Operation “Cleansing Fire”: Magyar accelerates purge of Orbán-era institutions

In a dramatic acceleration of his post-election agenda, Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar has announced on 22 June plans to amend the constitution to remove President Tamás Sulyok from office. The move forms part of a broader initiative to dismantle remnants of Viktor Orbán’s long-dominant system, which Magyar and his Tisza Party characterize as a network of cronyism and state capture. In several public statements, Magyar framed these actions as essential to restoring the rule of law, combating entrenched corruption, and realigning Hungary with European democratic standards.

Magyar’s government, fresh from a landslide victory in April, wasted little time in signaling its intent. The prime minister set a deadline for Sulyok to resign, which passed without compliance. Now, lawmakers from the Tisza Party are preparing to submit the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law. This change would explicitly terminate the incumbent president’s mandate shortly after its entry into force, paving the way for parliament to elect a successor for a transitional period of up to five years. Magyar has projected that Sulyok could be out of office around mid-July, with a new president selected before 20 August.

The constitutional battle for the Presidency

Sulyok, appointed during Orbán’s tenure and previously president of the Constitutional Court, has vowed to resist what he sees as an abuse of parliamentary power. In interviews, he accused Magyar’s administration of seeking a faster and more absolute concentration of authority than Orbán achieved over 16 years. The president has appealed to the Constitutional Court and sought an opinion from the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, framing the situation as a potential crisis. Several judges recused themselves from related proceedings, complicating the legal landscape.

Magyar counters that Sulyok acted as a guarantor not of balance but of Orbán’s interests, turning a blind eye to systemic abuses. The amendment process, he insists, respects the constitution’s provisions while addressing a president unwilling to fulfill legal obligations. If Sulyok refuses to promulgate the amendment after parliamentary approval, Magyar has indicated that impeachment could follow, with the Speaker of the National Assembly temporarily assuming presidential duties. Critics, including Orbán allies, denounce the effort as politically motivated “slander,” while supporters hail it as a necessary purge of compromised institutions.

For Magyar, the stakes extend beyond one office: the changes also target other Orbán-era appointees, including through age limits for constitutional judges that could affect figures like Constitutional Court President Péter Polt, and reforms empowering judges in the selection and accountability of top judicial leaders.

Parliamentary term limits are another flashpoint. Feedback from public consultations on the amendment has prompted discussions about tightening them further, potentially to eight years, though the current proposal applies prospectively. Magyar emphasizes that these measures respond to genuine citizen input rather than costly, performative national consultations of the past.

Operation “Cleansing Fire”: reclaiming state assets and fighting corruption

Parallel to the presidential ouster, Magyar has unveiled “Operation Cleansing Fire” (also referenced in contexts as elements of “Operation Purgatory”), a comprehensive political and legal campaign against corruption. Central to this is the creation of a National Office for the Protection and Recovery of Assets, tasked with investigating misuse of public funds over the past two decades. The government plans to amend dozens of laws to empower this body, which will operate with significant resources, around 10 billion forints (28.2 million euros) annually, and leadership selected through open competition, earning ministerial-level salaries with narrow removal provisions.

Magyar has drawn parallels between Orbán’s governance and historical mafia structures, particularly their exploitation of EU funds. He pledged to prevent violent fallout while aggressively recovering assets and curbing unjust enrichment. The office will examine allegations across institutions, though some key positions like the Prosecutor General are expected to see voluntary resignations or further action later. Public support, according to the prime minister, is strong for these transparency measures.

Economically, Magyar links corruption to a substantial drain, estimated at 8-10% of GDP, hindering Hungary’s potential. Unlocking EU funds, totaling billions, depends on demonstrating credible rule-of-law reforms. By addressing judicial independence, media influence, and institutional capture, the government aims to satisfy Brussels while rebuilding domestic trust. A broader constitutional review, including a potential new Fundamental Law ratified by referendum, could introduce direct presidential elections in the future.

Orbán’s media empire shrinks as state funding dries up

Opposition voices and Orbán loyalists warn that these rapid changes risk undermining institutional stability and concentrating power anew. Márton Hajdu, a Tisza lawmaker, dismissed such claims, pointing to the previous regime’s failures to check abuses. Yet the speed and scope invite scrutiny: can a supermajority elected on an anti-Orbán wave legitimately overhaul the system without echoing the centralisation it condemns?

Sources: Forbes.hu, Telex, FocusEurope.pl, Reuters, Politico

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Caption: Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar (C) speaks during an extraordinary session of the Hungarian Parliament in Budapest, Hungary, 22 June 2026. EPA/Boglarka Bodnar HUNGARY OUT