Is Montenegro’s EU path held hostage by Belgrade and Moscow?

In a recent edition of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Bridge program, host Omer Karabeg discussed Montenegro’s prospects for European Union membership with two prominent Montenegrin analysts: Daliborka Uljarević, executive director of the Center for Civic Education in Podgorica, and Zlatko Vujović, professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Podgorica.

The conversation revolved around the unusually warm praise coming from Brussels, the geopolitical stakes behind it, and the many internal and external forces that could still derail the process.

The tone from European officials has been strikingly positive. Montenegro is regularly described as the frontrunner among Western Balkan candidates, with some voices – most notably German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, suggesting that membership by 2028 is a realistic prospect. Yet both guests on the program cautioned against taking the compliments at face value.

“This is not a surprise,” Uljarević said. “The EU accession process has become primarily political. Such messages are above all an incentive for Montenegro at a time when the European Union, facing numerous geopolitical challenges, really needs a success story from a candidate country.”

She stressed that the EU wants to revive its enlargement policy in the Western Balkans in order to counter the growing influence of Russia, China, and Turkey. Still, she warned, praise must not be confused with guarantees. Although Montenegro has made considerable formal and technical progress, the deepest reforms – especially in the rule of law, remain incomplete. “If Montenegro is now the best in a class of bad students,” she added, “that does not mean it is truly ready for membership.”

Zlatko Vujović agreed that the EU’s enthusiasm was expected. “Brussels wants to push Montenegro toward membership because, given its size and geostrategic importance and small size, it is an ideal candidate for a quick success,” he explained. However, he pointed out that praise and encouragement are one thing; the ratification process in national parliaments and possible referendums across the current 27 member states is quite another.

The German optimism about 2028 was tempered by more cautious voices inside the EU. High Representative Kaja Kallas recently described 2030 as a more realistic horizon, while Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has spoken of a “probationary period” for new members – an idea that raised eyebrows in Podgorica.

A particularly striking paradox emerged during the discussion: the closer Montenegro gets to the EU, the more public support for membership appears to be falling. Vujović attributed this to a familiar pattern already seen in Serbia. Pro-Serbian and pro-Russian media outlets, many of them controlled from Belgrade, have intensified an anti-European campaign. “When the government changed in 2020,” he recalled, “part of the pro-Serbian electorate initially viewed the EU sympathetically because it saw Brussels as an ally in consolidating pro-Serbian and pro-Russian parties. But as Montenegro’s accession chances grew, the same media turned sharply anti-European.”

The conversation inevitably turned to Belgrade’s role. Both analysts agreed that Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has a strong interest in preventing Montenegro from overtaking Serbia on the European track. Uljarević described Vučić’s worldview: “In principle he has never accepted Montenegro as a truly equal and sovereign state, but rather as a temporarily lost Serbian territory.” She cited concrete examples of obstruction, such as Parliament Speaker Andrija Mandić – widely seen as a Vučić ally, blocking key media-regulator appointments for almost a year, a move that risks reopening a negotiation chapter the EU had provisionally closed.

‘Vučić’s greatest political defeat’

Vujović went further, arguing that Montenegro’s entry into the EU would represent Vučić’s greatest political defeat. “It would destroy his narrative that the EU will never enlarge to the Western Balkans and that Serbia is the regional leader in European integration,” he said. More importantly, it would end Belgrade’s and Moscow’s strategic dream of controlling access to the Adriatic. “There is no effective Serbian-Russian military alliance without sea access,” Vujović noted, “and that access disappears the moment Montenegro becomes a full member of the Western democratic community.”

Recent nationalist incidents – anti-Turkish protests and attacks on Croatian football fans, were described as deliberate attempts to damage Montenegro’s image in the final phase of negotiations. Uljarević called them externally induced, largely from Serbia, and harmful to social cohesion and bilateral relations. Vujović revealed that the anti-Turkish demonstrations were organized by Serbian football ultras and loyalists of Belgrade-backed parties in response to Turkey’s delivery of drones to Kosovo. The Montenegrin government’s hasty decision to suspend visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, taken on the basis of what he called false police intelligence, is expected to be reversed soon.

The Montenegro’s outburst of anti-Turkish violence explained

The Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro also came under scrutiny. While its leaders occasionally pay lip service to the European idea, both guests described its deeper orientation as anti-Western and aligned with Russian interests. Metropolitan Joanikije’s remark that EU membership is not a “sacred cow” was cited as typical of the Church’s ambivalence.

Russia’s open displeasure was illustrated by a recent undiplomatic statement from its ambassador in Podgorica, who called Montenegro’s NATO membership and accelerated EU bid “short-sighted.” Uljarević observed that Moscow usually operates more discreetly, through disinformation, support for pro-Russian politicians, and church networks, but grows nervous as membership draws nearer. Vujović added that Russia views the EU as its main obstacle to re-establishing influence over former communist countries and did not anticipate Montenegro’s rapid progress.

Could Russia actually stop the process? Both analysts believe it retains the means, primarily through loyal segments of the current ruling coalition. Yet Western pressure and domestic pro-European forces have so far succeeded in raising the political cost of open pro-Russian actions. “If it depended only on Moscow’s allies in the government,” Vujović concluded, “negotiations would already have been halted. But Montenegro still has a chance to escape the Belgrade–Moscow scenario – though whether that will happen by 2028 depends on how willing the current coalition is to abandon its narrow interests and genuinely accelerate reforms.”

For now, the praise from Brussels continues to flow, but the road to 2028 remains littered with internal divisions, regional rivalries, and great-power maneuvering. As Uljarević and Vujović made clear, compliments are not the same as membership, and the next few years will show whether Montenegro can convert geopolitical goodwill into irreversible progress.

The full article, published by EUalive’s Montenegrin partner Antena M, is available here.

Think tank: The Council should set the objective of Montenegro’s accession by 2029

Caption: European Council President Antonio Costa inspects the honor guard with Montenegro’s president ahead of their meeting in Podgorica, Montenegro, 14 May 2025. EPA/BORIS PEJOVIC