EditPoland’s SAFE ratification exposes deep rift over EU defence integration
For thes national-conservative camp, SAFE has come to symbolise the gradual expansion of Brussels’ authority into areas traditionally viewed as state prerogatives
Poland’s decision to join the EU’s SAFE defence financing programme was meant to be a technical step toward faster rearmament. Instead, it has ignited one of the sharpest political confrontations in recent years, exposing deep divisions over sovereignty, Brussels’ growing role in defence policy and the limits of European integration – with potential consequences far beyond Poland, including for Ukraine’s military support.
On 13 February, Poland’s lower house of parliament, the Sejm, approved legislation enabling the country to join the European Union’s SAFE programme (Security Action for Europe) – a move that could unlock tens of billions of euros in preferential financing for Poland’s defence industry.
The vote, however, laid bare a sharp political divide. While 236 MPs backed the bill, 199 voted against it and four abstained, underscoring the extent to which defence policy has become entangled in domestic political conflict.
The right-wing opposition – Law and Justice (PiS) and Confederation – opposed the initiative, with PiS calling on President Karol Nawrocki to veto the law.
The reversal is striking. Just months ago, the same political camp had openly supported SAFE. The sudden shift has raised questions about whether the dispute is really about debt and financing – or about deeper concerns over European integration, national sovereignty and Poland’s role in supporting Ukraine.
€43 billion at stake
SAFE has emerged as one of the most hotly debated political issues in Poland in recent weeks. The programme is designed to strengthen the EU’s defence industrial base by expanding production capacity and investing in advanced military technologies.
On paper, the scheme is exceptionally attractive for Warsaw. The overall SAFE envelope amounts to €150 billion, with Poland eligible for nearly a third – €43.7 billion, the largest allocation among EU member states.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk has repeatedly described the financing terms as unprecedented: a ten-year grace period followed by repayment over up to 45 years. According to Tusk, no comparable funding could be obtained on market terms.
Crucially, at least 80% of SAFE funds allocated to Poland would be channelled directly into the domestic defence industry, turning the programme into not only a security initiative but also a major industrial and economic project.
Deputy Defence Minister Paweł Bejda has confirmed that the government has already identified which equipment and production lines could be financed under SAFE, although details remain classified.
“This information is not disclosed for a simple reason: we cannot show our enemies where potential gaps exist,” Bejda said, citing both security concerns and the need to preserve the state’s negotiating position on pricing.
From support to opposition
Despite these benefits, SAFE has triggered an unusually fierce debate in the Sejm and is now shaping up to be a potential flashpoint between the government and the presidency.
The opposition’s stance is particularly notable given its earlier enthusiasm. Former defence minister and current PiS MP Mariusz Błaszczak had previously called SAFE a “chance for the development of Poland’s armed forces” that should not be squandered by allowing EU funds to flow elsewhere.
Now, Błaszczak has emerged as one of the programme’s sharpest critics, warning of the rapid legislative process and what he sees as excessive powers being shifted to the EU level. His abrupt change of position prompted a pointed response from Jacek Dobrzyński, who publicly questioned whether the former minister was suffering from “amnesia”.
Yet the vote showed that the issue goes well beyond one politician.
For Poland’s national-conservative camp, SAFE has come to symbolise a broader trend: the gradual expansion of Brussels’ authority into areas traditionally viewed as core state prerogatives. Critics argue that defence policy risks becoming another domain of European centralisation – raising concerns not only about debt but about political leverage and long-term autonomy.
A possible presidential veto
Following its approval in the Sejm, the bill moves to the Senate, where it will be debated during the next session on 18-19 February. With the governing coalition holding a stable majority in the upper chamber, no major obstacles are expected there.
The final decision, however, rests with President Nawrocki, who has the constitutional power to veto the law.
PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński has explicitly urged the president to do so, framing SAFE as a political as well as financial risk. In his rhetoric, Kaczyński has linked the programme to what he claims is a broader push to increase German influence in Europe, warning against what he described as “Poland under a German boot”.
Nawrocki has echoed some of these concerns, calling SAFE a “huge debt” that Poland would be repaying for years and cautioning against long-term financial dependence. The programme was one of three key items discussed at the most recent meeting of Poland’s National Security Council.
Tusk raises the stakes
Tusk, for his part, has taken the unusually direct step of publicly warning the president against blocking the law. Vetoing SAFE, he said, would represent an “irreparable loss” for Poland.
According to the prime minister, SAFE is the single largest financial project available to enhance Poland’s defence capabilities, armed forces and defence industry using European funds. He stressed its “dual value”: strengthening military readiness while simultaneously boosting domestic industrial capacity.
Among the priorities mentioned by Tusk are the “Eastern Shield” project, counter-drone systems and the procurement of 155 mm ammunition.
By taking the dispute into the open, Tusk has framed the issue as a stark choice: whether Poland will fully exploit European instruments to bolster its security – or allow internal political conflict to override strategic interests.
The SAFE controversy shows that even in one of Europe’s most outspoken supporters of Ukraine and of a hard line towards Russia, defence policy can become hostage to domestic power struggles. The €43.7 billion debate, ultimately, is not just about credit terms, but about who defines Poland’s strategic course – and with what consequences for Kyiv.
The original article in Ukrainian by EUalive’s partner European Pravda can be found here.
Caption: Polish President Karol Nawrocki attends to lay flowers at the monument to General Haller in the fishing port in Puck, northern Poland, 10 February 2026. The president of Poland attended the 106th anniversary celebrations of Poland’s ‘Wedding to the Sea.’ On February 10, 1920, General Józef Haller performed the symbolic Wedding of Poland to the Sea. The ceremony marked Poland’s regained access to the Baltic Sea. EPA/ADAM WARZAWA
Updated: February 18, 2026 - 06:38
