Investigative report: The role of Skopje in the North Macedonia EP report scandal

In late 2022, the Qatargate scandal rocked the European Parliament (EP), exposing corruption through cash-filled envelopes and prompting promises of a new era of transparency and integrity. Yet, by June 2025, a different but equally damaging controversy has emerged – one that threatens to derail EU enlargement, undermine institutional trust, and expose vulnerabilities in the EP’s oversight mechanisms.

This time, the scandal centers not on personal enrichment but on the subtle, sustained influence of a third-country government: North Macedonia.

At the heart of this storm is Austrian MEP Thomas Waitz of the Greens/EFA group, the EP’s rapporteur on North Macedonia’s accession progress. What began as a routine resolution on North Macedonia’s alignment with EU values has spiralled into a crisis, with Bulgarian parliamentarians, multiple MEPs, and insiders condemning the process as “Qatargate without the cash.” Waitz is accused of coordinating with Skopje to produce a one-sided report, concealing critical meetings, leaking confidential drafts, sidelining opposing voices, and failing in his duty as a neutral rapporteur.

This investigation draws on extensive evidence: the EP’s Transparency Register, official documents, public statements by North Macedonia’s Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski, independent reporting by NGOs and Balkan media, and Waitz’s own responses. Together, they reveal a troubling pattern of procedural abuse and foreign influence that jeopardizes the EU’s enlargement framework and the Parliament’s credibility.

A rapporteur’s duty betrayed

The role of an EP rapporteur is clear: to conduct neutral fact-finding, include all legitimate stakeholders, and preserve institutional credibility. In the context of North Macedonia’s EU accession, this role is particularly sensitive, given the country’s ongoing unsolved issues with Bulgaria over history, identity, and minority rights. The 2022 EU consensus on North Macedonia’s accession path established a delicate balance, requiring Skopje to address these issues while advancing reforms.

Thomas Waitz, however, has failed to uphold this mandate. Between November 2024 and May 2025, he held at least 31 meetings with North Macedonian officials, according to the EP’s Transparency Register. These were not casual engagements—they involved senior ministers, MPs, party leaders, diplomats, and the Prime Minister’s cabinet, averaging nearly one meeting per week. In contrast, Waitz’s engagement with the other side of the dispute—Bulgaria and the Bulgarian-identifying community in North Macedonia—was virtually nonexistent.

• Only one meeting was held with Bulgarian government representatives over six months.
• Zero meetings occurred with Bulgarian-identifying communities in month Macedonia.
• Zero consultations took place with victims of ethnic violence or political persecution.
• Over 40 amendments addressing anti-Bulgarian hate crimes, cultural repression, and SLAPP lawsuits were rejected by Waitz.

This exclusion is stark. Bulgarian-identifying citizens in North Macedonia have faced well-documented discrimination, including hate speech, physical assaults, and political suppression. Reports from the Bulgarian National Assembly and MEPs highlight specific incidents: beatings, fabricated prosecutions, banned organisations, and systemic intimidation. Yet Waitz dismissed these concerns, claiming his report included “general references to hate speech and minority rights.” Such vague language cannot substitute for addressing documented violations, and his refusal to engage with victims or their representatives reveals a deliberate bias.

The transparency cover-up

Transparency is the cornerstone of trust in politically sensitive EP processes, especially those involving foreign governments. Yet Waitz’s handling of the North Macedonia report has been marked by a systematic lack of disclosure. As of 20 May 2025, the EP’s Transparency Register showed only five meetings related to the North Macedonia file, all dated December 2024. Given the intensity of Waitz’s engagement with Skopje, this sparsity raised immediate red flags.

Bulgarian journalists and NGOs soon circulated screenshots of the incomplete register, prompting formal complaints from two shadow rapporteurs to EP President Roberta Metsola. Between 22 and 24 May 2025, Waitz retroactively declared 26 additional meetings – a belated correction that confirmed suspicions of concealment. Some of these meetings, including high-level contacts with North Macedonia’s EU mission, were logged well beyond the EP’s mandatory 3-month declaration deadline, breaching transparency rules.

It is worth noting that during the same period, Waitz diligently declared meetings related to his role on the Agriculture and Rural Development Committee (AGRI), some as late as May 2025, while North Macedonia-related meetings from February to April remained hidden. This selective transparency seems to suggest a deliberate effort to obscure his coordination with Skopje, depriving fellow MEPs, civil society, and the public of critical information about the report’s drafting process.

The timing of the retroactive declarations is also telling. They came only after public exposure, press publications and internal complaints, indicating that Waitz might have acted not out of procedural integrity, but out of necessity to mitigate a failing cover-up.

Skopje’s advance knowledge: a diplomatic scandal

Perhaps the most serious aspect of this scandal is the evidence that North Macedonia’s government had early and detailed knowledge of the report’s content, well before the EP’s internal deliberations concluded. Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski made multiple public statements in May 2025, weeks before the draft was finalised, predicting with precision what the report would include. He claimed it would feature four references to “Macedonian language and identity” – a highly sensitive issue in the context of Bulgaria’s objections – and celebrated this as a diplomatic victory.

At the time, these references had not appeared in any public document, and the amendments mentioning “recognising the Macedonian language and identity” were still confidential. Yet Mickoski’s confidence was iron-cast. On 1 June he went further, stating in a televised interview that a Bulgarian-proposed amendment to insert the word “present” before “Bulgarian community” would fail – a prediction made while EP negotiations were ongoing. His statements were not speculative; they reflected real-time access to the report’s evolution.

Waitz later admitted that North Macedonian actors had seen draft compromise amendments, though he insisted no changes were made based on their feedback. This admission alone is staggering. It confirms that Skopje was not merely aware of the report but had direct insight into its development, raising questions about how such access was granted and whether outcomes were pre-coordinated. Whether through direct leaks or intermediaries, a candidate country was able to monitor and anticipate an EP process meant to be independent and neutral.

The implications are profound. While MEPs debated behind closed doors, Skopje had already declared victory, briefed its media, and shaped public narratives at home and abroad. The EP’s deliberations consequently became a formality, with the real story unfolding in Skopje, not Brussels. This asymmetry of information has the potential to undermine the integrity of the legislative process and suggests a level of foreign influence that the EP is apparently ill-equipped to counter.

Foreign lobbying inside the Parliament

The EP prides itself on safeguarding its processes from undue foreign influence, but Waitz’s actions suggest a troubling erosion of this principle. A key moment came in May 2025, when a delegation of eight North Macedonian MPs visited Brussels, coinciding with the shadow rapporteurs’ meeting to finalise the report. This visit, planned since February, was no coincidence. It included private meetings with Waitz and other MEPs, some held just one hour before the shadow negotiations began.

The timing was highly inappropriate. A candidate country under review was granted direct lobbying access during the most sensitive phase of the report’s drafting. The day prior, Waitz hosted the delegation for lunch inside the EP premises, further blurring the line between diplomacy and influence. No such access was afforded to Bulgarian representatives or civic groups, raising concerns about discrimination against Bulgarian-identifying citizens in North Macedonia.

Waitz’s defence – that the overlap was due to scheduling constraints – is questionable. The visit was scheduled months in advance, and the shadow meeting’s time was adjusted three times to align with the delegation’s arrival. The optics alone should have warranted a postponement, but Waitz proceeded, knowingly compromising the process. This convergence of events paints a picture of a parallel negotiation, conducted not among EP members but between a rapporteur and a foreign capital.

Silencing victims, amplifying one side

While Waitz met frequently with North Macedonian officials, he failed to engage with Bulgarian-identifying communities in North Macedonia, despite well-documented cases of ethnic discrimination. Reports detail a pattern of state-enabled hostility: physical assaults, hate speech, banned organisations, and fabricated prosecutions. Over 40 amendments submitted by MEPs sought to address these abuses, but Waitz has rejected them all, opting for vague references to “hate speech” and “interethnic tensions” that omit specific victims or communities.

This refusal to acknowledge an entire ethnic group’s plight can hardly be considered neutral. Waitz had the opportunity to give a voice to those suffering intimidation and violence. Instead, evidence shows that he amplified the narrative of the government accused of perpetrating these abuses, undermining the EU’s commitment to justice and non-discrimination.

Misleading the public

As criticism mounted, Waitz’s public responses only deepened the controversy. On 31 May, during an interview on Bulgaria’s bTV, he falsely claimed that his report did not recognise the Macedonian language. This was untrue – two amendments explicitly included the phrase “recognising the Macedonian language and identity,” a fact already celebrated by Skopje and criticised by Bulgarian MEPs.

The European Parliaments mishandling exacerbated tensions between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, fuelling accusations that this institution had become a platform for foreign interests. In a region already fraught with historical disputes, Waitz’s lack of clarity undermined trust in the EP’s ability to mediate impartially.

A threat to EU enlargement

The 2022 Enlargement Framework balanced North Macedonia’s EU path with its bilateral commitments, including minority protections and good neighbourly relations. Bulgarian MEPs however say that Waitz’s report disrupts this consensus by favouring Skopje’s narrative and excluding Bulgarian concerns. Six near-identical amendments recognising the “Macedonian language and identity” were included, suggesting external coordination, while neutral language proposals were rejected. Mickoski has since used the report to argue against constitutional changes, stalling progress.

This scandal exposes vulnerabilities in the EP’s safeguards and raises questions about how enlargement reports are drafted. Waitz’s actions – excluding stakeholders, concealing meetings, and misrepresenting the report – threaten the EP’s credibility and the integrity of EU enlargement. The Bulgarian National Assembly has unanimously condemned the report as “unbalanced” and called for Waitz’s removal as rapporteur.

Bulgarian parliament to reject any ‘plan B’ for North Macedonia

A call for accountability

To proceed with this report would signal that foreign lobbying and exclusionary drafting can shape EU policy much in the same way as the Quatargate or Huawei scandals. Bulgarian MEP, across party lines, say that the EP must suspend the vote on the North Macedonia report and launch a formal ethics investigation into Waitz’s conduct. In their perspective, the integrity of the enlargement process – and the trust of EU citizens – depends on it.

Caption: Thomas Waitz in the European Parliament in Brussels, 21 March 2023. [European Parliament Multimedia Library]

• European Parliament
• lobbying
• North Macedonia
• transparency

Updated: June 3, 2025 - 07:10