Peevski Über Alles: Bulgaria’s descent into political turmoil

Delyan Peevski’s camp operates on a clear hypothesis: amassing official political power is the best path to lifting the U.S. Global Magnitsky sanctions weighing on him, Ilian Vassilev writes.

Ilian Vassilev is a former Bulgarian ambassador to Moscow, now a media publisher and commentator. His website Alternativata is a content partner of EUalive.

Over the past week, Bulgaria has been engulfed in a political storm that raises grave concerns about the state of its democracy. At the heart of this escalating crisis is Delyan Peevski, a controversial power broker whose growing influence alarms citizens, experts, and Bulgaria’s European partners.

While Bulgaria has officially joined the Schengen area and prepares for eurozone accession in 2026, internal political developments threaten to undermine its reputation as a stable EU member. Instead of advancing integration and governance reforms, Bulgaria risks democratic backsliding—a trajectory that could isolate it within the European Union and jeopardize the benefits of membership.

Several parallel developments demand urgent attention:

The failed bid to lift Magnitsky sanctions

Efforts to remove Delyan Peevski from the U.S. Global Magnitsky sanctions list, imposed in 2021 for significant corruption, have collapsed. Despite lobbying by Boyko Borissov and the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry—including appeals to U.S. Senator Marco Rubio and Donald Trump Jr.—Washington has remained silent. This silence is resounding: the sanctions endure.

The failure exposes the limits of backdoor diplomacy and shatters the notion that alignment with Trump-style politics guarantees immunity. While transactional, Trumpism is not universal, and it has failed to shield Peevski from U.S. law.

Peevski’s Plan B: seizing the state

With sanctions intact, Peevski has pivoted to consolidating power domestically. His strategy involves sidelining critics, dominating institutions, and expanding control over Bulgaria’s legislative and executive branches.

His “New Beginning” movement is the vehicle for this takeover, aiming to eclipse the reformist opposition and potentially absorb or displace GERB, Borissov’s party. What began as an informal alliance with Borissov is evolving into a hostile takeover, with GERB at risk of being hollowed out or fully captured.

Peevski’s camp operates on a clear hypothesis: amassing official political power is the best path to lifting U.S. sanctions. His ambition reportedly includes a senior post, possibly even the premiership. The logic is pragmatic: if Peevski secures a formal leadership role in a NATO ally’s government, the U.S. might be forced to reconsider its stance, as seen in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán’s chief of staff was quietly removed from the Magnitsky list after assuming a top post.

Peevski is openly signaling his ascent through frequent photo ops with mayors and local leaders, not only from his Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) but also from GERB, indicating his infiltration of Borissov’s base. Consolidating local support requires financing, fueled by the national budget, entrenched corruption networks, and the increasingly lucrative “border business.”

Schengen, the Eurozone, and the border business

Bulgaria’s entry into Schengen and preparations for eurozone accession should mark institutional maturity. Yet, a darker reality undermines these milestones. Peevski’s growing dominance casts doubt on Bulgaria’s ability to safeguard the EU’s southeastern flank.

Through control over security services, customs, and intelligence, a shadow economy thrives: Russian sanctions are circumvented, trafficking in goods, people, and drugs flourishes, and corruption at border checkpoints generates political capital. Schengen has amplified this gray economy, with strategically managed border permeability serving as a cash cow. For Peevski, this is not a byproduct but the engine of his political project.

Bulgaria’s vulnerable institutions are being repurposed to entrench power, financed not by public trust but by illicit flows and backroom deals. The border—Europe’s gateway—has become the foundation of a political architecture that trades sovereignty for influence and turns integration into extraction.

A familiar script, higher stakes

This playbook echoes the early 2000s, when Borissov leveraged underworld ties into political capital. However, Peevski’s gambit is bolder, backed by powerful allies, fewer constraints, and a geopolitically volatile moment that weakens international resolve to counter creeping autocracy.

If unchallenged, the border business will not only fund Peevski’s campaign but institutionalize a system where smuggling and patronage supplant democratic accountability. Where Europe and Bulgaria’s democratic forces see risk, Peevski sees opportunity.

His “prime minister” project hinges on a paradox: the instability he creates can be transformed into societal and institutional control, sanctions can be leveraged into status, and European membership can be stripped of values, reduced to a passport for corruption.

The media laundromat

Bulgaria’s mainstream media no longer serves as a watchdog but as an extension of Peevski’s power. This well-oiled machine has two primary functions: rehabilitating Peevski’s image and discrediting his opponents.

A coordinated narrative across television, online platforms, and “expert” panels recasts Peevski as a pragmatic statesman and patriotic savior, erasing his legacy as a symbol of corruption. This mirrors the media strategy that propelled Borissov in the early 2000s, blending populist imagery, selective silence, and myth-making.

Yet, public opinion remains a hurdle. Polls from 2024 show 87% of Bulgarians disapprove of Peevski. No amount of spin can easily erase years of distrust and sanctions. Thus, the PR campaign is paired with a darker tactic: suppressing dissent.

