Mali: Jihadist surge exposes limits of Russia’s influence

On Saturday Mali experienced one of the most significant coordinated attacks in recent years. Jihadist fighters from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (ALF) launched simultaneous assaults on military targets in Bamako, the nearby Kati base (home to junta leader General Assimi Goïta), and northern cities including Kidal and Gao.

Gunfire and explosions rocked the capital and its outskirts. By evening, Malian forces, supported by Russian Africa Corps personnel, had regained control of key areas in Bamako. However, the scale of the offensive – reaching the heart of the junta’s power – highlighted the growing insecurity despite years of Russian military assistance.

How Russia replaced France in Mali

France led a major counterterrorism operation in Mali starting in 2013 (Operation Serval, later Barkhane), deploying thousands of troops to combat Islamist insurgencies linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS. However, relations soured after the 2020 and 2021 military coups that brought General Assimi Goïta to power.

The junta accused France of neocolonialism, expelled French forces in 2022, and turned to Russia. Wagner Group mercenaries (later rebranded as the state-controlled Africa Corps) arrived in late 2021, promising decisive action against jihadists in exchange for payment and resource access. France completed its full withdrawal, ending a decade-long presence.

Russia positioned itself as the new security partner for the junta, helping retake the northern stronghold of Kidal in 2023. Wagner/Africa Corps forces (estimated at up to 2,500 personnel) have provided combat support, training, and protection for key sites, while Russia has delivered heavy equipment including tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft.

Mixed results and recent strains

Despite initial gains, the partnership has shown clear limitations:

Wagner’s exit and Africa Corps transition: Wagner largely withdrew in mid-2025, handing over to the more formalized Africa Corps. New Russian arms shipments arrived in 2025, but operational tempo has reportedly declined.
Rising casualties and setbacks: Russian forces have suffered ambushes and losses, including a major incident in Tinzaouaten. Jihadist activity has surged in some areas, with a notable fuel blockade affecting Bamako.
Human rights concerns and limited gains: Reports of civilian casualties and brutal tactics have persisted, while large swathes of territory remain contested.

The 25 April attacks underscore these challenges, as insurgents penetrated deep into government-held zones.

EU’s low-key reaction

The European External Action Service (EEAS) issued a brief statement on Sunday condemning the “terrorist attacks” of April 25, offering condolences to victims and Malian authorities, and reaffirming the EU’s commitment to fighting terrorism and supporting stability in the Sahel.

The response was notably restrained – focusing solely on condemnation and general solidarity without referencing the junta’s governance, the role of Russian forces, or broader strategic shifts in the region. It stands in contrast to more pointed past EU criticism of the Malian authorities and reflects the EU’s limited leverage after France’s exit and the junta’s pivot eastward.

Mali remains part of the Alliance of Sahel States (with Burkina Faso and Niger), a bloc that has distanced itself from Western partners and ECOWAS. While Russia has filled part of the security vacuum left by France (and later the UN’s MINUSMA mission), the junta continues to face jihadist pressure, internal tensions, and humanitarian challenges. Some analysts suggest growing “buyer’s remorse” among Sahelian juntas regarding reliance on Russian support.

The situation in Mali illustrates the complex geopolitics of the Sahel: a rapid shift from French to Russian influence has not yet delivered the promised stability, leaving the country vulnerable to renewed insurgent offensives.

The massive Al-Qaeda (JNIM) offensive in Mali shows that Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and northern Nigeria are all in danger of falling under total control of jihadist control.

However, Sudan is another nearby state which could also become fully controlled by Islamists, and some sense is already very far down that path.