EditInside Orbán’s Kremlin connection: should EU trigger Article 7 and suspend Hungary’s voting rights?
Investigative findings detail economic, energy, and cultural deals with Russia amounting to high treason to EU interests
With Hungary’s voters heading to the polls on 12 April, verified journalistic investigations and leaked audio recordings have depicted a shocking picture of systematic alignment between Budapest and the Kremlin. The consortium includes VSquare, FRONTSTORY, Delfi Estonia, The Insider, and the Jan Kuciak Investigative Centre.
The long-dominant Prime Minister Viktor Orbán faces his most formidable challenge in 16 years. Polls show his Fidesz party trailing significantly behind the opposition Tisza party, led by Péter Magyar, a former insider turned fierce critic.
At the heart of the heated campaign lies Hungary’s foreign policy: Orbán’s persistent outreach to Russia, even as the EU imposes sanctions over Moscow’s war in Ukraine. This has prompted debate over whether the European Union should invoke Article 7 of the EU Treaty, the so-called “nuclear option”, to suspend Hungary’s voting rights for persistently breaching core values like the rule of law and solidarity among member states.
The European Commission has been unequivocal in its assessment of Russia as a partner. Responding to reports of a fresh bilateral pact, deputy chief spokesperson Arianna Podestà stated that the Kremlin has proven unreliable, particularly in the energy sector where it has repeatedly weaponized supplies. “Our views on Russia’s reliability are very clear – it’s an unreliable partner,” she said, declining further comment without full specifics but underscoring a pattern of broken commitments.
The December pact: broadening cooperation beyond politics
One of the most striking pieces of evidence emerged this week in the form of a 12-point cooperation plan signed in December 2025 during a meeting in Moscow. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Russian Health Minister Mikhail Murashko formalized an agreement under the Russian-Hungarian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation. The document, drawn up by Russian authorities and obtained by Politico, outlines expanded joint efforts across a wide array of fields: bilateral trade and economic ties, energy (including nuclear power), industry, healthcare, agriculture, construction, as well as cultural and humanitarian initiatives. Specific plans include deepening collaboration in nuclear fuel, increasing the presence of Russian language teachers and graduate students in Hungary, and forging new partnerships between sports teams and universities.
This pact arrives at a sensitive moment. Hungary continues to rely heavily on Russian energy imports, resisting broader EU efforts to phase them out by 2027. Orbán’s government has long argued that such dependence serves national interests, shielding Hungarian households from higher costs. Critics, however, see it as a deliberate choice that weakens collective European leverage against Moscow. The agreement’s timing, just months before the election, has fueled accusations that Orbán is doubling down on an eastward tilt to secure economic and political breathing room, even as Western allies urge greater alignment.
Szijjártó has defended the engagement as pragmatic, driven by Hungary’s need for energy security and trade diversification rather than ideological affinity. Yet the breadth of the deal, spanning education and culture alongside strategic sectors like nuclear energy, suggests a relationship that goes beyond transactional dealings. It underscores how Budapest positions itself as a bridge – or, in the eyes of detractors, a conduit – for Russian influence within EU structures.
Leaked calls reveal coordinated undermining of EU positions
Beyond the formal agreement, a series of leaked phone conversations between Szijjártó and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov provide even more granular insight into the dynamics at play. Recorded between 2023 and 2025 and independently verified by investigative journalists, the calls depict Szijjártó regularly briefing Lavrov on internal EU discussions, seeking approval for Hungarian maneuvers, and even offering to share sensitive documents.
In one exchange from December 2023, during a European Council meeting on opening accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, Szijjártó stepped out to update Lavrov in real time. Lavrov reportedly endorsed Hungary’s hardball tactics, describing “well-intentioned direct blackmail” as effective, though in this instance, Orbán ultimately left the room to allow the decision to pass unanimously while Hungary abstained. Similar patterns repeated in later calls, including efforts to ease EU sanctions on Russian oligarchs and entities. Szijjártó is heard coordinating to push for the removal of specific names from sanctions lists and working to blunt the impact of new packages targeting Russian companies and banks.
