New war of words between Spajić and Vučić deepens Serbia-Montenegro rift

Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić on Tuesday accused Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić of acting as “Russia’s PR” and applying double standards in foreign policy, intensifying a public dispute between the two neighboring countries. Spajić’s remarks came in response to Vučić’s claims that authorities in Podgorica seek the worst possible relations with Serbia and aim to “re-educate” the country’s Serb population.

In a post on the social network X, Spajić stated that Montenegro does not want conflict with Serbia but wants good-neighborly relations together with a clear European policy. “It is not particularly appropriate from the position he occupies for him to take on the role of Russia’s PR and teach others lessons in principle,” Spajić wrote. He then asked how Serbia ranks among significant sources of weapons and ammunition for Ukraine while sending one message to Moscow and another to Europe. “We in Montenegro do not have a problem with a clear position. We only have a problem with double standards,” the prime minister added.

The exchange forms part of a broader deterioration in relations that has accelerated as Montenegro advances toward European Union membership while Serbia’s accession process remains largely stalled. Serbian officials quickly responded. Ana Brnabić, president of the Serbian parliament, accused official Podgorica of wishing the worst for Serbia and the Serbian people, citing Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, its stance on the 1995 Croatian military operation Storm, and the status of the Serbian language. Miloš Vučević, president of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, said politicians in Podgorica repeatedly seek political cover by attacking Vučić and Serbia. He rejected the arms-export criticism, arguing that Serbia does not give away weapons or join other people’s wars and that Montenegro lacks understanding of global trade because it has no dedicated defense industry.

Historical grievances and geopolitical stakes

Recent friction has also focused on recent commemorations of the 1995 Croatian operation Storm, which Serbian sources describe as one of the largest episodes of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. Serbian officials have criticized Montenegro for sending representatives to Croatian events while, in their view, showing insufficient solidarity with Serb victims. Parallel tensions have arisen over the Serbian Orthodox Church, dual citizenship proposals, and alleged Serbian political influence inside Montenegro.

🔙 Knin, August 5, 2026
Thousands of Croatians, including fans of various Croatian clubs, marched through the streets of Knin to mark the 31st anniversary of the fall of the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. That event was the result of Operation Storm in 1995—a… pic.twitter.com/cj6xeX6qGq
— Udruga za bolju Hrvatsku (@Bolja_Hrvatska) August 11, 2026

The dispute over Serbia’s arms trade adds a contemporary geopolitical dimension. Independent reporting and intelligence assessments have indicated that significant quantities of Serbian-produced munitions have reached Ukraine through third-country intermediaries since 2022. Belgrade maintains that these are commercial transactions and that Serbia has not directly supplied either side of the conflict. Russian agencies have publicly criticized the practice, while Serbian leaders continue to cultivate close political and energy ties with Moscow. Spajić’s intervention framed this dual messaging as incompatible with lectures on principle.

European ambitions and regional influence

The deeper conflict concerns influence. Serbian political and media ecosystems continue to treat Montenegro as part of a broader Serbian cultural space. Nationalist rhetoric about a “Serbian world,” dual citizenship proposals, and repeated interventions on behalf of the Serb minority are viewed in Podgorica as challenges to sovereignty. Montenegro’s NATO membership in 2017 was already a bitter pill for Belgrade; EU membership would represent a still greater symbolic and practical separation. Some Serbian commentators have openly described Montenegro’s potential accession as a “slap in the face” to Vučić’s regional standing.

Serbia obtained candidate status in 2012 but has advanced far more slowly. Only a small number of chapters have been provisionally closed. Progress has been hampered by rule-of-law concerns, incomplete normalization with Kosovo, and Belgrade’s refusal to fully align with EU sanctions against Russia. Vučić has publicly expressed skepticism about rapid enlargement and has at times called for the Western Balkan countries to join the EU as a group, a position interpreted in Montenegro as an effort to slow its own progress and retain regional influence.

For Montenegro, the European path is also a way of consolidating its independent statehood after centuries of shifting unions and after the traumatic 1990s. For Serbia, an independent Montenegro racing into the EU while Serbia remains outside risks isolating Belgrade and reducing its leverage over neighboring Serb communities. The result is a cycle of mutual suspicion: every Montenegrin reform or diplomatic gesture is scrutinized in Belgrade for anti-Serb intent, while every Serbian statement on identity or Kosovo is read in Podgorica as interference.

The latest exchanges, conducted largely on social media platforms, show how quickly bilateral relations can deteriorate when larger geopolitical questions – Russia’s war in Ukraine, the credibility of EU enlargement, and the unfinished business of the former Yugoslavia – intersect with domestic politics. Spajić insists Montenegro seeks good-neighborly relations alongside a clear European orientation. Serbian officials counter that Podgorica’s actions, from Kosovo recognition to language policy to participation in commemorations that Belgrade regards as celebrations of ethnic cleansing, demonstrate the opposite.

What is clear is while Podgorica closes chapters and prepares the institutional machinery of membership, while Belgrade stagnates, the rhetorical temperature between the two capitals is likely to remain high. Their political choices are pulling them in opposite directions, turning what should be a story of regional European integration into another chapter of Balkan rivalry.

Sources: Antena-M, BETA, BGNES

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Caption: European Council President Antonio Costa (R) talks with Montenegro’s Prime Minister Milojko Spajic (L) ahead of the plenary session at the EU-Western Balkans summit in Tivat, Montenegro, 5 June 2026. The high-level one-day summit brings together European Union (EU) leaders and their Western Balkan counterparts to discuss concrete integration measures and accelerate the region’s path toward bloc membership. EPA/BORIS PEJOVIC