Praise for the leader, persecution for dissent

Peevski’s efforts aim to create a controlled political environment where praise is amplified and criticism is punished. This involves authoritarian tactics: media glorification bordering on a cult of personality, institutional pressure via the prosecutor’s office and security services, and smear campaigns targeting protest organizers, journalists, and activists.

Peevski avoids open debate or independent interviews, speaking only on his terms. This curated silence allows the media to inflate his image, presenting ambition as patriotism. However, resistance persists.

Memory, resistance, and the fight for the narrative

Bulgaria’s civil society remains active, with memories of the 2013 and 2020 protests, where Peevski symbolized systemic corruption. The media machine’s second task is to erode this resistance, using familiar tactics: discrediting protest leaders, questioning the timing of unrest, and sowing doubt about motives.

These are not mere talking points but a deliberate divide-and-rule strategy to weaken solidarity. In 2025, power consolidates not through a coup but through narrative control, dissent erosion, and the normalization of the unacceptable.

When the carrot fails, enter the stick

With soft approaches—bribes, appeasement, and image campaigns—failing, Peevski has shifted to repression. His recruitment of former Interior Minister Kalin Stoyanov, who declared “the streets will no longer determine who governs,” signals this intent. Increased salaries for security and law enforcement create a loyal base, while a cadre of media figures and operatives stands ready to silence dissent.

A controlled media environment masks scandals, buries investigations, and numbs outrage, forming the backbone of Peevski’s regime. In his vision, there are no equal partners—only subordinates. Ahmed Dogan and now Borissov have learned this lesson.

Peevski’s parallel state

Peevski is not building a government but an architecture of control, rooted in border business managers, enablers in customs and intelligence, and corrupt patronage systems. This pyramidic, autocratic structure thrives on illicit capital, sidelining independent media, civic institutions, and democratic checks. A shadow state emerges, where ambition is funded by organized crime, and democratic rhetoric is hollowed out.

The Orbán connection: a geopolitical realignment

Internationally, Peevski has found a model in Viktor Orbán. As GERB’s influence in the European People’s Party wanes, Peevski positions his New Beginning movement to join Orbán’s far-right European Parliament group, signaling a shift from pro-European conservatism to authoritarian populism.

This is strategic, not ideological. By co-opting Borissov’s clientelist machine, including the symbolic Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), Peevski consolidates the mainstream right, accelerating Bulgaria’s drift toward “illiberal democracy”—autocracy under a democratic façade. Orbán’s model of centralized power and institutional capture is Peevski’s template.

Smuggling, sovereignty, and authoritarianism

Peevski’s ascent is underwritten by illicit revenues from smuggling routes across the Turkish border and Black Sea ports. These provide funding and leverage, turning corruption into political capital for tradeoffs with Russia and Turkey. Wrapped in “patriotic conservatism,” Peevski sells himself as Bulgaria’s Orbán or Trump, but his trajectory risks domestic authoritarianism rooted in elite impunity.

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office has launched investigations, some potentially targeting Peevski. This scrutiny drives his quest for power: transforming personal legal liabilities into a national standoff against European allies.

The Moscow anchor

With Western legitimacy faltering, Peevski is reactivating ties with Russia, backed by Orbán and tacitly accepted by Ankara. The Kremlin sees his ascent as a lever to destabilize Bulgaria, especially amid Western support for Ukraine. The freezing of a gunpowder plant near Smyadovo, set to boost ammunition exports to Ukraine, signals this alignment, while a proposed Rheinmetall joint venture remains distant.

OCCRP investigations document Peevski’s links to Russian entities and proxies, including the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Through control over customs and smuggling channels, he offers Moscow a backdoor for evading EU sanctions. Gazprom’s 2024 profit surge, tied to gas flows through Bulgaria, underscores his role.

Peevski avoids overt pro-Russian rhetoric to maintain deniability, letting proxies handle messaging while reaping Kremlin goodwill. This aligns with Russia’s regional goals: weakening institutional resilience and expanding influence.

Peevski as a systemic threat

Peevski’s rise signals the decay of Bulgarian democracy and a geopolitical shift masked by EU and NATO membership—a continuation of Borissov’s legacy. Like Orbán, Peevski is building a system where repression, media capture, and patronage replace competition, creating a “Trojan horse” within the EU: a state that absorbs European funds but abandons its values.

The threat is not formal EU exit but a hollowed-out membership, undermining integration as Bulgaria seeks eurozone entry. Peevski’s personal survival risks becoming a national crisis, positioning Bulgaria in opposition to the EU.

This is no longer just about Peevski but whether Bulgaria will resist authoritarianism or succumb. The collision between his model and the European project is inevitable. The question is whether Bulgarian society and its European allies will act in time.

An original version of this article was published with Alternativata, a content partner of EUalive.

Caption: Archive photo. A man holds a sign as people take part in an anti-government protest in front of the Council of Ministers in Sofia, Bulgaria, 24 July 2020. Thousands of protesters met for many days demanding the resignation of the prime minister Boyko Borissov, the prosecutor general, Ivan Geshev, and stopping the rise to power of Delyan Peevski. [EPA-EFE/VASSIL DONEV]

Updated: May 6, 2025 - 05:28