EditRussia escalates Orthodox tensions: accusation of Bartholomew’s meddling in Georgia
Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service claims that the Patriarch of Constantinople is seeking to influence the post-Ilia II transition
Russia’s external intelligence service has accused Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of attempting to shape the future leadership of the Georgian Orthodox Church, opening a new line of tension in the already fractured Orthodox world.
Following the death of Ilia II, the patriarch of the Georgia Orthodox Church on 17 March at the age of 93, the Georgian Orthodox Church has entered a sensitive period of transition. Ilia II, who had led the Church since 1977, was widely seen as a unifying figure who guided it through the final decades of the Soviet Union and into the post-independence era, overseeing a major religious revival.
In a statement released on 31 March, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claimed that the Patriarch of Constantinople is seeking to influence the post-Ilia II transition by supporting figures within the Georgian ecclesiastical hierarchy. The agency named two senior clerics as potential candidates aligned with Constantinople, but provided no evidence to substantiate the allegation.
Bartholomew, who has led the Ecumenical Patriarchate since 1991, is widely recognised as “first among equals” in the Orthodox Christian world – a position of spiritual primacy that does not confer direct authority over other national churches. The Ecumenical Patriarchate has not publicly responded to the latest accusations.
The ability of Ilia II, the longest serving patriarch in the history of the Georgian Orthodox Church, to maintain a balance between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople makes the question of his succession particularly delicate, as competing centres of influence are now expected to take a closer interest in the outcome.
The Russian statement situates the Georgian case within a wider set of disputes. It points to earlier tensions in Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in Serbia and parts of the Baltic region, where questions of ecclesiastical authority have increasingly overlapped with geopolitical divisions.
At the centre of the dispute lies a long-running struggle between Moscow and Constantinople over leadership in the Orthodox world. That conflict deepened significantly in 2019, when Constantinople recognised an independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine in a move rejected by the Russian Orthodox Church, which subsequently severed communion.
Since then, the Ukrainian church has gained recognition from several other Orthodox churches, including those in Alexandria, Greece and Cyprus, further consolidating a divide within global Orthodoxy.
Georgia, however, has largely remained outside this confrontation. Its Church represents one of the oldest continuous traditions in Orthodoxy and has historically maintained relations with both sides. Any suggestion of external interference in its succession process is therefore likely to be interpreted through the prism of the broader Moscow–Constantinople rivalry.
Montenegro as a precedent
The Georgian case follows a similar episode in Montenegro earlier this year, where Russian intelligence accused Bartholomew of preparing to grant autocephaly to a Montenegrin Orthodox Church – despite no public indication of such an intention.
In Montenegro, religious identity remains closely intertwined with national politics. Around one third of the country’s population identifies as Serb, while many Serbian nationalists contest the existence of a distinct Montenegrin identity.
The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the dominant religious institution, though it is often accused by Montenegrins of advancing Belgrade’s political interests. Alongside it exists a small and unrecognised Montenegrin Orthodox Church with limited support.
In its statement, Russian intelligence described Bartholomew as the “Antichrist of Constantinople” in January, arguing that his alleged ambitions extend beyond Ukraine into other parts of the Orthodox world.
Russian intelligence launches special church operation targeting Montenegro
Religion and Russian strategy
The language used by the SVR suggests that the issue goes beyond purely theological disagreement. It reflects the extent to which religious authority continues to intersect with state strategy, particularly in regions where ecclesiastical jurisdiction overlaps with geopolitical alignment.
The future trajectory of the dispute will depend less on Moscow’s rhetoric and more on how the Georgian Orthodox Church manages its internal transition. Unless the succession process visibly tilts towards one external centre of authority, the current accusations may remain a warning signal rather than escalate into open confrontation.
Russia’s intelligence activity and the positioning of the Russian Orthodox Church point to a coordinated strategic objective that operates on several levels.
Moscow seeks to preserve its influence across part of the Orthodox world by preventing further expansion of Constantinople’s authority. The recognition of the Ukrainian Church marked a major geopolitical and symbolic loss for Russia, weakening its religious leverage in a key neighbouring state.
By raising allegations of external interference Russian intelligence aims to pre-emptively delegitimise any future shifts in church leadership that might reduce Moscow’s influence. This creates a narrative framework in which internal ecclesiastical developments can be framed as foreign manipulation.
The original article, published by EUalive’s partner Bosphorus News can be found here.
Caption: Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople attends the funeral of the late Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II at the Holy Trinity Cathedral, also known as Sameba, in Tbilisi, Georgia, 22 March 2026. Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II (Irakli Gudushauri-Shiolashvili) of All Georgia died on 17 March, at the age of 93 in Tbilisi. He had led the Georgian Orthodox Church since 1977, becoming the longest-serving primate in its history. EPA/IRAKLI GEDENIDZE /POOL
Updated: April 1, 2026 - 05:30
