EditPfizergate: unraveling the EU commission’s veil of secrecy
If a formal probe is launched by the European Prosecutor's Office, the VDL Commission's future could hang in the balance
Few actions in the EU Commission have attracted more attention than the discussions between the President von der Leyen and the Chief Executive Officer of Pfizer in March and April 2021 which resulted in Pfizer winning a contract to supply the EU with 1.8 billion doses of COVID vaccine.
The lack of transparency surrounding the contract has been the subject of a highly critical report by the European Ombudsman, a stinging judgement by the EU General Court, of extraordinary revelations by the European Court of Auditors, two separate probes by Belgium judicial authorities, an investigation by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) which has still to reach a conclusion and several unsuccessful interventions in the EU Parliament.
Despite all this, four years after the EU Commission signed the multi-billion-euro contract with Pfizer/BioNTech, details of the negotiations between that Commission President and the Pfizer CEO remain a mystery. Multiple questions remain to be answered, and they are not all political. Keeping everybody in the dark is not an option for the Commission.
The EU vaccines strategy
On 12 June 2020 EU Health Ministers agreed that the EU Commission would buy the vaccines needed by the EU member states. It was felt that centralising the purchase of vaccines, could help accelerate the development, manufacturing and deployment of COVID-19 vaccines and ensure that the EU could make the ‘best deals’ with suppliers. It would also be a sign of ‘EU solidarity’ and avoid a position where richer EU member states would ‘outbid’ poorer member states. At the time of the Council meeting Germany, France, Netherlands and Italy were completing an advance purchase agreement with AstraZeneca for 300 million doses.
On 17 June the European Commission unveiled the EU Vaccines Strategy. The following day a procurement Steering Board consisting of one representative per member state and co-chaired by the European Commission and a member state representative was established. A seven-person Joint Negotiation Team (JNT) was also put in place to take charge of negotiating the contracts.
Delivering on the strategy
On paper the EU looked ‘ready to go. Implementing the strategy proved to be an Achilles heel. The EU fell behind the UK and the US at each stage of its COVID strategy.
The EU signed its first Advance Purchase Agreement for COVID vaccines in August 2020. The UK made a similar purchase agreement with AstraZeneca in May and the US ‘signed up’ in July.
The UK also beat the EU to the line in authorising vaccines for use. The UK authorised use of the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine on 2 December 2020. It cleared the AstraZeneca vaccine for use four weeks later. The European Medicines agency authorised the two vaccines on 21 December 2020 and 29 January 2021 respectively.
Mass vaccinations got underway in the UK on 8 December 2020, in the US three days later and in the EU on 27 December. While only days apart in terms of starting to administer vaccines, the EU rapidly fell behind. By 5 February the UK had administered 16.5 doses per 100 people, the US had administered 10.6 vaccines per 100 the EU figure was 3.5 doses administered per 100 population. Serbia, which bought vaccines from Russia and China, had administered 8 doses per 100 people.
Vaccine supplies were an early problem for the EU. A March 2021 report by the EU Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) found that virtually all EU member states were experiencing vaccine supply problems.
Poorly framed EU contracts with suppliers which contained multiple ‘let out clauses’ allowed producers to prioritise deliveries to other customers when production problems arose. At the time the EU was trying to ramp up vaccinations, AstraZeneca, without any real penalty, delivered 31 million vaccine doses instead of an expected 80 million doses. A legal action against the company launched in April 2021 produced a less than impressive outcome for the EU. There were also problems with the delivery of the Pfizer vaccines. The company slowed vaccine deliveries of vaccines in January 2021 to make ‘manufacturing adjustments.’
Mounting political discontent
By January 2021 criticism of the EU Vaccines Strategy was growing. In mid-January Italy threatened legal action against Pfizer. An ill-judged effort by the Commission to conserve vaccine supplies involving restrictions on the export of EU produced vaccines across the Irish border into Northern Ireland produced a furious reaction from Dublin. The measure, which was immediately dropped, was seen as a sign of growing panic within the Commission.
The criticism was particularly loud in Germany. Olaf Scholz, then Vice Chancellor, is reported as describing the EU vaccine strategy as ‘a pile of crap’ during a cabinet meeting. The Bild newspaper labelled the EU vaccine contracts ‘a complete disaster’ pointing to 18 let-out clauses which essentially allowed vaccine producers to determine when to deliver vaccines. The paper’s lead political correspondent wrote that President von der Leyen had “disgraced Europe”. Der Spiegel described the EU efforts to secure the vaccines as “hare-brained”.
President von der Leyen takes over
In early February 2021 von der Leyen accepted that there had been failures with the EU Vaccines Strategy, accepting that the EU was “still not where we want to be.” While indicating that there were questions that would have to be answered the President avoided going into specifics
The following month, the process of setting contracts for EU vaccine supplies was changed. A Steering Board meeting with scientific advisors to discuss strategy for 2022 scheduled for mid-March was cancelled abruptly. As that was happening, discussions on what was to be the largest single EU contract for COVID vaccines were underway between President von der Leyen and Pfizer/BioNTech CEO. The Commission President effectively displaced the arrangements introduced in June 2020 to oversee, negotiate and to validate the contracts at the core of the EU COVID strategy.
