EditRussia and China deepen dialogue on Ukraine, while North Korea bolsters Russia’s war effort
After a three-day visit to North Korea, Russia's Sergei Lavrov met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Beijing
On Sunday (13 July), Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing to discuss their relations with the United States and prospects for resolving the Russia-Ukraine war, ahead of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) foreign ministers’ meeting.
The talks highlighted the strengthening strategic partnership between China and Russia, cemented by their February 2022 “no limits” partnership, declared days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Both nations emphasised the need for close coordination in international forums such as the United Nations, SCO, BRICS, G20, and APEC to address global challenges and promote mutual development, according to their foreign ministries.
China’s stance on the Ukraine conflict remains carefully nuanced, balancing its strategic alignment with Russia against its economic ties with the West. Since the war began in February 2022, China has maintained a position of nominal neutrality, abstaining from UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia’s actions. Beijing has consistently called for a “political settlement” through dialogue, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stating in 2024 that China refrains from supplying lethal aid to either side.
At the 2024 Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi reiterated China’s policy against selling lethal weapons in conflict zones, positioning itself as a potential mediator. The then Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba’s visit to China in July 2024, a rare diplomatic engagement, saw Wang Yi express support for a negotiated resolution.
However, China’s neutrality is undermined by indirect support for Russia. Reports indicate Chinese firms have supplied dual-use goods, including navigation equipment, jamming technology, and fighter jet components, to Russian state-owned enterprises. Exports of nitrocellulose, a key gunpowder ingredient, have enabled Russia to produce millions of rounds of ammunition.
In April 2024, a sanctioned Russian vessel carrying North Korean weapons was docked at a Chinese shipyard in Zhejiang, raising concerns about China’s complicity, despite denials from involved companies. These actions align with Beijing’s broader aim of countering Western influence, as seen in President Xi Jinping’s “Friends for Peace” initiative at the 2024 BRICS Summit, which promoted “indivisible security” and de-escalation without directly criticizing Russia.
China’s response to North Korea’s military involvement in Ukraine has been notably restrained. Analysts suggest China is wary of Pyongyang’s growing alignment with Moscow, which could diminish Beijing’s influence over its treaty ally. However, some argue China tolerates this development as it reduces pressure on Beijing to provide direct military support to Russia while sustaining North Korea’s economy with food and fuel.
With EU-China trade valued at €739 billion in 2023, Beijing seeks to avoid Western sanctions, maintain economic stability, and prevent escalation on the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea serves as a strategic buffer.
North Korea’s military support to Russia
Prior to Beijing, Lavrov visited North Korea for three days, meeting leader Kim Jong Un and Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui in Wonsan to advance their strategic partnership.
Kim pledged “unconditional support” for Russia’s efforts in Ukraine, emphasizing the need to address the conflict’s “root causes,” according to North Korea’s state media, KCNA. This commitment builds on a June 2024 mutual defence treaty, which deepened military cooperation and included mutual assistance in case of aggression.
Lavrov hailed Russian-North Korean ties as an “invincible fighting brotherhood,” expressing gratitude for Pyongyang’s deployment of over 11,000 troops to Russia, primarily to the Kursk region, to counter Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion.
South Korea’s Defence Intelligence Agency reported in July 2025 that North Korea has supplied Russia with approximately 12 million artillery rounds, including shells, rockets, and missiles, since the war began. In November 2024, Pyongyang delivered nearly 50 M-1989 Koksan self-propelled howitzers and 20 M-1991 short-range missile systems, with an estimated 70% of Russia’s artillery munitions in Ukraine sourced from North Korea.
The Open Source Centre documented 64 shipments over 20 months, carrying nearly 16,000 containers of munitions, with a recent delivery on 17 March 2025. These supplies have been vital for Russia’s fire-superiority strategy, offsetting depleted domestic stocks, though up to 50% of North Korean ammunition has shown high failure rates due to outdated inventories.
North Korea’s troop deployment, confirmed by NATO and Ukrainian intelligence in October 2024, includes elite Storm Corps units trained in infiltration and sabotage. Approximately 500 officers and three generals are among the forces, trained in Russian facilities like Ussuriysk and Ulan-Ude. South Korean intelligence reports these troops receive $2,000 monthly salaries and incentives like Workers’ Party membership, offering significant social and financial benefits.
By January 2025, South Korea estimated 1,100 North Korean troops were killed or wounded, with Ukraine reporting up to 3,000 casualties, reflecting their inexperience and language barriers. In January 2025, reports indicated North Korean troops were withdrawn from front lines after heavy losses, though it remains unclear if this was a retreat or rotation.
Pyongyang’s motivations include gaining combat experience, testing weapons like the KN-23 missile, and securing Russian aid, including food, fuel, and potential military technology transfers.
North Korea’s Defense Ministry issued a warning on Sunday against South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. following their joint aerial drill on Friday, which included a U.S. B-52 bomber, underscoring the broader geopolitical ramifications of Pyongyang’s support for Russia.
With Reuters, edited by g.g.
Caption: A handout photo made available by the Russian Foreign Ministery Press Service shows Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (R) and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (L) during their meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Foreign Ministers’ Council meeting in Beijing, China, 13 July 2025. EPA/RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS SERVICE
Updated: July 14, 2025 - 05:44