One particularly telling moment came in July 2024, shortly after Orbán met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv and just before a NATO summit. Szijjártó contacted Lavrov to relay details of the encounter and inquired whether Putin would receive Orbán in Russia beforehand. The discussion touched on Hungary’s rotating EU Council presidency, with Szijjártó noting how Orbán’s dual role enhanced his leverage. Lavrov, in turn, probed for information on minority rights issues in Ukraine, a longstanding Kremlin talking point, and received assurances that Szijjártó would forward relevant documents via embassy channels – a move amounting to high treason with respect to EU interests.
Master and servant
Intelligence sources quoted in the investigations have described the relationship as unusually deferential, likening it at times to that of an “agent and leading officer” rather than peer foreign ministers. Others frame Szijjártó as a “useful idiot” advancing Moscow’s interests unwittingly. Either interpretation highlights Hungary’s role as what some EU officials call a “fifth column” in Brussels: a member state actively softening pressure on Russia while extracting concessions on funds and policy.
Additional details come from an October 2025 phone call between Orbán and Putin, the transcript of which was reviewed by Bloomberg. Orbán reportedly told the Russian leader, “In any matter where I can be of assistance, I am at your service,” invoking a fable of a mouse aiding a trapped lion to illustrate Hungary’s willingness to help despite its smaller size. Putin reportedly praised Hungary’s “independent and flexible” stance on the war in Ukraine. The call ended on a personal note, with banter about exercise and sports.
These revelations have intensified during the campaign. Orbán accuses Magyar and the opposition of being Brussels puppets who would drag Hungary into conflict and sever vital Russian energy links. Magyar, conversely, has called for investigations into potential treason over the government’s Kremlin connections and vows to reorient Hungary firmly toward Western institutions, reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
External interference and the question of Article 7
The scandals unfold against a backdrop of alleged external meddling. Reports suggest Russian intelligence officers and “political technologists” are active in Hungary, spreading narratives that frame a Fidesz defeat as a path to war and instability. On the other side, U.S. Vice President JD Vance visited Budapest this week, openly endorsing Orbán as “one of the few true statesmen in Europe” and criticizing EU and Ukrainian attempts to influence the vote. Vance rallied alongside Orbán, with President Donald Trump joining via speakerphone to praise the Hungarian leader.
This convergence of Russian and American support for Orbán, however distinct their motivations, has globalized what might otherwise remain a domestic contest in a country of 9.5 million. Right-wing figures worldwide watch closely, viewing Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” model as inspirational or cautionary.
For the EU, the accumulated evidence revives long-standing frustrations. Hungary has repeatedly blocked or delayed decisions on Ukraine aid, sanctions enforcement, and rule-of-law mechanisms, leading to the freezing of over €22 billion in cohesion funds. The European Court of Justice has imposed fines, including €200 million over refugee policies. Critics argue that Orbán’s actions systematically erode trust and solidarity.
The question now is whether this pattern justifies triggering Article 7, which could ultimately strip Hungary of its voting rights in the Council if a unanimous determination (excluding the accused state) finds a serious and persistent breach of EU values. Past attempts have faltered due to the high threshold and political reluctance to isolate a member so severely. Proponents say the latest leaks – demonstrating active collusion with an aggressor state – cross a new line. Opponents warn that such a move would backfire, fueling populist resentment and playing into Orbán’s narrative of Brussels overreach.
As Hungarians prepare to cast their ballots, the stakes extend far beyond one nation’s government. Whether Article 7 becomes a tool or remains a dormant threat will depend on the political will in Brussels after April 12, and on how the new Hungarian leadership chooses to engage with both the EU and the Kremlin.
With Reuters, The Guardian, Politico, The New York Times
Kremlin shadow over Budapest: Russia’s multifaceted push to secure Orbán’s hold on power
Caption: Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) and Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto shake hands before a meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, 04 February 2026. EPA/MIKHAIL METZEL / SPUTNIK / KREMLIN POOL
Updated: April 9, 2026 - 10:30
