EditMoldova: The battleground of Russia’s state-of-the-art hybrid influence operation
One of the features of Russian propaganda in Moldova is its adaptability against the measures of the government
In recent months, the Republic of Moldova has once again become a key battleground for Russian-orchestrated disinformation campaigns. As Chisinau reaffirms its pro-European choice and approaches parliamentary elections this autumn, the intensity and sophistication of Russian propaganda have reached new heights. The clear objective: to undermine Moldova’s European trajectory, discredit the current government, and foster deep distrust in democratic institutions.
Russian propaganda infiltrates the Moldovan information space through a variety of well-calibrated channels. No longer limited to traditional television broadcasts or press articles, messages now spread via Telegram channels, TikTok and Facebook accounts, and local influencers recruited to amplify the so-called “voice of the people.” From celebrities to young people in rural areas presenting themselves as apolitical, many unwittingly become part of the Russian propaganda machine. This strategy echoes the 2024 presidential campaign of Calin Georgescu in Romania.
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As an EU candidate country, Moldova today is the stage of a hybrid influence operation emanating from Moscow, bearing all the hallmarks of a modern information war. Experts call it a “destabilisation operation”. For ordinary citizens, this translates into a constant wave of online content, paid protesters, and a string of false narratives that have dominated the Moldovan information landscape.
Russian propaganda reinvents itself
One of the most striking features of Russian propaganda in Moldova is its adaptability. In recent years, Moldovan authorities have implemented unprecedented legal measures against Russian propaganda, suspending licenses and blocking channels one by one. However, rather than eliminating propaganda, these measures have led to its restructuring.
In December 2022, the Moldovan Commission for Exceptional Situations suspended broadcasting licenses for six television stations: Primul în Moldova, RTR Moldova, Accent TV, NTV Moldova, TV6, and Orhei TV. These channels were accused of spreading false information and manipulating public opinion, often retransmitting Russian political and analytical content banned in Moldova.
Similarly, in 2023, Moldova’s Information and Security Service (SIS) blocked access to over 20 Russian media websites, including Russia Today (RT), VGTRK, and TASS – key players in the information war. This included major portals such as rt.com and ren.tv, which became inaccessible following government orders to internet providers.
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Yet state restrictions were quickly met with alternative propaganda tactics. After the official blocking of Sputnik.md, cloned versions of the site appeared. DNS blocking proved ineffective, and some portals continue to bypass restrictions using new domains or VPNs.
In early summer 2025, authorities also blocked the “HaiTV” streaming app, which broadcast Russian channels prohibited in Moldova, such as RTR and Pervii Kanal. This app had become a way to circumvent traditional bans and spread propaganda.
These developments demonstrate how Russian propaganda continuously reinvents itself. When a TV channel is shut down, clones emerge; when a site is blocked, new platforms arise. License revocations fail to stop the growth of Telegram channels, streaming services, and rebranded pages that carry the same message.
The “Calin Georgescu method” and influence on Moldovan society
Russian propagandists in Moldova have taken inspiration from the electoral campaign of Calin Georgescu. Recently, influencers in Moldova have played an increasingly active role in disseminating Kremlin-friendly content. They have participated in “World Championships” held in Russia, joined trips under slogans like “Moldova’s Pride,” and regularly shared propaganda messages, mostly targeting young audiences accustomed to consuming entertaining content from these figures.
Another vector for Russian propaganda, especially in rural areas, is local “opinion shapers” affiliated with pro-Russian parties who organise paid protests and rallies. This strategy fuels the disappointment of older populations with the pro-European government in Chisinau.
Preferred narratives: fear, contempt, and disgust
Russian propaganda in Moldova does not only spread anti-European messages. It is designed to provoke fear and activate negative emotions such as anger, repulsion, and shame. One of the most widespread narratives claims that the European Union wants to “impose LGBT values” in Moldova, supposedly leading to the destruction of the traditional family. Emotional but simplistic language is used: “our children will be taught to be gay”.
Other messages assert that the Russian language is “banned” in Moldova or that the Russian Orthodox Church is being persecuted. The idea is spread that authorities want to eliminate Orthodoxy from schools and impose a foreign lifestyle on Moldovans. Europe is portrayed not as a space of freedoms but as an imperialist project aiming to dissolve Moldovan national identity and turn the country into a “colony state”.
