EditNorth Macedonia in NATO: a formal ally, a questionable partner
Skopje’s actions often stand in complete contradiction to the formally declared, desirable, and appropriate conduct and policies expected within NATO
the authorities in North Macedonia are unwilling to behave as a normal and stable NATO member and are pursuing interests that diverge significantly from the Alliance’s common objectives and obligations, writes Professor Oliver Andonov of the Skopje Military Academy.
Ahead of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it is worthwhile to examine North Macedonia’s participation in NATO, particularly through the lens of its implementation of policies aligned with NATO’s defence concept, as well as its conduct and reliability amid emerging geopolitical developments.
Several interconnected perspectives must be considered together to form a complete picture of North Macedonia within the Alliance. This is essential for a realistic assessment of its behaviour as a member, the level of trust it enjoys among partners, its cooperation with allies, the actual readiness of its capabilities, the development of its defence capacities, the strengthening of societal resilience, defence spending, regional influences, adherence to common defence policies – especially regarding third countries – and its participation in arms and military equipment transportation deals involving questionable states.
We emphasise these criteria because North Macedonia’s actions often stand in complete contradiction to the formally declared, desirable, and appropriate conduct and policies expected within NATO.
This contradiction is not limited to its relations with Bulgaria. Skopje’s day-to-day politics persistently create and intensify tensions with Bulgaria while presenting these relations in a completely distorted manner to the domestic public. The problem Macedonia creates extends beyond its own relationship with NATO; it also damages relations between NATO allies. This bilateral “problem” is used almost daily to portray relations as irresolvable, shifting the focus from political disagreements to an increasingly societal and interpersonal conflict between the two communities. Such a development is particularly dangerous for the region and, consequently, for NATO’s Southern Flank.
Is North Macedonia a reliable NATO partner?
No, it is not. Simply put, North Macedonia is a conflict-prone society in which existing and latent internal security risks make it vulnerable and turn it into an exporter of instability to the region — and consequently to NATO itself.
Russian influence maintains strong positions in North Macedonia through various social groups and religious communities, but most notably through direct influence within the government. The country has a Deputy Prime Minister, Ivan Stoiljković, who maintains direct and close ties with Putin, while the authorities expect their declarative statements about being a reliable NATO member to be accepted at face value.
Of course, Russian influence through Stoiljković is not exclusively Russian; there is also direct involvement from Belgrade. Relations with Serbia and its influence on North Macedonia will be addressed in a separate analysis.
What is important to note is that the creation of tensions with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as North Macedonia’s failure to join the European Union, can also be viewed as consequences of Russian influence. This represents a prolonged strategy of cultivating distrust toward allies and among allies within NATO, and in the long term, within the European Union as well.
This deliberately cultivated conflict with Greece and Bulgaria in particular, together with latent tensions with Albania – especially when viewed through the prism of both future and past relations with Macedonian Albanians — provides a comprehensive picture of North Macedonia as an (un)reliable NATO member.
It should be emphasised that this assessment concerns exclusively political relations and political tensions. The idea of meaningful military or military-technical cooperation within NATO, or any other form of regional alignment with NATO partners through sub-alliances, defence-industrial cooperation, or technological development, remains largely imaginary rather than a reflection of reality. North Macedonia has effectively isolated itself from such cooperation. There is no serious cooperation with NATO allies, even on a bilateral basis. Formal relations with Turkey – such as the purchase of artillery systems and the receipt of equipment and vehicles as assistance – do not constitute serious strategic cooperation. Annual visits by the Prime Minister or attendance at defence exhibitions by the Minister of Defence are treated primarily as public-relations opportunities for domestic consumption rather than genuine efforts to build effective military-technological ties.
This clearly indicates that the authorities in North Macedonia are unwilling to behave as a normal and stable NATO member and are pursuing interests that diverge significantly from the Alliance’s common objectives and obligations.
North Macedonia’s approach to European NATO initiatives
A particularly important issue is North Macedonia’s attitude toward European NATO initiatives such as the Coalition of the Willing and the Westminster Coalition, its refusal to join various regional alliances within NATO, its lack of support for European NATO partners, and, above all, its decision to cease providing any meaningful assistance to Ukraine – whether material, humanitarian, or military – in its defence against Russian aggression.
Formally, North Macedonia supports Ukraine, but in practice it has done almost nothing over the past two years, particularly since the government led by Mickoski took power. This is widely seen as evidence of direct Russian influence within the Macedonian government, which operates under Moscow’s scrutiny and, through Belgrade’s mediation, is unable to take meaningful steps to assist Ukraine.
