Mladić’s funeral: a political show directed by Vučić

The funeral of Army of Republika Srpska wartime commander Ratko Mladić, convicted of genocide and other war crimes, provoked heated reactions in Serbia and across the region. European officials did not stay silent either. Both the funeral in Belgrade and the commemoration that preceded it unfolded as Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić wanted, and he used those events to score political points.

Directed by Vučić

Mladić’s funeral went beyond a private farewell. The presence of senior state and church officials, the involvement of the Serbian Armed Forces and a gun salute made clear that the occasion carried a strong state imprint.

Vučić mobilized his machinery to mythologize and humanize Mladić and to relativize his crimes. The Serbian government sent an airplane to The Hague to bring back the body, with Justice Minister Nenad Vujić in the entourage. Members of the Serbian Armed Forces carried the coffin, covered with the Serbian flag, off the plane. Along the highway through Belgrade, members of the Gendarmerie’s Special Unit saluted the van transporting it.

The commemoration was held at the Central Military Club in downtown Belgrade, a building used for state ceremonies. It was attended by former Army of Republika Srpska members, veterans, Mladić’s supporters and politicians, including Justice Minister Vujić, New Democratic Party of Serbia leader Miloš Jovanović, and Republika Srpska President Siniša Karan. Outside, people gathered in T-shirts bearing Mladić’s image and the word “Hero.” New murals of Mladić appeared across Belgrade.

Two days later Mladić was buried. Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Porfirije led the funeral service. Among those present were several cabinet ministers – Nenad Vujić, Bratislav Gašić, Nikola Selaković, Milica Đurđević Stamenkovski and Nenad Popović – as well as the president’s son, Danilo Vučić, members of right-wing and veterans’ organizations, and Russian Ambassador Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko. Milorad Dodik and Željka Cvijanović came from Republika Srpska. The pro-government channels Informer and Tanjug carried both the commemoration and the funeral live and filled the day with special programs in which guests glorified Mladić.

Vučić himself did not attend, citing a previously scheduled meeting with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. His stance was not neutral. It allowed the authorities to send two messages at once. At home, especially among nationally minded voters, they showed that they would not abandon the symbolic defense of Mladić’s legacy under Western pressure. His absence also gave him an argument for Brussels: he had not been at the funeral. Vučić wanted the state visible at the ceremony, but he kept himself far enough away to claim that the authorities had not organized it.

The state and military honors mattered more than his absence. They sent a symbolic message that a man convicted by an international court of genocide and war crimes was not being treated merely as a private person whose family had a right to a dignified burial, but as a figure to whom Serbia’s institutions were granting public legitimacy. That is the difference between a family’s right to bury its dead and a political decision to take part with symbols, resources and the state.

The Serbian Orthodox Church mattered as well. Patriarch Porfirije led the service and said that Mladić’s name would remain “deeply woven” into the memory and prayers of most of the Serbian and Orthodox people. The coffin was covered with the flags of Serbia and Republika Srpska, adding national and religious symbolism.

Flourishing nationalism as part of the pre-election atmosphere

Vučić has sharpened his anti-Western rhetoric ahead of the snap general election and used Mladić’s death to lock in the votes of his sympathizers. Pro-regime media claimed that more than 150,000 people attended the funeral. Vučić put the figure at 120,000 to 150,000. The informal Public Assembly Archive estimated about 16,000. Even the lower number confirmed that, for part of the Serbian public, Mladić still has the status of a national symbol and hero.

Vučić also used the death to keep alive themes that suit him more than they suit the opposition, given that most Serbian citizens do not take a negative view of Mladić. He calculated that he gains more from the surge of nationalism — the glorification of Mladić in pro-government media, on the streets and at sporting events — than he loses from Brussels’ criticism of the treatment of a late Hague convict. He also sought to harden a domestic divide by suggesting that those who regard Mladić as a criminal are a small minority who will never return to power.

Timing mattered. Mladić’s death coincided with the start of the campaign. Vučić balanced a wish not to disappoint voters who mostly see Mladić as a hero against a decision not to appear at the funeral himself, so as to limit criticism from the European Union. He did not, however, refrain from harsh language. He insulted European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos after she canceled a planned visit to Serbia, saying that praise for Mladić was incompatible with the values on which the path to the EU is built.

The main source of the positive attitude toward Mladić is the sense, among part of the Serbian public, of injustice and of a Hague tribunal biased against Serbs. Another is the status that some Croats and Bosniaks give to figures convicted of, or linked to, war crimes, who are treated as national heroes in Croatia and in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vučić said as much himself: EU officials such as Marta Kos “did not understand too well” the Serbian people’s message. “Even if you put away the whole story about general Mladić, they do not understand how sick the Serbian people are of lies, deceit, stealing of territories, punishment only for Serbs and acquittals for everyone else. I won’t have Marta Kos lecture me on who is and who isn’t a criminal,” he said.

The funeral also showed that Mladić’s legacy divides not only the regime and the opposition, but the opposition itself. The national-conservative part of the opposition took a different line from the pro-European and civic opposition, which called the state honors a disgrace. The legacy of war remains a usable instrument of political positioning. The attitude toward Mladić becomes a test of national identity and of the stance toward Republika Srpska.

A policy of confrontation

The reactions show how far the authorities’ stance sits from Serbia’s European path. The European Commission, whose president Ursula von der Leyen has a close relationship with Vučić, hardened its tone after an initially mild response. Von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa called the scenes from the funeral shocking and said that the presence of senior Serbian officials contradicts the values on which Serbia’s path to the EU is founded. The Commission also warned that it would consider the future of accession talks in light of the glorification of a man convicted of genocide.

The consequences were more immediate in relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Foreign Minister Elmedin Konaković announced the withdrawal of almost the entire diplomatic staff from the embassy in Belgrade and expelled two employees of the Serbian embassy in Sarajevo. The authorities in Sarajevo are also demanding sanctions against Serbia and its leadership. In Croatia, Defence Minister Ivan Anušić and Veterans’ Minister Tomo Medved said the funeral showed that Serbia was still pursuing the policy of the 1990s and “is not giving up those who carried and implemented a criminal ideology.” Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti said Serbia had “switched to state worship of genocide.” Those reactions from Sarajevo, Zagreb and Priština work in Vučić’s favor, and he was counting on them. Attacks from those capitals only strengthen him among nationalist voters.

Mladić’s death could have been an occasion to show that Serbia can honor a dead man without relativizing verdicts, to separate the private right to a funeral from state glorification, and to face the legacy of war more seriously. Instead, the mix of army, officials, church leadership, national symbols and a large crowd produced a different image.

For the authorities, the funeral was a chance to mobilize the electorate and to show that they will not yield to external pressure or abandon a narrative that wins them political points. For the regime’s critics, it became proof that Vučić has set aside his European policy and returned to a policy of confrontation.

The original version of this analysis by EUalive’s partner BETA can be found here.

Caption: Members of the honor guard carry the coffin during the funeral for Ratko Mladic in Belgrade, Serbia, 7 September 2026. Former Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic, who was convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2017, died on 27 August 2026 at the age of 84. EPA/ANDREJ CUKIC