Nawrocki’s SAFE veto escalates Poland’s EU rift, raising Polexit fears

The phrase “those who do not want to feed their own army will feed a foreign one” has recently gained renewed traction in Poland. It reflects growing concern following President Karol Nawrocki’s decision to veto legislation enabling the country’s participation in the EU’s SAFE (Security Action for Europe) programme.

The programme offers relatively low-cost loans backed by EU guarantees, aimed at modernising member states’ armed forces. Nawrocki’s veto has triggered strong backlash, not only from the pro-government coalition but also across Polish society.

On Sunday several thousand protesters gathered outside the Presidential Palace in Warsaw to oppose the decision. The president was also booed during a football match appearance. Although Nawrocki proposed an alternative funding mechanism for military modernisation – dubbed “SAFE 0%” – the idea has been met with widespread scepticism.

Political tensions are expected to escalate further. The government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk has already identified a way to bypass the presidential veto without a new parliamentary vote, while the opposition has pledged to challenge this move before the Constitutional Tribunal.

At the same time, the true motivations behind Nawrocki’s decision and the stance of the right-wing opposition remain unclear. One explanation points to a desire to align with US President Donald Trump, who has openly opposed EU plans to expand its defence industry instead of purchasing American weapons.

Another possible factor is more strategic. If the right wins the 2027 parliamentary elections, a large European loan could complicate any future policy aimed at distancing Poland from the EU, or at least limit its ability to use such a scenario as leverage in negotiations with Brussels.

The SAFE programme is part of a broader EU debate on strengthening defence cooperation and increasing investment in military capabilities. It foresees €150 billion in support through preferential loans for arms procurement, with a significant share intended for European manufacturers.

For Poland, participation could mean access to up to €43.7 billion in loans backed by EU guarantees, at an interest rate of around 3.5% annually – significantly lower than what the national government could secure independently. Repayment periods would range from 30 to 35 years, with full repayment expected by 2070.

The Tusk government has already outlined potential uses for these funds. While details remain confidential, it is known that approximately 89% could go to Poland’s domestic defence industry. Additional spending was planned for border protection, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity.

However, the right-wing opposition, led by the Law and Justice (PiS) party, has reversed its earlier position on the programme. It now portrays SAFE as a risk of placing Poland under the influence of Brussels and, in particular, Germany.

President Nawrocki has argued that Poland must strengthen its military “on its own terms” and raised concerns about sovereignty. He questioned whether decisions that could limit national control over security policy are compatible with the Polish constitution.

The government rejects these arguments, noting that several EU countries are expected to join the programme without fearing a loss of sovereignty. Officials emphasise that SAFE is essentially a standard loan, imposing only the obligation of repayment.

Critics of SAFE have also raised concerns that most funds could go to large European defence companies rather than Polish firms, especially given the relatively short timeframe for spending the funds by 2030. However, government representatives argue that these concerns are overstated.

Behind the official arguments, some analysts suspect deeper political calculations. Nawrocki reportedly hesitated before making his decision, with some of his close advisers supporting the law’s adoption. Public opinion also leaned in favour of participation, with polls showing that over half of respondents supported joining SAFE.

Nevertheless, pressure from PiS leadership intensified, turning the issue into a test of political control and alignment within the right-wing camp. Nawrocki ultimately faced a difficult choice between party expectations and broader public and institutional support.

To mitigate criticism, the president introduced the concept of SAFE 0%, proposing to fund military modernisation through taxation of profits from Poland’s central bank, potentially increased by active gold market operations. The proposal has been widely criticised as unrealistic, with government officials noting that the central bank has recorded losses in recent years.

Prime Minister Tusk responded sharply to the veto, stating that it “only brings satisfaction in Russia” and insisting that the decision would not halt the government’s plans. Lacking the parliamentary majority to override the veto, the government has moved to adopt a special resolution allowing Poland to join SAFE without new legislation.

This approach involves creating an “Armed Poland” programme, channeling EU funds through a national support fund backed by state guarantees. The mechanism does not require parliamentary approval but may face legal challenges, with opposition figures already calling it unconstitutional.

Beyond the immediate political dispute, the controversy has broader implications. Support for PiS has reportedly declined, and the debate has reignited discussions about Poland’s long-term relationship with the EU.

Some observers link the anti-SAFE campaign to a wider eurosceptic narrative, potentially paving the way for a gradual distancing from European integration. While support for EU membership remains relatively high, it has declined among right-wing voters in recent years.

Prime Minister Tusk has warned that such rhetoric could evolve into a more serious debate about a possible “Polexit”. Whether the current conflict over SAFE will reinforce or undermine this trajectory remains to be seen.

What is clear, however, is that an issue traditionally uniting Poland’s political class – national security, has now become a source of deep division, with implications not only for Poland but also for the broader European security landscape.

The original article of Stanislav Zhelikhovsky, Candidate of Political Sciences, international expert, and Yuriy Panchenko, editor of EUalive’s partner “European Pravda” can be found here.

Caption: Polish President Karol Nawrocki attends a press conference in Sejm, lower house of parliament, in Warsaw, Poland, 26 February 2026. Nawrocki has highlighted an alignment with the government’s foreign policy, when it comes to ‘fundamental and strategic issues’, following an annual foreign policy speech delivered by the Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski earlier in the day. EPA/ALBERT ZAWADA