EditMoldova’s critical elections: Sandu’s party fights to preserve pro-European path
PAS’s campaign centres on EU integration, with the slogan “UE 2028” promising membership within three years
On 20 July Moldova launched its parliamentary election campaign, culminating in a pivotal vote on 28 September that will shape the country’s future. As a parliamentary republic, Moldova’s legislature wields significant influence over domestic and foreign policy, making this election crucial for sustaining the pro-European trajectory led by President Maia Sandu and her Action and Solidarity Party (PAS).
With pro-Russian forces gaining ground, the outcome could either advance Moldova’s EU ambitions or steer it toward Moscow’s sphere, impacting regional stability, particularly for neighboring Ukraine.
Since 2021, PAS has held a rare monopoly over Moldova’s executive, legislative, and presidential branches, securing a parliamentary majority. However, recent polls indicate that retaining this “monomajority” is unlikely. PAS’s dominance has made it a lightning rod for public frustration over socio-economic challenges, worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic ripple effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
These issues have eroded the party’s support, despite Sandu’s personal popularity outpacing PAS’s. Last year’s presidential election highlighted this vulnerability: many voters backed Sandu’s rival, Alexander Stoyanoglou, as a protest against PAS’s governance rather than an endorsement of his pro-Russian leanings.
To counter declining support, PAS is pursuing a two-pronged strategy. First, it aims to secure another majority by refreshing its image. The party has revamped its candidate list, retaining only 36 of its 61 current MPs and placing many in lower, less electable slots. This overhaul sparked outrage among excluded deputies, such as Iulia Daskelu, who compared her dismissal to being discarded like a “torn sock.”
To attract voters, PAS has recruited prominent non-political figures, including athletes like former footballer Maxim Potyrnice and Olympic wrestler Anastasia Nikita, alongside cultural icons like conductor Nicolae Botgros and university rectors. The return of Nicu Popescu, a respected former foreign minister who secured Moldova’s EU candidate status in 2022, bolsters the party’s pro-European credentials. However, this strategy is risky, as these candidates’ legislative effectiveness is unproven, and Moldova has little precedent for such a tactic succeeding.
PAS’s campaign centres on EU integration, with the slogan “UE 2028” promising membership within three years. This resonates with pro-European voters and aligns with support from Brussels and Bucharest, where Sandu has built strong ties, including endorsing Romania’s Nicusor Dan in its presidential race. Yet, the party’s reliance on non-political figures raises questions about their ability to govern effectively.
The second strategy involves preparing for a coalition government, as PAS anticipates falling short of a majority. Options are limited, with Renato Usatii’s “Our Party” as the only viable partner. Usatii, a polarizing figure with shifting allegiances, has recently courted Russian-speaking voters by hosting Russian artists like Leonid Agutin, some of whom support Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Despite his past ties to Russian business and nationalist politics, Usatii backed Sandu in 2020. Rumours in Chisinau suggest a tacit agreement to channel pro-Russian votes to Usatii, away from more toxic rivals, though such a deal remains unconfirmed and politically sensitive.
Pro-Russian forces, while fragmented, pose a significant threat. The Kremlin’s main proxy, fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, has been barred from elections after his “Victory” bloc was ruled unconstitutional. Shor’s allies, like Viktoria Furtune of the Moldova Mare party, who has made territorial claims against Ukraine, face legal obstacles but continue to campaign.
Meanwhile, a coalition led by ex-President Igor Dodon’s Socialists, alongside smaller groups like Irina Vlach’s Heart of Moldova, aims to consolidate pro-Russian votes. This bloc, potentially infiltrated by Shor’s associates, seeks to capitalize on anti-Sandu sentiment.
The “Alternative” bloc, led by Stoyanoglou and Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban, presents itself as a pragmatic “third force.” Despite avoiding overt pro-Russian labels, its leaders’ past Socialist ties and Ceban’s recent EU travel ban – allegedly at Sandu’s behest – undermine its neutrality. Cooperation with PAS is improbable, given strained relations.
The Kremlin’s broader strategy involves sowing discord in Moldova, leveraging figures like Shor and Dodon to destabilize the pro-European agenda. Sandu’s team, in turn, has restricted pro-Russian parties’ participation, a tactic that, while effective, raises questions about democratic norms. Despite these challenges, Sandu’s resilience, bolstered by EU and Romanian support, keeps the pro-European path viable.
PAS’s hopes for a majority are slim, and coalition-building is fraught with risks, but Sandu’s track record – defying predictions in last year’s presidential race -suggests she remains a formidable player. With pro-Russian forces coalescing, the election promises to be a dramatic battle for Moldova’s future.
Author: Adapted from Serhiy Gerasimchuk, Deputy Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism,” for European Pravda. A longer version of this article in Ukrainian can be found here.
Caption: President of Moldova Maia Sandu addressres a joint press conference with the European Council and the European Commission presidents after the EU-Moldova Summit in Chisinau, Moldova, 4 July 2025. The presidents of the European Council and the European Commission are visiting Chisinau for the summit, which is expected to address Moldova’s efforts toward EU integration, democratic reforms, and economic development. EPA/DUMITRU DORU
Updated: July 23, 2025 - 07:03
