EditReport exposes Montenegro’s hidden security crisis
A particularly alarming dimension is the ongoing campaign against Montenegrin national identity, language, and culture
Montenegro faces a hidden security crisis, with hybrid pressures and internal capture threatening democracy and the country’s euro-atlantic path, a policy paper warns.
Montenegro continues to project an image of stability and progress in the Western Balkans at the start of 2026 – with steady advances in EU accession negotiations, a functioning parliamentary majority, and positive assessments from Western partners. Yet beneath this surface lies a profound and largely concealed security crisis, driven by hybrid external pressures, internal political capture, institutional vulnerabilities, and systematic assaults on national identity. These factors seriously undermine the country’s democracy, economic resilience, rule of law, and long-term commitment to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
This warning comes in the first major state-of-the-country analysis for 2026 from the think tank WestBalkanNet (WBN) — the Regional Forum for Democracy, Reconciliation, and Strategic Analyses.
The report argues that Montenegro’s political system remains highly fragile due to the government’s heavy reliance on hard-line pro-Serbian and pro-Russian political forces. These actors exploit key institutions – particularly the judiciary and security sector – through selective and politically motivated actions that erode the rule of law, pressure independent media and journalists, and weaken civil society’s capacity to resist growing authoritarian trends.
Persistent influence of pro-Serbian and pro-Russian structures
The former Democratic Front (DF) coalition, along with the increasingly authoritarian Democrats led by Alekso Bečić, retain outsized influence in the governing coalition. These parties maintain close ties to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić’s regime and ideological alignment with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Their strategy, according to WBN, is twofold: either transform Montenegro into a “Trojan horse” for Russian and Chinese geopolitical interests within NATO and the EU, or – if that proves impossible – deliberately derail the country’s European integration process.
For Belgrade, Montenegro’s successful EU membership while Serbia remains outside the bloc would represent a major strategic setback. The analysis suggests that preventing Podgorica’s accession is the more likely preferred outcome for pro-Serbian actors.
Systematic attacks on Montenegrin identity
A particularly alarming dimension is the ongoing campaign against Montenegrin national identity, language, and culture. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) plays a central role here, functioning not merely as a religious institution but as a powerful political and geopolitical actor. Through influence in education, cultural bodies, and public symbolism, pro-Serbian and pro-Russian forces promote narratives that deny Montenegro’s distinct statehood and identity – a tactic the report describes as integral to a wider hybrid offensive aimed at fracturing social cohesion and delegitimizing the Montenegrin national narrative.
“Symbolic struggles over language, history, and culture are not secondary; they are an integral part of a broader strategic offensive,” the WBN authors emphasize. Such efforts seek to render Montenegrin society more receptive to external narratives aligned with the interests of Belgrade and Moscow.
Security sector vulnerabilities and hybrid tactics
Despite Montenegro’s status as a NATO member since 2017, the country’s security environment remains far from secure. The report highlights the compromised nature of the Security and Defence Council, where unanimous decision-making allows pro-Serbian figures – such as parliamentary speaker Andrija Mandić – to potentially block critical actions. These include military deployments, activation of national defence protocols, or invocation of NATO’s Article 4 (consultations) or Article 5 (collective defence) in response to threats.
The analysis points to real-world manifestations of hybrid destabilization, including the recent protests in Botun, which were ostensibly about local infrastructure but served as a pretext for broader political pressure. The Democratic People’s Party – one of the key pro-Serbian forces and whose leader faces accusations linked to the 2016 Russian-backed coup attempt – has threatened to withdraw support from the government unless the Constitution is amended to advance radical Serbian nationalist goals.
Foreign policy caution and economic fragility
In foreign policy, Montenegro maintains formal alignment with the EU and NATO but adopts a defensive, often overly cautious stance toward Serbia – at the expense of stronger ties with partners like Croatia and Kosovo. The diplomatic service is described as slow, internally divided, and inefficient.
Economically, solid growth masks deep structural weaknesses: an oversized public sector dominated by partitocracy, unsustainable spending, weak private-sector dynamism, and inflation that has eroded recent wage increases. These issues threaten long-term economic stability as much as political and security challenges do.
Weak parliamentary opposition
The report also critiques the parliamentary opposition, led by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). Despite its historical role in securing independence, NATO membership, and the EU path, the DPS is now politically weakened, compromised by past clientelism, and paralyzed by fear of investigations. Internal ideological confusion and a lack of urgency among younger opposition figures have created a “comfort zone” that fails to effectively challenge anti-state tendencies.
Urgent recommendations
WBN concludes that Montenegro stands at a critical crossroads. Without swift corrective action, the country risks sliding into political degradation, economic instability, and authoritarianism.
The think tank offers two sets of recommendations:
- For Montenegro: Foster new patriotic, pro-European political forces rooted in national interests and economic rationality; actively promote Montenegrin identity and culture; reduce the political influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church; purge pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements from the security sector; increase defence spending; and curb public-sector bloat and partitocracy.
- For Western partners (EU, US, NATO): Bolster support for independent media and civil society; enforce stricter conditionality on EU Chapters 23 and 24 (rule of law and fundamental rights); demand security-sector reforms to eliminate foreign-aligned influences; publicly challenge the SOC’s role as a vector for hybrid interference; and apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Serbia to halt destabilizing activities.
The stakes are high. “The absence of action… leads to serious consequences,” the analysis warns. Montenegro could become an authoritarian, anti-Western state fractured by internal divisions, Russian influence, and pro-Serbian nationalism – with risks of civil unrest, collapse of EU integration, and effective neutralization of its NATO membership.
“Time for action is now,” WBN stresses.
The article by EUalive’s partner AntenaM reflecting the same report can be found here.
EU Council President Antonio Costa (L) and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (R) welcome President of Montenegro Jakov Milatovic (C) for the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Brussels, Belgium, 17 December 2025. EU and the Western Balkans leaders meet in Brussels to reaffirm their commitment to strengthening regional cooperation and partnerships. EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET
Updated: January 18, 2026 - 11:35
