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Prodi: If we let the European Union die, civilisation ends

The EU still has an intellectual strength and a collective message of considerable dimension, but the problem is not to let it wither away in the hypothesis a of failed union

Roberto Castaldi Focus Europe Italy June 15, 2026 11:47

Roberto Castaldi, Director of EUalive’s partner Focus Europe Italy, interviewed Professor Romano Prodi – President of the Foundation for Cooperation among Peoples, former President of the European Commission and former Prime Minister of Italy – on the sidelines of the “Conference on the Europe of the Future” organised by the Vision think tank in Siena.

In 2027, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Greece, Finland, Estonia and Slovakia will go to the polls – roughly two-thirds of Europeans. What is at stake in all these national elections?

Each country has its own national stakes, but there is a common one: the continuation or otherwise of the process of European integration. Let’s be clear: no country will leave the European Union. It wouldn’t be convenient, and the people know it very well. The only case was Britain, but in this respect it acted as a vaccine, because the failure of Brexit ensures that no one will ever leave the Union again. However, a possible victory by anti-European parties would mean an Europe that is little more than a free-trade area. And that would be a tragedy, because a crippled Europe would prevent us from playing any role in the world.

Unlike 20 years ago, today we have a debate on European sovereignty and pragmatic federalism – concepts that were once taboo. Can this advance in the discussion also lead to concrete progress in reforming the Union’s institutions?

In a small circle, the discussions of 20 years ago were similar to those of today. The difference is that today national elections have the European chapter at the forefront. So the discourse itself hasn’t changed, but the importance of the issue in the vote has. The sum of next year’s elections will certainly define the speed and direction of Europe. Then, if there are negative outcomes in some countries, the European Union won’t dissolve, but it would be paralysed – and we don’t know for how long.

If we fail to achieve a sharing of sovereignty on defence in this period, while we are caught between Putin’s anvil and Trump’s hammer, will it become more difficult afterwards? In other words, might another American president – who perhaps pursues the same policies but in a friendlier tone, as Obama did with his pivot to the Pacific – risk diminishing the public perception that we are alone and must act together?

By now, the fact that Europe is alone is taken for granted. Any observer understands that even after Trump, the United States is no longer Europe’s brother by definition. It is a change I have witnessed throughout my life. I started with the Bush presidents, who were not of my political side, but were European by definition, even in jokes. Then came Clinton, who became European through political intelligence – he didn’t start out European, but he became so. For Obama, Copenhagen and Singapore were the same thing. Then Trump, clearly hostile to Europe. But there is no going back to a conception of the United States and Europe as brothers by definition, even if sometimes with different interests. In this sense, albeit slowly, the European Union has become a necessity. Therefore, I do not believe that this phase of nationalism and populism is definitive. Because as long as Europe remains, populism is a passing phase. Our destiny, if we want to survive, is European unity.

But in the past, great civilisations have found themselves in this situation and have died. Like the Greek city-states facing the Roman Empire, or the small Italian states of the Renaissance facing the first modern states.

That is why I said “if we want to survive”. Because civilisations die too. But I believe that Europe still has an intellectual strength and a collective message of considerable dimension. The problem is not to let it wither away in the madness of failed integration, of a failed union, which is indispensable.

Yet in Italy we have a political offer that is not centred on Europe. The centre-right is divided on Europe, but even in the centre-left there are very different positions on Europe and Ukraine. How do you see it?

Coalitions are divided on everything. But the centre-left considers [favourably] Europe and has an [internal]  absolute pro-European majority. The centre-right does not. There is a big difference. The leading party of the right does not want Europe and wants unanimity. The leading party of the centre-left wants Europe and does not want unanimity.

Do the internal divisions within the coalitions on Europe risk pushing the issue out of the electoral campaign, with the centre-right talking about migrants and the centre-left about waiting lists, while the world is burning?

The electoral campaign on migrants will be conducted everywhere. Because it is the new tragedy of democracy, in which the issue is identity, no longer even economic interest. Clinton’s “it’s the economy, stupid” no longer applies. Now it’s played on identity. We see it in the United States with the MAGA movement. But also elsewhere. I went to Poland for the 20th anniversary of EU accession. Everyone was happy about the development it brought, but then they elected an anti-European president who accuses Europe of not respecting Polish roots.

So the challenge is to build at least some European identity?

It takes time, because it is the first political construction in history that is not made with weapons, but with democratic consent. For Europe we must say “it’s democracy, stupid”. This is our challenge. Of course I am disappointed by this slowness. But I am convinced that we are not at the end of the European mission.

Why do nationalists always play on the attack against the Union while pro-Europeans only defend themselves, instead of attacking the costs of national sovereignty – for example, when people say that the Union is an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm, in reality they are saying that where we have shared sovereignty we are strong, where it has remained national we are weak –  and denouncing that many of the accusations against the EU are linked precisely to the lack of competences and powers in those sectors?

This is obvious as long as we maintain the madness of unanimity. Which means that not only does Europe play defence, but it doesn’t even know how to play defence, because there is not even unity of action to play defence. There is not even a defence strategy because unanimity is required. The real problem is to move from unanimity to a democratic Europe, or from the paralysis of unanimity to a Europe of multiple circles – that is, to multiple levels of integration – otherwise we remain paralysed.

After all, every step forward has been made with vanguards: the euro started with eleven states, Schengen with five at the beginning.

Exactly. And now in the euro we are 21! It is democracy. Europe works and proceeds with democracy, and I trust that this will happen sooner or later. Naturally this phase of populism makes it more difficult. But it is a process that does not stop, unless we reach suicide. You earlier recalled that civilisations end. Well, if we let Europe end too, civilisation ends.

Caption: Caption: Romano Prodi, photo dated 25 March 2025 [Europe by Satellite]

Updated: June 15, 2026 - 11:47

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