“Plan B” for Ukraine’s EU accession: Brussels’ strategy to counter Hungary’s veto

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has emerged as a persistent obstacle to Ukraine’s European Union (EU) aspirations, shifting from tactical bargaining to an unyielding veto on Kyiv’s accession process. This blockade, now a cornerstone of Orbán’s domestic election campaign, threatens to stall Ukraine’s EU integration indefinitely.

In response, Brussels is quietly developing a “Plan B” to bypass Hungary’s opposition, initiating preliminary steps while hoping to persuade Budapest before fully implementing this controversial workaround. Though not ideal, this strategy aims to keep Ukraine’s EU path alive despite Orbán’s intransigence. However, it carries significant risks, including legal challenges, potential EU disunity, and limited legal impact.

Orbán’s veto and its implications

Orbán’s hardened stance marks a departure from his earlier approach of leveraging Ukraine-related votes for EU concessions. By framing Ukraine as an “enemy of the Hungarian state,” he has made blocking its EU accession a central campaign theme ahead of Hungary’s 2026 parliamentary elections. This veto has already delayed the start of formal accession negotiations, raising concerns that Ukraine’s EU ambitions could be stalled for years unless Orbán relents.

Orbán’s electoral strategy: Crafting Ukraine as the new national enemy

Brussels, aware of this risk, is exploring alternatives. On 9 May, in Lviv, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas acknowledged the existence of a “Plan B” to circumvent Hungary’s veto, though she avoided specifics. This admission contrasts with the EU’s official stance, which emphasizes the need for unanimous consent among all 27 member states for key accession steps. European diplomats privately insist that no legal workaround can bypass this requirement, with one stating, “The final decision rests with Budapest.”

Yet, the European Commission believes a limited bypass is possible without undermining member states’ powers. Discussions on “Plan B,” initiated by the Commission’s enlargement directorate in April 2025, have gained traction despite initial Ukrainian scepticism. While Kyiv has not fully endorsed the plan, its outlines are becoming clearer.

The contours of “Plan B”

Dubbed “parallel negotiations,” Plan B is an insurance policy to be activated if Orbán’s veto persists beyond Hungary’s 2026 elections. The strategy involves proceeding with technical and political steps toward Ukraine’s accession without Hungary’s consent where possible, while acknowledging that legally binding decisions, such as opening negotiation clusters, require unanimity.

A key element is decoupling Ukraine’s accession process from Moldova’s, which faces no Hungarian veto. The EU may prioritise formal negotiations with Moldova to bolster President Maia Sandu’s pro-EU campaign ahead of Moldova’s September 2025 parliamentary elections. However, this risks portraying Ukraine as sidelined, potentially fuelling euroscepticism and undermining domestic reforms. To counter this, Plan B proposes that the 26 non-vetoing EU states engage in “parallel negotiations” with Ukraine, synchronized with Moldova’s progress to maintain the appearance of a unified package.

These negotiations, while lacking legal weight, would carry political significance. For instance, when Moldova opens negotiation clusters, the 26 states could issue statements affirming Ukraine’s readiness to do the same, pending Hungary’s approval. Public elements of the process, such as Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs), could include Ukraine, leveraging EU rules that do not require unanimity to convene such meetings. Joint IGCs for Ukraine and Moldova could further reinforce this symbolic unity.

Early steps and procedural workarounds

Ukraine and the EU have already taken steps toward Plan B, though both avoid publicizing them. On May 14, 2025, Kyiv approved three “roadmaps” on rule of law, public administration reform, and democratic institutions—criteria for opening the first negotiation cluster. Moldova followed suit the same day. These approvals bypassed standard EU procedures, which require a formal EU Council invitation that Hungary has blocked. Instead, Brussels informally provided Kyiv with roadmap parameters, allowing Ukraine to proceed unilaterally.

Poland, holding the EU presidency, endorsed this move. On May 14, Polish Minister for EU Affairs Adam Szlapka visited Kyiv, declaring Ukraine “technically ready” to open negotiations. On May 15, Ukraine submitted its roadmaps to Brussels and Warsaw, alongside a 48-page plan addressing Hungary’s demands on national minority rights. Moldova mirrored this action. The European Commission is now expected to assess these roadmaps, a step that does not require Hungary’s consent, further advancing the process.

Risks and challenges

Plan B is not without flaws, and many EU and Ukrainian diplomats view it sceptically. Key risks include:

Lack of legal weight: Parallel negotiations cannot produce binding outcomes, such as opening negotiation clusters, limiting their practical impact.
EU disunity: Isolating Hungary may fracture the unity of the remaining 26 states. Countries like Bulgaria, facing similar veto disputes with North Macedonia, may resist setting a precedent. Austria has reportedly suggested linking Ukraine’s and North Macedonia’s tracks, complicating consensus.
Legal challenges: Hungary could challenge parallel negotiations in the EU Court of Justice, potentially winning if the process is deemed to violate EU law. However, the court’s slow pace might delay rulings until they are moot.
Orbán’s staying power: Plan B assumes Orbán’s regime will eventually soften or lose power. If he wins in 2026, Ukraine could face prolonged exclusion unless a compromise is reached.
Minority rights dispute: Even a post-Orbán Hungarian government is likely to demand concessions on minority rights, a politically sensitive issue in Ukraine.

Strategic considerations

Despite these risks, Plan B offers a pragmatic way to maintain momentum. By aligning Ukraine’s reform agenda with EU expectations, it counters Eurosceptic narratives and sustains public support for integration. The EU’s proactive approach also signals commitment to Ukraine, mitigating the fallout from prioritizing Moldova.

Efforts to persuade Orbán continue, with hopes pinned on the 26-27 June EU summit or the post-Polish presidency period starting in July. However, Orbán’s alignment with Russian interests and his domestic political strategy suggest the veto will persist. External pressure, such as from the United States, could shift his stance, but no such intervention is currently evident.

Caption: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban attends a joint press conference following a meeting with the Slovak prime minister in Bratislava, Slovakia, 28 April 2025. [EPA-EFE/MARTIN DIVISEK]