Kosovo’s institutional crisis continues: a vicious circle

Kosovo remains trapped in a deepening institutional crisis, with no resolution in sight for electing a new president and the country edging closer to yet another round of snap parliamentary elections. The inability of political actors in Pristina to reach any meaningful agreement, combined with outgoing President Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu’s controversial decree to dissolve the Assembly – and the Constitutional Court’s immediate temporary suspension of that decree – has only prolonged the deadlock.

The core problem is clear: in the current power configuration, no candidate can become president without the backing of Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Self-Determination Movement (Vetëvendosje), which holds the largest bloc in the Assembly following its convincing victory in the December 2025 early elections.

Yet Vetëvendosje itself has been unable to secure the necessary cross-party support to install one of its own figures, as non-Serb minority MPs alone are insufficient to reach the required quorum and vote thresholds. This structural impasse has made early parliamentary elections the most probable outcome.

The only realistic path to avoiding new elections would require the Constitutional Court to declare Osmani’s dissolution decree unconstitutional, thereby preserving the current Assembly and opening a fresh 60-day window to elect a president. In that scenario, the sole viable solution would be a genuine political compromise between the ruling majority and the opposition to agree on a consensus candidate acceptable to all major players. So far, however, none of the parties has shown genuine willingness to compromise.

Although Kurti publicly expressed openness to dialogue, the meetings he held in late February and early March with opposition leaders Bedri Hamza (Democratic Party of Kosovo) and Lumir Abdixhiku (Democratic League of Kosovo) produced no concrete names or progress. Both sides later confirmed that only general principles were discussed – widely interpreted in Pristina as evidence that Kurti was never seriously interested in striking a deal. On 4 March he instead nominated two Vetëvendosje figures – Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca and MP Fatmire Kollçaku – for the presidency. Both were predictably unacceptable to the opposition, which had repeatedly insisted that any candidate must emerge from prior political consensus rather than unilateral imposition by the ruling party.

When the Assembly convened on 4 March to vote, opposition MPs from the three main non-governing parties – together with the Serb List – boycotted the session. Only 66 deputies from the ruling majority were present, far short of the mandatory quorum of 80 MPs required even to open voting. No election took place, and the session was adjourned. With the 5 March constitutional deadline for electing a successor having passed without result, President Osmani-Sadriu signed a decree on 6 March dissolving the Assembly and paving the way for snap elections.

The decree immediately sparked fierce legal debate. Some constitutional experts, including former Constitutional Court President Enver Hasani, argued it was unconstitutional: they contend that dissolution is premature until all three voting rounds have been exhausted and that MPs retain a 60-day period from the date a presidential election is formally placed on the agenda. Others maintain the decree is lawful, as the 30-day pre-expiration window for electing a new president had clearly lapsed.

Vetëvendosje swiftly challenged the decree before the Constitutional Court, which on 9-10 March issued a temporary measure valid until 31 March. The ruling suspends the dissolution, prohibits Osmani from scheduling elections or taking any further steps related to the presidency, and freezes all Assembly activity on the matter, including any renewed attempt to vote for a president.

The Court is expected to deliver its final decision by the end of March. If it upholds the decree, snap elections must be called within 45 days of the ruling. If it strikes the decree down, the Assembly survives, and a new 60-day clock starts for electing the president. In either case, once Osmani’s term expires on 4 April, Assembly Speaker Albulena Haxhiu – a close Kurti ally – will assume the role of acting president and would, at least formally, hold authority to set an election date (though in practice she would follow Kurti’s guidance).

The current impasse has also laid bare a dramatic rupture between two figures who were once close political partners: Kurti and Osmani-Sadriu. The outgoing president has openly blamed Kurti and his circle for the crisis, stating that “this situation could have been avoided” and accusing unnamed actors of putting personal or party interests above the country’s need for stability.

Insiders in Pristina report that tensions had been simmering for months, but the decisive break came when Kurti refused to back Osmani’s bid for a second term. Despite her public desire for re-election and her growing international profile – including her appointment to U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace and success in securing additional recognitions of Kosovo’s independence – Kurti never proposed her candidacy.

Those close to Kurti argue that he views any leader with independent authority or strong external backing as a potential challenge to his unchallenged dominance in Kosovo politics. Conversely, associates of Osmani describe her as ambitious and determined, suggesting that the dissolution decree was partly an act of political retaliation against Kurti for denying her re-election. Speculation is rife that, if given the chance to set the election date as acting president, she might choose a timing that disadvantages Vetëvendosje – particularly by reducing turnout among the Kosovo diaspora in Western Europe, whose votes were decisive in Kurti’s December victory.

The rift is widely seen as more than personal. Osmani’s independent political capital has grown significantly in recent years, bolstered by her diplomatic successes and international credibility. Many observers now expect her to run in the next parliamentary elections on a separate ticket, potentially splintering the vote on the centre-left and altering the balance of power in Kosovo’s volatile political landscape.

Whatever the Constitutional Court decides by 31 March, the underlying dynamics remain unchanged: deep mistrust, unwillingness to compromise, and competing personal ambitions continue to paralyse Kosovo’s institutions. at a moment of increasingly uncertain regional environment.

Caption: Girls draped in Kosovo flags during celebrations marking the 18th anniversary of the country’s independence in Pristina, Kosovo, 17 February 2026. Kosovo is marking 18 years since proclaiming independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. EPA/GEORGI LICOVSKI