Insight: How Ukraine is rehearsing EU accession talks

In the coming months, Ukraine’s government is expected to approve a sweeping policy document that will not only guide the reforms required for EU membership, but also set deadlines for the country’s full legal readiness to join the bloc.

This document – the National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation to the EU Acquis, will need to be finalised and adopted under the next government.

How is Ukraine preparing for accession in practice? And why is the EU itself helping Ukraine gear up for negotiations withth e EU? Is there a conflict of interest? And what happens if, against the backdrop of recent political developments, accession talks are delayed?

EUalive is publishing the adapted text by Sergiy Sydorenko, chief editor of European Pravda.

“This is supported by a major EU-funded initiative, Ukraine2EU,” said former Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Olha Stefanishyna in an interview following her resignation. She confirmed the programme includes an ambitious objective: to complete legal harmonisation by 2027. Stefanishyna is to take soon the post of Ambassador of Ukraine to the U.S.

European Pravda spoke with representatives of the Ukraine2EU project to find out how is the country is preparing for accession in practice, and what happens if, against the backdrop of recent political developments, accession talks are delayed.

Among the revelations: the government is conducting “mock sessions” of negotiations with simulated EU panels, and support is being extended to think tanks and NGOs working on accession-related issues.

A quiet start to formal accession

Anyone following Ukraine’s European integration efforts knows that Kyiv is pushing hard to open the first “clusters” of accession negotiations. Yet, paradoxically, the talks have already begun – albeit in a form few have noticed.

Since early 2025, Ukraine and the EU have been quietly conducting a chapter-by-chapter screening of Ukraine’s legal framework against EU law. This technical but crucial process is a preliminary phase of formal negotiations.

The screening involves a detailed review of Ukrainian laws to identify divergences from the acquis. Once the EU agrees to open relevant clusters and chapters, a process of continuous benchmarking will begin, based on the screening reports. Was requirement No. XY fulfilled? Are the legislative changes passed by Ukraine’s parliament or government sufficient to ensure compliance in a specific sector? Are the laws implemented as they would be in an EU member state?

These ongoing discussions – rather than traditional bilateral haggling, are what constitutes EU accession negotiations.

A chapter can only be provisionally closed once the EU agrees that Ukraine has fully implemented the required legal and institutional reforms.

Understanding the technical, legalistic nature of the process will be key to its success. European partners are now actively working to change perceptions about the nature of accession. While many officials already grasp this, a large part of Ukraine’s political and administrative class still equates the process with the softer, more flexible Association Agreement.

“That mindset is changing but slowly,” said Mante Makauskaite, head of the Ukraine2EU project. “Many Ukrainians still think in terms of ‘approximation’ with EU law. But accession requires full harmonisation. With few exceptions, Ukraine must fully adopt the EU acquis, not merely align with it.”

Ukraine is not unique in this. All candidate countries have undergone a similar realisation. Lithuania, which now leads Ukraine’s technical support team, once benefited from Denmark’s assistance in its own accession process. Sweden mentored Latvia, and Finland gave a hand to Estonia.

Simulating negotiations and building capacity

The Ukraine2EU project is designed to support Ukraine throughout the entire negotiation process – with assistance tailored to Kyiv’s requests.

“We work with all key Ukrainian institutions involved in accession. If they ask for help that aligns with the process, we respond,” said Makauskaite.

One of the most innovative tools developed under the project are so-called “mock sessions”, simulated negotiation meetings.

Before each screening session with the European Commission, Ukrainian officials gather in the same configuration they would use in Brussels. Opposite them sits a “fake” Commission – played by moderators and experts. This rehearsal format allows Ukraine to test its presentations, receive feedback, and improve its documentation ahead of the real sessions.

“These simulations are run exactly like real meetings with the Commission. We bring in national and international experts, a moderator, and we give detailed feedback on Ukraine’s materials – presentations, questionnaires, everything,” explained Makauskaite.

The demand for such sessions is high. By June, Ukraine2EU had helped Ukraine prepare for bilateral screening sessions across 13 negotiation chapters, with 20 to 100 participants per mock session.

Ukraine2EU is also supporting Kyiv in drafting its negotiating position for selected clusters – a crucial document that Ukraine must prepare before talks open. This is being done at Ukraine’s request, and the input of European experts is carefully coordinated.

The project also contributes to the drafting of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) – the internal roadmap for legal harmonisation. Though not legally required, this document has become standard practice among candidate states. Its weight is immense – especially for Ukraine, which aims to complete legal alignment by 2027.

The NPAA is a detailed domestic work plan listing EU legal acts to be transposed into national law, along with deadlines. This is the document cited by officials when referencing Ukraine’s 2027 membership readiness goal.

Ambitious? “Our programme is set for three years – unless Ukraine joins the EU sooner,” quipped Makauskaite.

Is there a conflict of interest?

One might ask: how can EU-funded experts help Ukraine prepare for negotiations with the EU? Isn’t that a conflict of interest?

It’s a fair question, Makauskaite acknowledged: “A Ukrainian colleague once asked why we should trust international experts. My answer is simple: trust depends on choosing the right people. There are EU member states that genuinely want Ukraine to succeed. Lithuania is one of them.”

“Experts from such countries can share experience and enrich domestic discussions in Ukraine – both in government and civil society,” she added.

And indeed, competition between Ukraine and countries like Lithuania is negligible. Lithuania has consistently backed Ukraine’s EU bid, both politically and practically.

Ukraine2EU also draws on experience from the Balkans. Drita Abdiu-Halili, a former deputy chief negotiator for North Macedonia, is among the experts involved. Her view: “The Commission doesn’t play the role of adversary. It acts as an advocate for candidate countries before the member states, and as the guardian of the process.”

Brussels, she added, doesn’t just hand over a to-do list and walk away. It pairs requirements with concrete support: “EU funding and technical assistance are embedded in the process.”

Beyond government: civil society’s vital role

Crucially, Ukraine must also build strong institutions. That includes deciding what tasks the state should keep – and what it can outsource.

In 2022, Kyiv managed to complete the EU’s detailed candidate questionnaire in record time. It did so thanks to input from NGO experts with deep European policy knowledge. Three years on, Ukraine continues to rely on non-government actors.

The EU is not used to this model – but has not objected. Ukraine2EU is even preparing a grants scheme for NGOs working on EU accession topics.

“Ukrainian civil society is one of the most impressive mysteries I’ve encountered,” said Makauskaite. “In some areas, NGOs are more capable than consultancies.”

Still, no external support can replace the fundamental requirement: a government able and willing to join the EU.

“As member states see it, EU accession is about whether your government can function as an EU member,” Makauskaite concluded.

European partners are ready to help. But it is Ukraine that must walk the walk.

A longer version in Ukrainian of this article by Sergiy Sydorenko, the chief editor of European Pravda, can be found here.

Caption: Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs Olha Stefanishyna (C) poses with European affairs ministers and representatives at the start of the first meeting of the Conference on Accession of Ukraine to the European Union in Luxembourg, 25 June 2024. The meeting follows a decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET