EditLike, share, panic: how networks amassed 20 million views spreading drone disinformation in Romania
The coordinated networks consisted of dozens of Facebook pages that posted identical messages in a tight 7-minutes window
In late May 2026, two coordinated disinformation networks on social media exploited Romanian public anxiety over potential Russian drone attacks, generating around 20 million views in just days. The coordinated networks consisted of dozens of Facebook pages (21 in one network, over 50 in the other) that posted identical messages. The campaigns peaked around the 28–29 May incident in which a Russian drone crashed into an apartment building in Galați, injuring residents.
Two sophisticated networks
Network 1 (21 coordinated pages) emerged on 27 May – two days before the Galați crash — and posted identical alarmist messages within a tight seven-minute window. These pages, which often mix recipe videos, AI-generated content, and sensational images (police, tanks, dramatic war scenes), collectively boast nearly 3.7 million followers. Their posts on the drone threat racked up over 5.8 million views and 44,000 shares.
Network 2 (over 50 pages) was even more effective. On 28 May, hours before the drone struck Galați, it spread a message falsely presented as an official appeal: “Call to the population! Raed Arafat urges Romanians to prepare.” (Raed Arafat is a well-known Romanian public figure, physician, and high-ranking government official.) It urged people to prepare a 72-hour emergency backpack. This network reached approximately 8.7 million followers, generating over 11.8 million views and 90,000 shares.
Ana Mocanu, Executive Director of Funky Citizens – the Romanian civic organisation that exposed the networks – explained the strategy:
“These pages build large audiences over time with everyday content like recipes or curiosity-driven posts. Then, at key moments when society is vulnerable to polarisation, they activate with coordinated disinformation.”
The pages use short, fear-inducing or curiosity-driven messages, identical text and images posted simultaneously (often via automation), and visuals designed to trigger panic (“Is war coming?”). Some impersonate official institutions or misuse real statements by officials like Raed Arafat, taken out of context.
Why it works: flooding the information space
The goal is not always to convince people of a specific lie, but to disorient and exhaust the public. By flooding feeds with noise, clickbait, and contradictory claims, these networks create confusion and apathy. People eventually stop checking facts.
This tactic echoes philosopher Hannah Arendt’s observations about authoritarian propaganda: the aim is to create so much chaos that truth no longer matters. In Romania, it is amplified by declining trust in state institutions and gaps in media literacy.
The disinformation spreads from online to offline – people discuss false claims (e.g., fabricated political appointments) with family and colleagues, normalising them.
Broader pattern and institutional gaps
Funky Citizens has documented similar coordinated campaigns during previous incidents, including earlier drone incursions and the 2025 Rahova explosion. These networks are pre-existing and can be activated quickly around any emotionally charged event.
The analysis highlights a critical vulnerability: the time lag between an incident and clear official communication. In the Galați case, disinformation filled the information vacuum before authorities provided full details.
Mocanu and her team stress that Romania lacks sufficient proactive measures against disinformation. While platforms bear some responsibility, state institutions need faster strategic communication, better detection of coordinated inauthentic behaviour, and long-term investments in media literacy and civic education.
A wake-up call
The 20-million-view drone disinformation campaign shows how easily fear can be weaponised in today’s information environment. Accounts that normally post recipes or AI-generated fluff can rapidly switch to amplifying panic or undermining institutions when the moment is right.
As Romania faces ongoing security challenges near the Ukrainian border, addressing this hybrid threat – through faster official responses, greater transparency, and stronger societal resilience – is becoming increasingly urgent.
The original more detailed article in Romanian by our partner PressOne can be found here.
Caption: Network 1 (21 coordinated pages on Facebook) emerged on 27 May – two days before the Galați crash — and posted identical alarmist messages within a tight seven-minute window. [PressOne]
Updated: June 3, 2026 - 06:04
