EditSchröder-type Russia еnergy networks still penetrate EU politics despite sanctions
Despite positioning itself as a champion of democracy and accountability, the EU remains vulnerable to opaque foreign influence
Despite sweeping sanctions and growing political isolation, Russia’s energy sector continues to maintain channels of influence within the EU and a key element of this influence has been the involvement of former senior officials, politicians, experts and media commentators who for years have worked with Russian energy companies or advocated for their interests.
The problem is compounded by the lack of transparency surrounding the financing of think tanks and public organisations, which obscures the true scale of Russian influence, European Pravda reports, citing a study by the Ukrainian tink-tank Razom We Stand.
The research identifies political parties, high-ranking politicians and networks across Europe that help safeguard Russia’s fossil-fuel revenues and slow efforts to phase out Russian gas, even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Golden Russian “revolving doors”
Over the past two decades, the Kremlin has developed a system of “golden rotation” – effectively a revolving door between European governments and the Russian energy sector.
Former prime ministers, ministers and influential politicians have taken seats on the boards of Russian companies after leaving office, converting their political capital into instruments of Moscow’s influence in Europe.
This practice not only created obvious conflicts of interest but also gave the Kremlin access to networks no official lobbyist could penetrate. The flow of former leaders into entities such as Nord Stream, Rosneft or Lukoil became part of a long-term strategy designed to make Russian projects appear “normal”, “profitable” and “apolitical”.
In this way, Moscow gained not merely sympathisers, but high-status ambassadors – retired top politicians capable of shaping debate and tempering moves towards energy disengagement from Russia.
Putin’s most prominent Western allies
Former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder is perhaps the most prominent symbol of Russia’s “gas diplomacy” and the first major Western political figure to accept a role working for Putin.
In 2005, shortly after Nord Stream 1 was approved, he became chairman of Nord Stream AG – a decision that shocked Germany at the time but quickly became the norm for retired politicians. Schröder later joined the board of Rosneft and was nominated to the board of Gazprom. Only after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, and following domestic scandals, did he step back from some of these roles.
Another influential figure is Matthias Warnig, a former Stasi officer who became a key intermediary between German corporate interests and Russian state enterprises in the 1990s and 2000s. Warnig has held senior positions in companies such as Transneft and Rosneft since 2011. His network spans German-Russian financial institutions and energy partnerships, making him central to long-standing economic ties between Berlin and Moscow.
Former Finnish prime minister Esko Aho worked at the Skolkovo innovation centre from 2010 and joined the supervisory board of Sberbank in 2016 – an example of how the Kremlin recruits European politicians under the guise of technological and economic cooperation.
In France, former prime minister François Fillon joined the boards of the state-owned Zarubezhneft and the private petrochemical group Sibur in 2021, both strategic pillars of Russia’s industrial sector.
Former Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl joined Rosneft’s board in 2021 and moved to Russia in 2023, where she now heads the G.O.R.K.I. analytical centre at St Petersburg University – a decision that caused political uproar within the EU.
One of Germany’s best-known Eastern policy experts, Alexander Rahr, has long promoted pro-Russian narratives in German media and political circles. He serves as research director of the German-Russian Forum, advises Gazprom in the EU and has worked closely with Wintershall, a company deeply linked to Gazprom.
Why Moscow cultivates these networks
For the Kremlin, the presence of former European leaders in media, think tanks and corporate boards is far more than a gesture of friendship. It is a deliberate influence tool that gives Moscow something formal diplomacy cannot – trusted “translators” of Russian interests into the language of European politics and business.
A familiar European name attached to a Russian brand creates an impression of normality. To some policymakers and business leaders, such cooperation appears a rational choice rather than a political risk – “if a former chancellor or minister trusts them, so can we”.
This illusion of “apolitical commerce” helped Moscow market its projects as purely business-driven, masking their geopolitical purpose. These individuals also open doors to informal decision-making networks. The Kremlin knows that major political deals are shaped not only in parliaments but also in private conversations at conferences, corporate gatherings and policy circles. Former leaders maintain access to these networks long after leaving office.
Their interviews, opinion pieces and public statements give Russia a platform in Western media, amplifying talking points about “pragmatic cooperation”, the “cost of sanctions” or the “risks of energy decoupling”.
The EU’s “grey zone”
Despite positioning itself as a champion of democracy and accountability, the EU remains vulnerable to opaque foreign influence. Unlike the United States, Australia or the United Kingdom, the EU has no unified mechanism requiring companies, lobbyists, former officials or think tanks to disclose cooperation with foreign governments or state-owned enterprises.
This regulatory gap creates a vast grey zone where financial flows and political ties can disappear from view. Russian state companies – and other authoritarian regimes – exploit these blind spots with ease. Divergent transparency standards between member states and between capitals and Brussels give Moscow a patchwork of opportunities.
Still reeling from its dependence on Russian gas, Europe lacks a mechanism to identify who is working with Russian state energy firms. The study argues that the EU urgently needs a public register covering corporate structures, individuals, organisations and institutions with ties to energy companies from high-risk states. Such a register would not be punitive but would clarify where independent expertise ends and politically motivated work begins, an activity often disguised as analytical research or technical consultation. Greater transparency would also help regulate the revolving-door cycle that allows former officials to move seamlessly into positions with foreign state corporations while continuing to influence European policy from the other side of the table.
Caption: Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder participates in a panel discussion titled `Peace in Europe` in Vienna, Austria, 31 October 2024. The event was organized by Swiss weekly newspaper `Weltwoche`. EPA/MAX SLOVENCIK
Updated: December 9, 2025 - 06:42