Anti-EU narratives have also targeted President Maia Sandu. Videos from the “Matrioshka” network claimed Sandu “belongs to the LGBT community” and that under her government, “non-traditional values” would replace traditional ones. These also allege the government’s “intention” to subordinate the Russian Orthodox Church and impose a Western Romanian identity in schools.
Recently, the Moldovan government spokesperson warned that Russian propaganda has intensified its manipulation campaigns, especially online. The official highlighted some of the most common narratives:
- EU integration takes away our sovereignty
- Justice is politically controlled
- Moldova is militarising
- The economy is collapsing and Moldova is isolated
- The West attacks the church and traditional values
Precise targets: Russian speakers, nostalgics, and disadvantaged youth
Russian propaganda does not operate randomly. It carefully selects its audience and messaging approach. In Moldova, communication strategies mainly target middle-aged people living in rural areas or belonging to Russian-speaking communities. These social groups tend to trust traditional media less, while consumption of Russian-language content remains high.
Young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, with limited access to civic education and independent media, are also prime targets for messages circulated via TikTok, Telegram, or Facebook.
On these platforms, propaganda lacks an official face: it appears as a clip or an outraged comment from an apparently neutral user (or bot). In recent weeks, Facebook posts by independent Moldovan media have been flooded with hundreds of bot comments spreading the idea that the current government, led by pro-European President Maia Sandu, wants to drag Moldova into war.
This strategy feeds on local realities: Moldova remains a country where distrust in authorities, disappointment with previous governments, and economic vulnerability are constant factors. Russian propaganda exploits these factors as leverage for influence.
Chisinau’s response: between censorship, defense, and counterattack
Over the past two years, the Moldovan government has taken significant steps against foreign propaganda. Besides banning TV channels known for propaganda and false narratives and suspending pro-Russian websites, the Constitutional Court banned the Șor Political Party (PPS), led by fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, after proving it orchestrated vote-buying and Russian online propaganda networks.
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The successor political bloc “Victory” (successor to PPS) was denied registration to participate in the September parliamentary elections. The Central Election Commission also banned other parties associated with Șhor from the elections.
These measures have sparked controversy. The opposition accused the government of authoritarianism and using “information security” as a pretext to eliminate political opponents. However, Chisinau’s authorities insist these decisions aim solely to protect national sovereignty and ensure free and fair elections.
A key moment was the sentencing in early August of Evghenia Guțul, the pro-Russian governor of Gagauzia and close ally of Ilan Șhor, to seven years in prison for illegal campaign financing in the 2023 and 2024 elections. This verdict was seen as a clear signal from Chisinau that Kremlin-backed political interference will no longer be tolerated. In response, the Kremlin called the sentence politically motivated and accused Moldova of failing to respect democratic principles. “We see how the opposition is being suppressed in every possible way,” said Vladimir Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov.
Following the 2024 presidential elections, in which thousands of Moldovans sold their votes, fines totaling nearly 15 million Moldovan lei were imposed. Currently, those who sell votes or engage in electoral corruption risk fines up to 37,000 lei (EUR 1,900).
Amid these tough actions, Chisinau claims it is merely defending the state’s integrity and Moldova’s democratic future. Against the backdrop of decisive elections, where the country’s geopolitical orientation is at stake, the inevitable question arises: how far can a state go in the name of national security without compromising the very essence of democracy?
The original article of EUalive’s partner PressOne in Romanian can be found here.
Caption: Supporters of the banned pro-Russian political party “Shor” attend a protest opposite to the Penitentiary N.13, a facility for pre-trial detainees and sentenced prisoners, in Chisinau, Moldova, 10 August 2025. The protesters are accusing the Moldovan authorities of political persecution of Evghenia Gutul, Governor of the Gagauzia autonomous territorial unit of Moldova, who was sentenced to seven years of semi-closed detention on 05 August in the case of illegal financing of “Shor”. EPA/DUMITRU DORU
Updated: August 12, 2025 - 06:05
