EditMoldova as a test laboratory: anatomy of a multi-vector Russian hybrid operation
Russia’s military intelligence organised training programmes in the summer of 2025 at a resort in western Serbia, as well as in Bosnia and near Moscow
In August 2026, The New York Times published a detailed investigation into one of the most extensive Russian hybrid campaigns conducted outside Ukraine. Titled “Inside Russia’s Giant Push to Upend a Tiny Country,” the report by Michael Schwirtz, Adam Goldman and Aaron Krolik draws on accounts from Western intelligence officials in three countries, Moldovan law-enforcement material, leaked documents and participant statements. It describes a coordinated effort to undermine Moldova’s pro-Western government under President Maia Sandu, particularly in the run-up to the 2024 EU-related referendum and the September 2025 parliamentary elections.
The operation combined several classic hybrid tools: preparatory training for street unrest and sabotage, religious influence networks, large-scale financial inducement of voters, and supporting cyber and information measures. Moldova, a country of roughly 2.4–3 million people wedged between Ukraine and NATO/EU territory, was treated as both a strategic priority and a proving ground.
Training camps and shock-troop preparation
According to the New York Times and corroborated by Moldovan prosecutors, Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU) organised training programmes in the summer of 2025 at a resort in western Serbia, as well as in Bosnia and near Moscow. The Serbian site was presented as a leisure facility offering barbecues, volleyball and spa activities. Participants – predominantly young Moldovans – were paid approximately $400 for three- to four-day courses. Instruction covered handling assault rifles, breaking through police lines, arson techniques, the preparation of incendiary devices, and the use of drones adapted for disruptive purposes. Western officials described the aim as building a cadre of “disciplined shock troops” capable of generating disorder around election periods. Over 100 individuals are reported to have trained near Moscow alone.
Militant camps in Balkans help Moscow bring back Moldova into Its orbit
Earlier reporting by POLITICO and Balkan Insight (drawing on Moldovan court cases from 2024–2026) established that the same Balkan infrastructure also prepared recruits linked to low-level destabilisation activities inside France and Germany. This indicates that the methods and networks tested in Moldova were already being adapted for use against EU member states.
Industrial-scale vote buying and mobilisation
The financial backbone of the campaign was run by fugitive Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, who operates from Russia and is described by Western officials as reporting to Sergei Kiriyenko of the Russian presidential administration. Leaked records examined by The New York Times show that more than 150,000 Moldovans were recruited into the network. Ahead of the 2024 referendum alone, nearly $20 million was distributed to approximately 38,000 people; overall expenditure is estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Methods included direct payments, prepaid cards, specialised apps and coordinated messaging. The operation was conceived and managed from Skolkovo, near Moscow.
Strategic context and results
Western intelligence sources cited by the New York Times and amplified by Meduza place the Moldova campaign within a broader 2026 objective attributed to President Vladimir Putin: efforts to achieve the “collapse of NATO and the EU from within.” After Ukraine, Moldova ranked as a high priority because of its location and the possibility of using it as a springboard or securing a land corridor through southern Ukraine.
Despite the scale of the effort, pro-European forces narrowly prevailed in both the 2024 votes and the 2025 parliamentary elections, aided significantly by diaspora turnout. Moldovan authorities disrupted parts of the network through arrests of returning trainees, seizures of equipment and related prosecutions.
Hybrid ops – and plausible deniability
This case illustrates a mature, multi-layered hybrid approach that integrates kinetic preparation, soft-power religious channels, mass financial coercion and transnational logistics. The same training pipelines that operated in the Balkans demonstrably extended toward EU core states, supporting the characterisation of Moldova as a test laboratory whose methods proved exportable.
The public evidence base – combining intelligence assessments, documentary leaks and judicial material – is comparatively strong. While Russian officials have not issued detailed public responses to the specific claims in the New York Times reporting, the overall pattern aligns with documented hybrid activity observed elsewhere in Europe since 2022.
Despite the extensive documentation by Western intelligence and independent reporting, the multi-layered use of proxies, cut-outs and third-country locations continues to provide Russia with the plausible deniability that characterises its hybrid campaigns.
Caption: According to a journalistic investigation by Balkan Insight, Russian intelligence services — including Wagner operatives — were training recruits in “training” camps located in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in preparation for a possible coup in Moldova. [@Visionergeo on X]
Updated: August 16, 2026 - 11:12