At the same time, different explanations are offered to different audiences. One narrative is intended for NATO allies — who are often treated as if they were adversaries – where information is withheld or sharing is avoided. Another is directed at the Macedonian public, portraying “sovereignty and courage” in refusing to assist Ukraine, using the same argument promoted by Orbán: that the country must preserve its weapons for its own defence.
These narratives are not only inaccurate but also damaging to NATO as a whole, as they create the perception that North Macedonia should rely primarily on itself rather than on the Alliance. Such an approach fosters distrust toward NATO within Macedonian society
.North Macedonia’s capabilities to contribute to NATO, including defence spending, further reveal the government’s actual policies. By avoiding participation in regional sub-alliances and refusing to engage in technological cooperation, defence-industrial development, and joint resilience models, this anti-NATO policy becomes increasingly visible. North Macedonia has chosen, of its own accord, to exclude itself from the more serious and strategically significant NATO activities.
Prioritising NATO infrastructure
One project of genuine strategic importance for NATO is the development of Corridor VIII. Yet even persistent British efforts have not succeeded in elevating North Macedonia’s capabilities within NATO from a merely tactical level to an operational one.
Relations with European NATO allies remain minimal in practical terms. It is largely due to British persistence that any noticeable momentum exists with the United Kingdom. However, the Macedonian government’s inability to prepare and implement major strategic infrastructure projects has become increasingly apparent.
The Macedonian government’s attempts to project commitment and a pro-British orientation will not be sufficient to change perceptions or justify its position before NATO partners, particularly among European members of the Alliance.
The net assessment of North Macedonia’s contribution to NATO’s Southern Flank
The reality remains unchanged and, in some respects, is even worse than it was one or two years ago. There is no concrete cooperation with immediate NATO neighbours, with the United Kingdom as its declared new strategic partner, or with Croatia. There has been no meaningful progress on corridors connecting NATO member states on the Southern Flank, nor investments or partnerships in the defence industry and modern technologies.
North Macedonia is simply not working on building and strengthening resilience to become a reliable, strong, and significant NATO member at the strategic or even operational level. Internal defence preparations and resilience-building have effectively stalled, particularly regarding participation in the NATO Coordinating Council on migration, disinformation, and intelligence-sharing.
Consequently, there are no meaningful exchanges of information, pointing to a lack of trustworthiness. This situation also negatively affects North Macedonia’s internal societal resilience. All genuinely necessary activities have not been halted by NATO partners; they are the result of North Macedonia’s own complete inactivity. Whether this stems from incompetence or deliberate policy, it points to a clear lack of credibility and a loss of trust among NATO partners.
North Macedonia’s credibility challenge within the alliance
A major obstacle to building trust is the strained relationship with Bulgaria. What began as a political dispute has escalated into encouragement of terrorist acts, including the arson of vehicles belonging to the Bulgarian Embassy in Skopje. Such developments were to be expected after sections of the Macedonian media engaged in vulgar attacks against Bulgarian officials – actions left unsanctioned by Macedonian institutions, with no public condemnation from the government.
This is a classic example of fostering distrust within NATO’s Southern Flank and is one of the key issues that should be raised with North Macedonia at the Ankara Summit.
North Macedonia’s relationship with NATO is further complicated by its alleged involvement in questionable transfers of military equipment and weapons from NATO and EU member states, through private companies and via North Macedonia, to third countries.
The core “defence policy” of the Mickoski government appears centred on defence expenditures presented to NATO – mostly purchases of weapons and equipment – and on maintaining a business-oriented relationship with the United States in the hope of securing political support for the government’s survival. Beyond this, virtually all meaningful activities related to the country’s own defence and its contribution to NATO have come to an end.
The upcoming NATO Summit in Ankara will likely provide important indications about the future direction of the Alliance. For North Macedonia, it represents another opportunity – and another test – of whether it is willing to act as a genuine and reliable member of the Alliance.
The original article published by EUalive’s partner Altanalyses can be found here.
Caption: Prime Minister of the Republic of North Macedonia Hristijan Mickoski (R) attends the presentation of Stryker armored vehicles at the ‘Strasho Pindzur’ barracks in Petrovec near Skopje, North Macedonia, 25 March 2026. The vehicles are being procured from the United States under a government-to-government deal to equip the Army of North Macedonia with light armored vehicles alongside Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs). All 96 JLTVs have been delivered, while the first batch of 17 Strykers out of 42 is presented at the event. EPA/GEORGI LICOVSKI
Updated: June 20, 2026 - 06:47
