Networks of disillusion: The shared fate of ruling parties in Greece and Bulgaria

Political history rarely repeats itself exactly, but it often rhymes. In recent years, Greece and Bulgaria have followed parallel paths of political erosion. This observation appears in an analysis by Spyros Sideris, editor-in-chief of the Independent Balkan News Agency (IBNA), a partner of EUalive.

Spyros Sideris is a journalist and writer, as well as a member of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) in the UK, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), and the Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in Greece. Having completed his studies in Bulgaria in the late 1980s, he is fluent in Bulgarian.

Long-term dominance by a single ruling party, widespread perceptions of corruption, and the instrumentalisation of state institutions have not ensured stability. Instead, they have accelerated crises. The emergence – or even anticipation, of new political parties in Greece, involving figures like Alexis Tsipras, Antonis Samaras, or Maria Karystianou, is no anomaly. It signals deep mistrust and a belief that the political game operates elsewhere, under unequal rules. Bulgaria provides the most recent and revealing parallel.

Since 2021, Bulgaria has endured prolonged instability: repeated elections, fleeting governments, and fragmentation initially hailed as “cleansing” but often resulting in paralysis. At its heart lies GERB, led by Boyko Borissov – a party akin to Greece’s New Democracy, both affiliated with the European People’s Party. GERB consolidated power through vast networks of influence, administrative controls, and entrenched ties to authority structures that prove hard to uproot. Corruption allegations went beyond opposition rhetoric; they eroded legitimacy, breaking the implicit social contract that promised “at least order.”

Crucially, in neither Bulgaria nor Greece has the ruling party’s decline spawned a coherent alternative. Rather, it has acted as a centrifugal force, scattering opposition efforts. In Bulgaria, eroded trust in GERB failed to consolidate a unified opposition. Instead, it spawned successive new entities: personality-driven parties and opportunistic coalitions. This created a fractured political arena where the old guard, though weakened, could re-emerge as the “necessary regulator” – not through persuasion, but because rivals could not coalesce into a viable counterpart.

Greece seems to trace a similar path, delayed and compounded by profound social exhaustion. The social-democratic political party PASOK fell first, a dominant force crushed by economic crisis and memoranda, leaving an unfilled void. SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) rose as a disruptive power, yet government tenure, internal rifts, and eventual defeat triggered its fragmentation. Today, the opposition is more divided than ever. The ruling party New Democracy, meanwhile, has seen steady support erosion since 2023, evident in polls and daily discourse alike.

This reveals the starkest parallel with Bulgaria: New Democracy’s weakening is not fostering systemic renewal. It is breeding proliferation – new formations, personal ventures, and fluid alliances. Rumours of Tsipras-linked parties, Samaras’s independent manoeuvres, and civic figures like Karystianou indicate segments of society seeking an “emergency exit” from established frameworks. Not out of faith in fresh visions, but sheer intolerance for the status quo.

The root issue transcends mere fatigue. It stems from power morphing into self-preservation. Under Kyriakos Mitsotakis, New Democracy has confronted scandals fuelling suspicion: the wiretapping affair, the Tempi rail disaster and its management, ongoing claims of tailored favours and clientelism, plus controversies over funding bodies like Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid (OPEKEPE). Irrespective of legal resolutions, these have cemented impressions of double standards in state operations. Governmental responses – denial, communicative hubris, or blame-shifting – do not heal; they exacerbate political hemorrhage.

Paradoxically, both GERB and New Democracy endure not despite erosion, but owing to the mechanisms sustaining it. Corruption, whether proven or perceived, serves as a power tool: gatekeeping access, forging dependencies, enforcing silence, and enfeebling rivals. Most insidiously, it perpetuates opposition fragmentation – the more divided the challengers, the greater the incumbent’s relative edge, even in decline. “Stability” emerges as a defensive mantra: “Yes, flaws exist, but who else?” Yet this is no true stability; it is extortion via stagnation.

Bulgaria’s trajectory warns that extended instability rarely yields purification or reform. It risks a vicious circle: old patterns reborn in novel forms, while public cynicism deepens. Should Greece follow suit, the challenge exceeds New Democracy’s polling slide. It lies in the system’s inability to produce a persuasive, united alternative – one able to sever dependencies and impose robust oversight.

In essence, Greece and Bulgaria mirror each other beyond politics alone. They exemplify nations where extended one-party rule, feeble institutional checks, and pervasive corruption perceptions render representational crises chronic. Here, fragmentation offers no remedy; it marks the endgame of a power that, though diminished, persists via networks, controls, and widespread disillusionment.

The full text of Sideris’ analysis can be found here.

Caption: Boyko Borissov and Kyriakos Mitsotakis, in Sofia, in 2019. Press Office of the Government of Bulgaria