Slovenia’s elections will test whether Roma rights are policy or rhetoric

As Slovenia heads into elections, a centre-left shift towards “law and order” measures in Roma policy has reset political competition. When signalling control becomes more politically rewarding than delivering results, all citizens lose, writes Zeljko Jovanovic.

Zeljko Jovanovic is the president of the Roma Foundation for Europe.

As Slovenia approaches its parliamentary election this Sunday and local elections later this year, Roma policy is no longer peripheral. It has become a test of whether the state can deliver on its own legal commitments – and how politics responds when it does not.

Compared to many EU member states, Slovenia has a relatively advanced policy framework for Roma inclusion. Article 65 of the Constitution recognises Roma as a group requiring specific protection, and the 2007 Roma Community Act sets out a framework for rights, institutional responsibilities and participation. This creates a structured basis for action in areas such as education, employment and living conditions.

Policies exist, but their impact is inconsistent. Over time, the gap between commitments and outcomes has widened. Monitoring reports point to uneven local delivery, weak coordination and limited evaluation of results.

The consequences are visible. Many Roma households face barriers in access to housing, infrastructure and employment. Around 8,500 Roma live in Slovenia, and a significant share reside in settlements with limited access to basic services such as water, sanitation or secure housing.

At the same time, local tensions and political pressure reflect a perception among parts of the majority population that long-standing problems remain unresolved. This combination of policies without visible progress creates conditions in which support for enforcement measures becomes politically rational, and Roma become easy scapegoats.

It is in this context that the so-called Šutar Law emerged. Adopted in November 2025 following a violent incident in Novo Mesto, the law expands police powers in designated areas – many of them coinciding with Roma neighbourhoods – including warrantless entry under specific conditions and broader surveillance measures subject to later judicial oversight. A long-standing socio-economic issue is reframed as a question of public order.

That this shift was initiated by a centre-left government is politically significant. Measures associated with “law and order” politics are no longer confined to parties that openly campaign on exclusion. They have entered the mainstream of governance. This changes the terms of competition, encouraging opposition actors to escalate rather than retreat.

This dynamic is already visible. Janez Janša and the Slovenian Democratic Party have called for additional legislative measures targeting Roma-related issues, building on demands from local authorities and voter petitions in affected regions. The political centre is not only not containing escalation, it lowers the standards for what counts as acceptable policy.

The shift also resonates with part of the electorate. Reporting at the time of adoption cited surveys indicating that over 60 percent of respondents supported stricter security measures in affected areas, even as legal experts and civil society organisations raised concerns about proportionality and collective targeting.

Elections intensify this logic. At the local level, political incentives favour visible, short-term action. Long-term investment in housing, education or labour market access requires time and coordination. Expanding policing powers produces faster signals of control. At the national level, parties that position themselves as defenders of equality must also respond to public concern about safety, narrowing the space between competing political offers.

This trajectory is not unique to Slovenia. Across Europe, including in France, governments have used policing to manage the effects of socio-economic exclusion. Such approaches can contain immediate tensions, but they do not address underlying inequalities. Over time, they tend to weaken trust, reduce cooperation with institutions and reproduce cycles of instability.

Slovenia is at an earlier stage of a similar pattern. Weak implementation produces persistent problems. These generate public pressure. Political actors respond with measures that demonstrate repressive control, reshaping the relationship between affected groups and the state.

The implications extend beyond domestic policy. Slovenia has positioned itself within the EU as a supporter of rights-based governance and minority protection. When domestic measures are perceived as disproportionate or collectively targeted, this affects the credibility of those positions.

The elections ahead will therefore shape more than political leadership. They will determine how Slovenia governs unresolved social questions. One path focuses on closing the implementation gap and turning legal commitments into visible results. The other places increasing weight on security measures, addressing symptoms while leaving underlying causes in place.

Slovenia has already defined its principles in law. The question now is whether, under electoral pressure, it chooses to implement them.

Caption: Illustrative photo provided by the author.