EditSanctioned but still streaming: EU’s failings in blocking Russian state media revealed
Despite EU bans, Kremlin-affiliated websites continue to draw notable traffic with the European audience
Three years after the EU’s landmark sanctions against Russian state-backed media, a new investigation reveals that Kremlin-linked outlets remain widely accessible and continue to attract significant online audiences across the bloc.
Despite ambitious efforts to stem the tide of disinformation following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU enforcement remains fragmented, inconsistent and surprisingly easy to circumvent.
The investigation by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) audited the enforcement of restrictions on 58 domains linked to 26 entities sanctioned by the European Commission.
Focusing on six EU Member States – Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia – the investigative report found that less than a quarter of access attempts were effectively blocked by the three largest internet service providers (ISPs) in each country.
While Germany and France performed relatively better, with some providers blocking up to 57% and 48% of domains respectively, enforcement gaps remain stark.
In Slovakia, a legal loophole allowed temporary blocks on pro-Russian websites to expire in 2022, with no replacement framework put in place. The divergence in national legal systems creates structural weaknesses in the EU’s collective defence against foreign information manipulation.
”More than three years after the first sanctions took effect, enforcement remains piecemeal. Fewer than a quarter (247 out of 1044) of sanctioned domains were blocked to some degree. This meant that for an overwhelming majority, accessing Russian state media sites on the sanctions list remains possible without restrictions”, the report finds.
Across all three checked Polish providers, at least 50 out of 59 domains were accessible without any blocks. The Czech Republic was slightly better, with the best-performing providers blocking 17 domains.
“The case of Slovakia highlights a misalignment between the EU’s sanctions regime and its implementation by member states whose legal systems are not structured to respond to hybrid threats. Further, it raises broader concerns about how countries with differing legal frameworks for the protection of the right to freedom of expression and access to information can effectively address the current threat of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) from Russia”, is stated in the ISD report.
Italian internet providers were inconsistent, with one blocking most domains while others failed entirely. These results highlight not only national disparities but also a general overreliance on DNS-level blocking – a method easily defeated by user-level tools such as VPNs or third-party DNS resolvers like Cloudflare or Google.
Kremlin content still reaches thousands
Despite the EU bans, Kremlin-affiliated websites continue to draw notable traffic within the European audience. Five domains received over 50,000 monthly unique visitors from Germany alone, with others reaching similar figures in France.
Data from traffic analytics tool Semrush shows some sanctioned sites attract millions of visitors globally, with long average visit durations, indicating sustained engagement, not accidental clicks.
Meanwhile, on social media, the sanctioned content continues to thrive. On X (formerly Twitter), over 49,000 posts linking to banned domains were published in May 2025 by around 2,450 unique accounts, mostly in German and French.
Some accounts exist solely to repost articles from sites like Russia Today (RT), circumventing restrictions with anonymous or foreign-based presence. Although many official accounts have been withheld in the EU, others like Sputnik India or Rubaltic remain accessible and continue to serve EU audiences.
Analysts used traffic analytics tool Semrush to provide estimates for traffic to determine how popular they sanctioned domains are.
Despite being sanctioned, ISD found that some of the sites received significant numbers of visits both from users in Member States and outside of the EU. Traffic was varied across the set. Of the 58 sanctioned domains collected, 10 had between 1 million and 10 million unique monthly visitors, although 13 websites had fewer than one thousand monthly visitors.
Taking this spread into account, ISD calculated the median number of monthly unique visitors to be around 47,300.
Disinformation and elections
ISD also documents how Russian state media continues to play a destabilising role during key electoral moments.
During the 2025 German federal and Polish presidential elections, disinformation narratives included denial of Russian war crimes, manipulation of refugee-related stories, and broader attempts to polarise domestic audiences.
The persistence of such narratives underscores the urgent need for more effective enforcement.
The report recommends that the European Commission maintain a publicly accessible, real-time list of sanctioned domains and mandate the use of Dynamic Site Blocking Orders (DSBOs) across Member States. These would offer a more robust alternative to DNS blocking, allowing faster adaptation to circumvention strategies like mirror sites.
Moreover, platforms such as X and Facebook, classified as Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) under the Digital Services Ac, should be required to monitor and restrict the dissemination of sanctioned content more proactively. National regulators, meanwhile, must support this effort with oversight, redress mechanisms, and stronger judicial mandates.
ISD’s findings paint a sobering picture while the EU declares its intentions to disrupt Kremlin-affiliated disinformation channels. The execution of the disinformation bans remains riddled with loopholes. With blocked domains still widely accessible, reposted or simply ignored by social platforms, the sanctions risk becoming symbolic rather than substantive.
Caption: Illustration contained in the report.
Updated: August 6, 2025 - 13:30
