EditSerbia signals openness to EU accession without veto rights
President Aleksandar Vučić says Belgrade could accept limited institutional rights if it gains access to the single market, reviving debate on “gradual” enlargement in Brussels
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has said that Serbia would consider joining the European Union even without full veto rights, provided that membership would grant access to the single market and ensure the free movement of goods, people and capital.
In an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Vučić stated that such a prospect would be acceptable for Belgrade if it opened the way to participation in the EU’s economic core. His remarks have brought back into focus a scenario periodically discussed in Brussels: a form of “gradual” or “asymmetrical” accession, under which new countries would gain earlier access to some benefits of membership, while temporarily lacking full voting rights and/or veto powers in certain policy areas until broader institutional adjustments are completed, EUalive’s partner IBNA reports.
The debate is not a technical footnote, but touches on the core European dilemma of “enlargement versus functionality”. Enlargement requires a series of political decisions taken in the Council of the EU and, at critical stages, unanimity among member states. Accession negotiations and gradual alignment with the EU acquis are politically sensitive, heavy procedures, often vulnerable to blockages.
The European Commission describes the accession path as a sequence of chapters and decisions, where progress is assessed on the basis of compliance with criteria and consensus among member states at decisive steps. Within this framework, proponents of “gradual accession” argue that it is not a substitute for full membership, but a way to accelerate practical convergence in selected areas – such as the single market, EU programmes and specific policies – without immediately transferring additional veto powers to new member states in a Union that already struggles to take decisions in certain fields.
Enlargement and the Western Balkans
Vučić’s public positioning functions as a political signal that a candidate country may be willing to examine an “asymmetrical” form of accession as a transitional solution, if the trade-off is immediate, measurable and economically meaningful. In a similar vein, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama has, at different times, referred to the need to find realistic formulas to break prolonged stagnation in the enlargement process, even if accession is not “full” from the outset in terms of all institutional rights.
At the same time, pressure is growing within the EU for greater effectiveness in decision-making, particularly in foreign policy and security, where unanimity can in practice turn into a tool for prolonged blockage. The link between enlargement and functionality has therefore returned as a central argument in political debates across the European public sphere, shifting the question from whether the Union will enlarge to how it can enlarge without further increasing the risk of paralysis.
If the EU were to institutionalise a model of “membership with transitional limited rights”, the stakes would be both double and explicitly political. First, there would need to be legal and political clarity on what exactly a “member with limitations” entails: which obligations are assumed, which rights are granted – such as access to the single market, potential participation in EU programmes or funding instruments, and involvement in selected policies – and which rights are postponed, in which areas and for how long.
Second, the issue of political legitimacy would arise. How sustainable is it to require a new country to adopt and implement European decisions without full institutional equality during a transitional phase? And what safeguard clause would ensure that a temporary arrangement does not evolve into a permanent second-tier status within the Union?
For existing member states, the debate acts as an indirect precursor to broader internal institutional reform. Either efforts will intensify to reduce the number of areas in which unanimity can lead to deadlock, or enlargement itself will be redesigned so as not to automatically introduce new veto possibilities into the EU’s decision-making core.
For candidate countries, the potential gain lies in faster access to tangible benefits. The political cost, however, could prove domestically sensitive. Governments would need to explain to their citizens why a “faster” accession might initially be “less equal” in institutional terms.
In Serbia, Vučić’s remarks have already opened this dilemma in the public debate, underlining that the issue is not only European but also deeply national for each candidate country that may be called upon to choose between speed and institutional completeness in its path toward the EU.
EU internally explores limited accession for Ukraine, Moldova, and Western Balkans
The original article in Greek by EUalive’s partner IBNA can be found here.
Caption: Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic talks during the press conference with the President of Azerbaijan (not pictured) following their meeting in Belgrade, Serbia, 15 February 2026. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev is on an official visit to Serbia. EPA/ANDREJ CUKIC
Updated: February 24, 2026 - 06:28
