EditLack of coordination leaves Visegrad Four defence modernisation patchy
Success will depend on whether these nations can cultivate the human capital, industrial depth, logistical resilience, and political cohesion required to field effective forces
The war in Ukraine has forced Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary into an urgent and costly overhaul of their armed forces. Soviet-era equipment, once the backbone of their militaries, no longer meets the demands of contemporary conflict. Yet replacing hardware is proving far simpler than addressing deeper structural weaknesses. Rearmament has not yet delivered strategic independence. Foreign contractors, chronic personnel shortages, and fragile domestic defence industries continue to shape what these countries can realistically contribute to NATO.
For the Visegrad Group, NATO remains synonym of credible defence. However each nation enters this new security environment from a distinct starting point, with varying levels of ambition, investment, and political commitment. While progress is visible across the region, the conflict in Ukraine has underscored a vital truth: arsenals alone do not make a functioning defence system. Modern weapons must be matched by skilled soldiers, reliable logistics, capable institutions, and the confidence of partners.
Poland: building a powerful army amid uneven progress
Poland has pursued the most ambitious transformation in the region. Defence spending has surged nearly fivefold in six years, now approaching 5 percent of GDP.
The modernisation effort leans heavily on international defence procurement. The United States supplies F-35 fighters, Patriot and IBCS air defence systems, HIMARS rocket launchers, and Apache helicopters. South Korea provides K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, FA-50 aircraft, and Chunmoo systems. These deals include provisions for technology transfer and eventual domestic production, driven by the urgent need to replenish stocks sent to Ukraine.
Nevertheless, large contracts do not instantly translate into combat power. Integrating new systems, training crews, developing maintenance capabilities, and managing the transition from legacy equipment requires years of sustained effort. Security analyst Mariusz Marszałkowski describes the process as “island modernisation,” where cutting-edge platforms coexist with neglected naval forces and outdated support infrastructure. The domestic defence sector, long accustomed to minimal orders, has struggled with labour shortages, limited production capacity, and immature products.
Political instability adds another layer of difficulty. The state-owned Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) has seen extraordinary turnover, with as many as 12 CEOs in 13 years. Lieutenant General Jarosław Gromadziński has advocated for a non-partisan “Constitution for Security” to shield long-term programmes from electoral cycles and streamline fragmented command structures. According to Marszałkowski, Poland is building the region’s strongest army, but it will likely take another five years before it can reliably defend its territory with minimal reliance on allied support.
Slovakia: greater security, deeper dependence
Slovakia’s modernisation gained momentum after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but only became a genuine priority following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Bratislava’s decision to donate MiG-29 fighters and S-300 systems to Kyiv created immediate gaps that allies have had to fill, including via air policing by Czech, Polish, and Hungarian aircraft.
The country is now acquiring U.S. F-16 fighters and Black Hawk helicopters, German Leopard tanks, Swedish CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, and the Israeli Barak MX air defence system. These acquisitions reduce reliance on Russian technology while creating new, long-term dependencies on Western suppliers for maintenance, spare parts, and political alignment. Slovakia still lacks robust air defence and independent satellite reconnaissance, leaving it reliant on NATO for critical capabilities.
For a nation of 5.4 million people, some degree of interdependence is inevitable. The more pressing concern is trust. The government of Robert Fico has faced criticism for ambiguous positions on Russia and the disclosure of confidential discussions, which has occasionally sidelined Slovakia – along with Hungary, in regional initiatives such as the proposed “drone wall.”
On the industrial side, Slovakia punches above its weight. It manufactures Zuzana 2 howitzers, tactical vehicles, mine-clearing systems, small arms, and especially 155 mm artillery ammunition. Former NATO ambassador Tomáš Valášek has emphasised the need for a comprehensive anti-drone strategy combining helicopters, subsonic aircraft, counter-drone systems, and sensor networks. If political tensions do not erode Alliance confidence, Slovakia’s rearmament could enhance interoperability and resilience through shared logistics and training.
Czech Republic: ambitious plans constrained by foundations
The Czech Republic continues to grapple with the legacy of chronic underfunding. Over two decades, the country has invested roughly 600 billion Czech crowns (about €24.8 billion) less in defence than NATO commitments required. In 2025, spending reached only about 1.85 percent of GDP, despite longstanding warnings from the military itself.
The consequences permeate the armed forces: personnel shortages, limited air defence, insufficient long-range precision strike capacity, low ammunition stocks, weak combat support, and inadequate infrastructure for hosting allied troops. The 7th Mechanised Brigade, intended as the heavy core of the army, remains incomplete more than a decade after being designated a priority. Training infrastructure has received significant investment, yet capacity and equipment still fall short, forcing adaptations such as stationing new infantry fighting vehicles outside their intended units.
Recruitment presents perhaps the most stubborn challenge. Defence expert Zdeněk Petráš highlights competition from the civilian labour market, adverse demographics, and the need for technically skilled personnel. Jan Ludvík notes that the post-conscription generation is retiring while the army requires more personnel than before. Retention of experienced soldiers has also proved difficult.
Despite these hurdles, the Czech Republic benefits from NATO experience, participation in international operations, and reduced dependence on Russian systems. To fulfil its role as a regional transport and logistics hub, urgent modernisation of military infrastructure is essential.
Hungary: industrial gains tempered by political risks
Hungary’s Zrínyi military modernisation programme launched in 2016 has sought to replace Soviet-era systems while building domestic production capacity. Partnerships with Rheinmetall, Airbus, Colt CZ, and others have established facilities for Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition, small arms, and helicopter components. Acquisitions include Leopard 2A7HU tanks, Gripen fighters, and NASAMS air defence systems.
Analyst Tamás Csiki Varga notes that NATO members need not develop every capability independently; the goal is effective collective defence. Licensed production, however, still depends on imported components and sustained foreign partnerships. Domestic small and medium-sized enterprises remain only marginally involved, with full operational capability likely years away.
Political factors complicate progress. The merger of state defence companies into N7 Defence Holding and its subsequent sale to a group linked to an Orbán ally drew sharp criticism. The new government under Péter Magyar has moved to terminate related contracts. Restoring trust with allies, reversing personnel disruptions from past purges, improving salaries, and addressing recruitment shortfalls in key specialities are now priorities. Hungary must also expand investment in unmanned systems while navigating strained relations with Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine has shattered the foundations of the Visegrad Four defence. Modern weapons are necessary but more is needed. Success will depend on whether these nations can cultivate the human capital, industrial depth, logistical resilience, and political cohesion required to field effective forces. Only then can the region move beyond reactive modernisation toward genuine strategic weight within the Atlantic Alliance.
The article in Slovak by EUalive’s partner euBrief.sme.sk can be found here.
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Caption: (L-R) Slovak Minister of Defence Robert Kalinak, Czech Minister of Defence Jaromir Zuna, Hungarian Minister of Defence Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, and Polish Minister of National Defence Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz attend a press conference after the Visegrad Group Defense Ministers meeting at the Stefania Palace in Budapest, Hungary, 25 June 2026. The defence ministers of the Visegrad Group (V4) countries meet for a working session in Budapest. EPA/BOGLARKA BODNAR HUNGARY OUT
Updated: July 22, 2026 - 15:40
