Report: TikTok manipulation reshapes political communication in the Balkans

A new BFMI-Sensika study offers one of the first systematic mappings of algorithmic political manipulation on TikTok across the Balkans, identifying structural vulnerabilities in Romania, Bulgaria and Kosovo. The report argues that TikTok’s design – combined with limited transparency, weak enforcement of its own rules and underprepared national institutions, has turned the platform into a powerful vector for coordinated inauthentic behaviour during election periods.

The Balkan Free Media Initiative (BMFI) is an independent Brussels-based organisation focused on strengthening advocacy and accountability on media-freedom issues in Southeastern Europe, while Sensika is Bulgaria’s most powerful AI platform for media monitoring and disinformation detection, covering online outlets, social networks, print, television and radio.

The report was presented in the European Parliament in Brussels at the initiative of Bulgarian MEP Radan Kanev (DSB/EPP)

At the centre of the study are several common patterns: the widespread use of the “Fire Hose” tactic of mass posting, synchronised commenting, hashtag hijacking, and metrics that indicate artificial amplification. Although the scale and dynamics differ across countries, the report concludes that malign political actors across the region increasingly exploit TikTok’s recommendation system to reach millions of voters, often young and politically disillusioned, with little effective oversight.

Romania: the most extensive manipulation operation mapped to date

The Romania chapter reconstructs the step-by-step structure of a large-scale online manipulation network built around Călin Georgescu, a former extremist presidential candidate. It draws on data collected by local civic organisations and highlights how automated accounts – around 25,000, according to the report, flooded the platform with pro-Georgescu content during the two weeks before the 2024 presidential election.

Mass posting, comment bombing and strategic hashtags were used to push his messages to millions of young Romanian users. Memes, viral trends and short-form content aligned well with Georgescu’s anti-system narrative, helping it spread far beyond his organic audience.

Institutional shortcomings amplified the impact. Romania lacked a centralised strategic communications body, leaving opaque intelligence services to lead monitoring efforts that ultimately failed to detect the manipulation in time. Emergency legislation ordering rapid removal of flagged content generated further controversy. According to the report, clear pre-election guidelines developed jointly with platforms and civil society could have prevented both over-removal and under-enforcement.

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Bulgaria: complex hybrid networks and hyper-targeting

The analysis of the case of Bulgaria relies heavily on Sensika’s proprietary data, allowing a detailed mapping of networks of official party accounts, influencers, fake profiles and fan pages. Despite TikTok’s ban on political advertising, Bulgarian parties increasingly used the platform for campaigning, particularly during the June and October 2024 snap elections.

The report identifies coordinated inauthentic behaviour similar to Romania – mass posting, fake comments, artificially boosted views and synchronised messaging. However, Bulgarian networks also deploy more sophisticated tactics to appear authentic. Some accounts used interactive formats, long captions and video series to prolong watch time, boosting algorithmic reach while masking coordinated activity.

A standout example is the fake account @prodajnipoliticivpandiza, (“corrupt politicians in prison”) registered in London and promoting populist party MECH and its leader. Despite the absence of political labels, its videos attracted hundreds of thousands of views but exhibited engagement rates below 2%, a key indicator of artificial boosting.

Hyper-targeting is another prominent feature of the Bulgarian ecosystem. Networks use geographically-specific hashtags to reach particular constituencies and employ hashtag hijacking to tap into competitors’ audiences. Mixed-format videos – combining political messaging with memes, cultural references or entertainment, mirror strategies seen in Romania but on a more localised scale.

The report also notes the role of influencers, either apolitical creators whose pages were captured or genuine supporters producing continuous streams of political content. The legal environment remains a grey zone, as Bulgaria lacks explicit regulation for paid or covert political content by influencers.

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Kosovo: widespread use of “Fire Hose” tactics during the 2025 elections

The report briefly assesses Kosovo’s online environment during the February 2025 parliamentary election and finds patterns similar to Romania and Bulgaria. TikTok is estimated to be the most used social media platform in the country, amplifying the impact of coordinated activity.

The research identifies extensive use of the “Fire Hose” tactic, synchronised commenting and hashtag hijacking, largely benefiting the incumbent Vetëvendosje Movement and its leader, Albin Kurti. One account alone, @hamzahatika46, posted over 18,000 videos and generated more than 13 million engagements during the campaign.

Despite TikTok being banned on government devices for cybersecurity reasons, major parties maintain active presence through personal networks and devices. Official party accounts, inauthentic networks and supporter-run “theme accounts” combine to push political messaging to large audiences, especially younger voters.

Recommendations: systemic reforms and proactive regulation

“Europe cannot rely on twentieth-century mechanisms to address twenty-first-century threats”, Antoinette Nikolova – Director of BFMI told EUalive. She added that what happens in the Balkans today may well anticipate what Europe will face tomorrow. “The Balkans, with a legacy of media capture and post-conflict vulnerabilities, has become a testing ground for algorithmic manipulation. What succeeds there will be deployed elsewhere. Foreign actors exploit regulatory gaps and democratic disillusionment in this region as a gateway to assault Europe’s broader information system. When disinformation artificially boosted on platforms bleeds into captured mainstream media, entire information ecosystems become compromised”, Nikolova warns.

The report concludes with several overarching recommendations. It calls for national strategic communications bodies capable of monitoring online manipulation transparently and effectively, tailored content moderation guidelines agreed with platforms before elections, and enforcement aligned with the EU’s Digital Services Act.

It also stresses the need for clearer regulation of paid political content, improved cooperation between authorities and platforms, and greater investment in civic and media literacy to reduce susceptibility to algorithm-driven manipulation.