In April 2021 the Commission presented the arrangements negotiated between von der Leyen and the Pfizer CEO to the Steering Board and a call for tender was launched. On 20 May 2021 the Commission signed a contract – worth an estimated €35 billion if fully executed – for 1.8 billion vaccine doses by far the largest contract completed between the EU and any vaccine supplier with Pfizer/BioNTech
Taken with contracts signed with Pfizer/BioNTech in November 2020 and February 2021, the deal signed on 20 May meant that Pfizer/BioNTech accounted for over half of all Covid vaccines ordered by the EU during the COVID-19 emergency.
Keeping everybody in the dark
In her 2022 report on the Commission’s handling of the request from the New York Times the EU Ombudsman was unequivocal about the Commission’s efforts determining maladministration had occurred. While stopping short of accusing the Commission of lying Ombudsman O’Reilly’s conclusion that Commission behaviour left “the regrettable impression of an EU institution that is not forthcoming on matters of significant public interest” came close. As commented in an earlier article, such a damning criticism if levelled at the administration in most EU member states would have significant repercussions – but not in Brussels or Strasbourg.
The ruling of the EU General Court on 14 May in the legal action taken by the New York Times (NYT) was another substantial rebuff for the Commission. The court’s conclusion that “the explanations given by the Commission […] do not suffice to provide a credible explanation of why those documents could not be found,” again raises a fundamental question about truthfulness and credibility.
A special report issued by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) released in September 2022 raises questions that go beyond maladministration.
In the report the European Court of Auditors (ECA) notes that while the EU vaccine procurement process had produced a diverse ‘portfolio of vaccine candidates’ the contract arrangements put in place failed to include provisions to deal with supply disruptions. It also noted that the procurement process was “not sufficiently assessed” and had not been “scrutinised or benchmarked” by the Commission “to draw lessons for the future.
Turning to the Pfizer/BioNTech contract for 1.8 billion vaccine doses the ECA makes a number of startling revelations.
It makes the point (para 48) that the preliminary negotiations between President von der Leyen and Pfizer/BioNTech in March 2021 was “the only contract for which the Joint Negotiation Team was not involved — contrary to the Commission decision on procuring COVID-19 vaccines”.
The ECA asked to be provided with information on the preliminary negotiations on the Pfizer agreement and the discussions between the Commission President and Pfizer/BioNTech. Specifically, the Auditors sought details of the scientific experts consulted, advice received, the timing of the talks, records of the discussions and details of the agreed terms and conditions. In the words of the ECA “However, none was forthcoming”. The ECA was looking for something more substantial for text messages, it was looking for records relating to a multi-billion Euro contract which, one must assume, the Commission holds. Refusing access to that information was a very deliberate decision by the Commission.
In its report, the ECA makes the point that the way it was treated in relation to the discussions between the Commission President and Pfizer/BioNTech was strikingly different from the level of cooperation it received on other aspects of its examination of the vaccine procurement programme.
In an early section of the Special Report (Para 14) the ECA describes the cooperation it received with Commission officials and Director’s General, notes that it was given direct access to data and to the Commission’s legal services. It emphasises that it was given “access to all Commission documents, with the exception to the President of the Commission’s involvement in preliminary negotiations with Pfizer/BioNTech.”
The Court of Auditors makes no attempt to explain why material relating to the Commission President’s involvement with Pfizer/BioNTech was withheld from it or where the issue should be taken next. That is unsurprising – in the words of the British judge, Lord Denning, “the auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound.” Depending on the circumstances withholding information from the ECA could be regarded as a criminal offence.
In October 2022 the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) confirmed that it was investigating the acquisition of COVID-19 vaccines in the European Union. In May 2023 EPPO announced that an investigation arising from a complaint made to Belgium judicial authorities in the city of Liège had been passed to it. What final decision, if any, has been taken by the EPPO is unclear.
Can the veil be parted?
The EU Commission which is frequently accused of failing to meet the EU’s standards for openness and transparency has stonewalled to an extraordinary level on the Pfizer/BioNTech May 2022 contract. The ruling of the General Court on 14 May on the denial has put the issue back in the spotlight. The revelations by the Court of Auditors make it clear that information was withheld from it by the Commission in relation to the negotiations with Pfizer. Withholding information from the ECA have significantly more serious consequences than denying the New York Times access to text messages. Hindering the Court of Auditors’ ability to fulfil its responsibilities could constitute a criminal offence. Were an formal investigation to be triggered into the Commission’s actions the survival of the Commission could be put in question. The Commission may not be out of the woods on the Pfizer contract yet.
EUalive’s columnist Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister of State for European Affairs. His columns can be found here.
Caption: Illustrative photo. A dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech Comirnaty Omicron XBB 1.5 Covid-19 vaccine is displayed on a table during a free walk-in clinic hosted by L.A. Care and Blue Shield of California Promise Health at the Community Resource Center in Pacoima, California, USA 5 October 2023. EPA/CAROLINE BREHMAN
Updated: August 20, 2025 - 05:34
