EditIs armed neutrality a viable security alternative for Ukraine?
Ukrainian international lawyer explores his country’s security path through armed neutrality amid stalled NATO prospects
Several rounds of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul in 2022 produced no breakthroughs, underlining the deep divide between the two sides and the risk of a protracted war of attrition. In the absence of a clear path to NATO, Ukrainian policymakers and analysts are considering alternative models that would allow the country to safeguard its sovereignty and security while maintaining integration with the West.
One such model is armed neutrality: a status outside military alliances but with a robust defence capacity and international backing. The concept, rooted in international law, allows a country to remain outside conflicts while maintaining the right to self-defence. For Ukraine, this would entail a clear commitment to neutrality paired with an unprecedented build-up of military capabilities – and, crucially, binding security assurances from key Western partners.
Not Russia’s “neutrality”
Unlike the Kremlin’s version of neutrality – often a euphemism for demilitarisation, armed neutrality envisions a heavily fortified Ukraine. Any deal that would deprive Ukraine of its ability to defend itself is seen as a non-starter, particularly given the Russian demand for disarmament that surfaced during the Istanbul talks.
International law distinguishes between several forms of neutrality. A permanently neutral state pledges to stay out of all future conflicts among other countries. This does not prevent it from receiving defence assistance or calling on allies in case of aggression. Switzerland, Austria, and Malta are examples of such states. Ukraine’s potential neutral status would need to be carefully defined to avoid misinterpretation or abuse by Russia.
Notably, neutrality refers strictly to military conflicts. It does not preclude political, economic or moral alignment. Neutral states such as Switzerland have condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and imposed sanctions on Moscow. Some interpretations of qualified neutrality even allow for military assistance to the victim of aggression – a position embraced by many Western nations in supporting Kyiv.
A neutral state with teeth
Under international law, neutral countries are obliged not to take part in armed conflicts or assist belligerents. Conversely, warring states must respect the sovereignty of neutral territories. Yet neutrality does not require military weakness. On the contrary, many legal scholars argue that a permanently neutral country must be ready to defend its neutrality with force.
This is the model Ukraine is increasingly examining. A strong national army and defence industry, supplemented by Western guarantees, could offer a viable alternative to NATO membership. Historical examples reinforce this argument: during the Cold War, Switzerland upheld its neutrality with a 625,000-strong army, extensive civil defence infrastructure and no foreign military presence on its soil. Ukraine, with its larger population and territory, could follow a similar path, albeit with significant foreign financial and technical support.
Security analysts like Michael O’Hanlon and Paul Stares have proposed a layered system of territorial defence for Ukraine. Such a system would require a professional army of 550,000 troops and a reserve of 450,000 – ambitious but feasible, given Ukraine’s wartime mobilisation experience. Funding it would cost $20-40 billion annually, but Western countries may find this a far more cost-effective option than prolonged military aid during active conflict.
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Western guarantees and postwar peace
Security guarantees for a neutral Ukraine would need to go far beyond the weak assurances of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which failed to deter Russian aggression. Historical precedents exist: the 1815 European Concert, comprising Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, formally recognised Switzerland’s neutrality and pledged to uphold it, including by force if necessary.
Critics argue that only NATO’s Article 5 could offer credible deterrence. However, proponents of armed neutrality note that even non-NATO guarantees – if made legally binding, ratified by parliaments and backed by real capabilities, could have substantial deterrent value. Moreover, failure to uphold such guarantees would damage the credibility of NATO’s own commitments elsewhere.
The Trump administration may be open to this idea. Its focus on great power deals and stated goal of ending the Russia-Ukraine war could align with a negotiated neutrality framework. But any viable model must satisfy the Ukrainian public and political establishment. Currently, the Ukrainian Constitution enshrines NATO accession as a strategic goal – a provision that could only be changed after the end of martial law and with a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Russia’s role and the limits of compromise
For any neutrality deal to hold, Russia must also accept its terms. Yet Moscow’s insistence on keeping Ukraine within its sphere of influence remains a major obstacle. From the Kremlin’s perspective, a strong, Western-aligned Ukraine, even outside NATO, is a threat to its long-term ambitions.
To overcome this, Ukraine and its allies must combine sustained military and economic pressure on Russia with creative diplomacy. A credible neutrality proposal could offer Moscow a way to claim strategic gain without further war, while denying it control over Ukraine.
Still, the danger remains that Russia could exploit vague treaty language or future shifts in Ukraine’s posture to justify renewed aggression. This is why any agreement must be precise, enforceable, and paired with deterrent capabilities on the ground.
EU integration and non-alignment
Importantly, neutrality or non-alignment does not preclude Ukraine’s continued European integration. Austria, Ireland and Malta – all EU members – maintain neutral status. Ukraine’s future EU membership would entitle it to mutual defence under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union, adding another layer of protection.
Non-alignment, distinct from neutrality, involves a political decision to avoid military alliances without necessarily committing to neutrality in war. Sweden and Finland maintained such policies until recently, before joining NATO in response to Russia’s actions.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s path will depend not only on what is negotiated but also on how it is implemented – in law, in practice, and in public perception. Armed neutrality could offer a strategic middle ground: staying out of alliances, but not out of the fight.
Editor’s note: This article is based on a contribution originally published by European Pravda, a partner outlet of EUalive, which featured an abridged version of a text by Ukrainian international lawyer Mykhailo Soldatenko. The article explores the idea of “permanent neutrality” as a potential foundation for Ukraine’s post-war security framework.
Caption: Mechanized infantrymen from the 93rd Brigade of the Ukrainian Army train with a BMP-2 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle at an undisclosed location in the rear of the Bakhmut front, Ukraine, 27 February 2025, amid the Russian invasion. The Ukrainian Army is incorporating more modern armored vehicles and weaponry, both domestically manufactured and supplied by Western countries, at a time new technologies play a key factor in the conflict. EPA/MARIA SENOVILLA
Updated: August 8, 2025 - 14:38
