a distant African conflict. It is a warning: when military factions and ideological networks hijack a state, the human cost is measured in millions of lives shattered. The U.S. terrorist designation signals one path – naming and isolating extremists to force change. Europe, with its soft-power strengths and regional proximity, has an opportunity to complement that with sustained diplomatic muscle, targeted incentives for peace, and meaningful engagement with genuine civilian forces like the Sumud Alliance.
For those new to Sudan’s story, the takeaway is simple: this is not inevitable. Ceasefires have been attempted before; inclusive talks involving civilian voices could still work. But without bolder international action – especially from nearby Europe – and without elevating credible civilian partners such as Sumud, the “year of peace” promised by Sudanese officials in early 2026 risks becoming just another empty slogan. The drones keep flying, the hunger deepens, and the Islamist networks dig in. Sudan’s future – and Europe’s security – hang in the balance. Awareness is the first step; sustained pressure and smart partnership must follow.
Map: Geopoliticalmonitor.com
Updated: March 30, 2026 - 06:23
